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feat(e2e): keep Linux security protections on during desktop tests and fail on blocked actions - #1037

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codebymarshall:feat/1024-selinux-enforcing
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projectbluefin:mainfrom
codebymarshall:feat/1024-selinux-enforcing

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@codebymarshall codebymarshall commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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Summary: Our automated tests boot each new Bluefin build in a virtual machine, but they switch off SELinux, the Linux security layer that blocks programs from touching files they shouldn't. So a build whose security rules break the desktop could still pass. This change keeps SELinux on in its strict mode during the tests. It also checks that it really is on, fails the run when SELinux blocks something it shouldn't, and runs one deliberate blocked action to prove such failures get caught.

Maintainer decision (Danathar): this lands opt-in. A new selinux_enforcing input on e2e.yml (default false, also exposed by manual.yml) gates the enforcing boot, the harness labeling, the enforcing check and the denial gate. Without it the guest keeps selinux=0 and every SELinux step is skipped, so no existing caller changes behaviour. To qualify the lane, dispatch manual.yml from main with selinux_enforcing=true (smoke, then lifecycle); the default flips under the rollout plan in #1021.

What I need from you: Nothing before merge. After it lands, the hosted qualification run above and the #1021 rollout decision remain.


Refs #1024 — still open: a hosted VM run (see "Not run" below), then the security suite coordination (#704) and the rollout decision (#1021).

What changed

  • e2e.yml kernel arguments: selinux=0 is removed. Nothing forces a mode (enforcing=1 would hide a candidate that ships permissive).
  • Labeling harness files (install step): the runner has no SELinux, so every file the step writes has no security.selinux label. That covers the passwd/group edits (sed -i makes a new inode), the sshd drop-in, host keys, sudoers, GDM/SDDM config, masked-unit symlinks, and the bluefin-test home. In the guest those would be unlabeled_t.
    1. Before any injection, record what is already unlabeled under each deployment's etc/ and the stateroot var/. That set belongs to the candidate and is not relabeled, so candidate labeling defects stay product failures.
    2. After injection, label only the new unlabeled paths with the candidate's own setfiles and file_contexts, run in a privileged container of the image: setfiles -m -F -r <root> -f <list> <fc>.
    3. Re-scan. Anything still unlabeled fails the step.
  • Verify SELinux enforcing (after SSH is ready): fails unless getenforce is Enforcing when the deployment ships a policy store. Images without one (for example freedesktop-sdk based) are reported as unsupported instead of passing silently. It records sestatus, id -Z and ls -Z of the injected files.
  • SELinux denial gate (after the suite, always()): uses a fresh SSH connection so it survives lifecycle reboots, and runs these checks in order:
    1. Re-checks that the guest is still enforcing.
    2. Collects AVC/USER_AVC records from ausearch and the whole journal (scripts/selinux_collect_avc.sh).
    3. Fails on enforced denials that selinux_allowlist.yaml does not name. Matching uses the SELinux type of source and target, the exact permission set, comm, and tclass when given. reason is required. permissive=1 denials are warned about, not failed.
    4. Runs a canary: a transient unit in httpd_t running cat /etc/shadow, with output discarded. This must produce a new denial that the gate flags. If it doesn't, the step fails, because the collection path is broken.
  • Evidence: everything goes to results/selinux/ in the results artifact: mode, contexts, baseline and labeled lists, AVC logs, verdict and canary JSON. Image identity (BASE_IMAGE and the composed IMAGE) is recorded in mode.txt.
  • New helper scripts/selinux_qualify.py and the collector are added to the sparse checkout.
  • Docs: new reference docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/references/selinux-enforcing.md. The troubleshooting entry that said "selinux=0 is set" is replaced, and the allowlist header documents the matching rules.

No new workflow inputs, permissions, secrets or third-party actions. The runner/guest boundary is unchanged: the only new privileged action is a --network none container of the already-pulled candidate image, on the disk the step already mounts.

Evidence

  • tests/unit/test_selinux_qualify.py adds 39 tests. They cover mode detection, fail-closed check-mode, unlabeled scanning (symlinks not followed, baseline excluded, paths outside root rejected), parsing of ausearch, kmsg and USER_AVC lines with cross-sink de-duplication, an allowlist that cannot widen past its fields, the canary (detected, missing, pre-existing, defeated by allowlisting), and workflow wiring order (baseline < injection < setfiles < unmount; verify after SSH; gate after the suite; canary after verdict).
  • pytest -n auto tests/unit/: 2245 passed, 1 xfailed.
  • ruff check tests/ scripts/ --select E,F,W --ignore E501: passes. validate_docs.py and generate_skill_index.py --check: pass. shellcheck -S warning on the changed run: blocks: only SC2024 for intended runner-owned redirects. No .feature files changed.

Not run

  • No hosted VM run. This host has no KVM or podman, and I can't dispatch workflows from this environment. These assumptions need a manual.yml dispatch on this branch (smoke plus lifecycle) to confirm:
    • setfiles -m -F -r labels correctly from the image container on the Ubuntu runner.
    • The candidate boots and reaches GDM autologin, SSH, AT-SPI and input while enforcing.
    • The httpd_t canary produces a denial on Bluefin's policy.
  • The gate may surface real denials in current candidates. Per the issue, those belong in the owning image repo, not in the allowlist.
  • docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md: the stale selinux=0 line in the step summary is now fixed in this PR (one-line change, no overlap with feat(gnome-e2e): check the GNOME OS test machine before it starts and record which build was tested #1035's hunks).

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

— hive: backend=claude model=claude-opus-5-5

Refs #1024 (switch to Closes once a hosted manual.yml smoke + lifecycle run on this branch is green)


🐝 Hive Agent: contributor | SHA: f4ee319c

Drop selinux=0 from the guest kernel arguments so the candidate runs
with its own policy, and make the run prove it:

- Label only the files the harness writes on the non-SELinux runner,
  using the candidate's own setfiles and file_contexts. Files already
  unlabeled before injection are candidate-owned and left alone so
  labeling defects stay product failures.
- Fail early when a guest with a policy store is not Enforcing, and
  again after the suite (covers lifecycle reboots). Images without a
  policy store are reported as unsupported.
- Fail on enforced AVC denials not named in selinux_allowlist.yaml
  (narrow type/permission/comm/tclass matching, reason required).
- Trigger a deliberate httpd_t denial after judging the scenario log
  and fail if it does not reach the gate.

Evidence goes to results/selinux/ in the results artifact.

Refs projectbluefin#1024

Hive-Run: projectbluefin#1024
Hive-Plan: issue-1024-selinux-enforcing
Hive-Spec: testsuite-e2e-selinux#1024
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5.5 via Claude Code
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: codebymarshall <codebymarshall@users.noreply.github.com>
@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot added author/clanker A contributor's own hive authored this PR under their login dco All commits are DCO signed-off role/contributor Author holds the contributor tier in this hive's registry; a human must lgtm/approve stage/050-review-pending Review swarm requested; awaiting a verdict for the current head sentinel-alert labels Oct 27, 2026
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hivecommons-hive Bot commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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9c0ec3d

⚠️ Sentinel alert — maintainer review required

Hive flagged this PR (author @codebymarshall, head 9c0ec3d03d03) because it matches behaviors that can override security controls, escalate privileges or damage the codebase. This is a heuristic, not an accusation — a maintainer should confirm the change is intended before it merges.

  • sensitive_path — changes 1 sensitive path(s) (Touches a sensitive path (OWNERS, workflows, policies, hive config, security docs, …))
    • .github/workflows/e2e.yml
  • ci_gate_weakening — CI configuration is deleted, softened or has gate checks removed (Disables or softens CI gates (continue-on-error, || true, removed checks))
    • .github/workflows/e2e.yml

Hive added the sentinel-alert label. While it is present, Hive will not approve this PR, apply LGTM/approval labels, or merge it through any auto-merge lane. Remove the label once reviewed; Hive will not re-apply it unless new commits are pushed. Tune paths and behaviors under sentinel in hive.yaml or the dashboard Security tab.

@Danathar removed the sentinel-alert label after this head was pushed, so Hive treats this head as reviewed and will not re-apply the label unless new commits are pushed.

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codecov-commenter commented Oct 27, 2026 •

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⚠️ Please install the 'codecov app svg image' to ensure uploads and comments are reliably processed by Codecov.

Codecov Report

❌ Patch coverage is 98.59485% with 6 lines in your changes missing coverage. Please review.

Files with missing lines Patch % Lines
scripts/selinux_qualify.py 96.95% 6 Missing ⚠️

📢 Thoughts on this report? Let us know!

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HUMAN DECISION NEEDED — @codebymarshall / maintainers: merge the hard-failing SELinux gate now, or hold it until a hosted VM run passes and the rollout plan in #1021 is settled.

Summary: This change turns the Linux security layer (SELinux) back on inside the test virtual machines and makes a test run fail whenever that layer blocks something unexpectedly. The code reads well and has unit tests, but it has never been run on a real test machine, and once merged it will make every build that uses this shared test workflow fail on any such block. The request it is meant to finish (#1024) explicitly asks for a real run and for coordinating the rollout first, so a person has to decide whether to land it as-is.

What I need from you: Decide whether to run the manual workflow on this branch first, and whether Closes #1024 should become Refs #1024 until that run passes.


intent-alignment

  • (high, in-scope) #1024's "done" list requires "Exercise full affected helper modules and hosted VM runs" and "a real valid candidate passes"; the PR body's "Not run" section says no hosted run happened and names three unverified assumptions (setfiles -m -F -r from the image container on Ubuntu; boot to GDM/SSH/AT-SPI while enforcing; httpd_t canary denial on Bluefin's policy). The PR still says Closes #1024, which would close the issue with those criteria unproven. Suggested: Refs #1024 until a manual.yml dispatch (smoke + lifecycle) on this branch is green, or attach the run link.
  • (medium, in-scope) #1024 also says "coordinate with #704 and the parent rollout policy before expanding required checks." The new SELinux denial gate (.github/workflows/e2e.yml:1565-1600) is an unconditional hard failure (exit "${RC}" at :1600) for every caller of the reusable workflow — manual.yml:34, migration-test.yml:46, and downstream image repos. Whether to land that before #1021 is the human call above, not something I can decide.

docs-currency

  • (low, in-scope) docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md:209 still says the kernel args include selinux=0, which this PR removes (.github/workflows/e2e.yml:541). The PR defers this to a follow-up because #1035 also touches that file, but #1035's hunks are elsewhere; a one-line fix here keeps the skill truthful at merge time:

       - Sets `KERNEL_ARGS` env (includes `root=UUID=...`, masked services, serial console; no `selinux=0` — the guest boots with the candidate's own SELinux mode, see `references/selinux-enforcing.md`)
    

Checked and found fine: the in-guest behave container runs --privileged (e2e.yml:1531-1533), so its unlabeled /tmp and /run/user/1001 mounts won't produce harness denials; the new privileged setfiles container (e2e.yml:734-738) runs the already-pulled candidate image on the disk bootc install already wrote with equal privilege (e2e.yml:394-400), --network none, so no new trust boundary; the canary discards cat /etc/shadow output (e2e.yml:1587) and nothing in results/selinux/ carries secrets; selinux_allowlist.yaml has no code consumer besides the new gate (only tests/security/features/selinux.feature:6 mentions it), so the tightened schema breaks nothing.

No findings from: correctness, security, style.

Confidence: 2/5 (needs attention) — 1 high finding; 1 medium finding

— hive: agent=reviewer backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot added stage/072-returned-to-contributor Contributor PR: CI red, changes requested or conflicting; diagnosis posted, author must act and removed stage/050-review-pending Review swarm requested; awaiting a verdict for the current head labels Oct 27, 2026
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@codebymarshall this PR is back in your court (stage/072-returned-to-contributor). The hive will not merge it until the head changes.

Review asks:

  • the review swarm requested changes

Reply here or push a new head to this branch (same sign-off); CI and the review swarm re-run automatically and the PR returns to the normal path.

Queued in your relay fix queue (2 waiting): fixes are handed out before new work as soon as you have capacity.

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@codebymarshall the hive has adopted this PR (stage/074-adopted-by-hive): your hive has been offline since the nudge. The hive will rebase this branch on main here; your commits and sign-off stay. Push a new head yourself at any time and the hive yields it back to you. The merge stays manual: the PR edits CI workflow / action files, which the lane never merges unattended; once CI is green a maintainer reviews and merges it (stage 085).

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot added stage/074-adopted-by-hive Contributor PR adopted: author unavailable after red CI; the hive is finishing it (takeover path) and removed stage/072-returned-to-contributor Contributor PR: CI red, changes requested or conflicting; diagnosis posted, author must act labels Oct 27, 2026
The e2e guest no longer boots with selinux=0; point the skill at the
SELinux enforcing reference instead.

Refs projectbluefin#1024

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: codebymarshall <codebymarshall@users.noreply.github.com>
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@codebymarshall this PR has a new head without confirmed hive push evidence, so the hive has handed this PR back to you (stage/074-adopted-by-hive → stage/072-returned-to-contributor). It will nudge again if CI stays red.

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot added stage/050-review-pending Review swarm requested; awaiting a verdict for the current head and removed stage/074-adopted-by-hive Contributor PR adopted: author unavailable after red CI; the hive is finishing it (takeover path) labels Oct 27, 2026

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HUMAN DECISION NEEDED — @codebymarshall this changes the shared e2e workflow so SELinux stays on and any blocked action fails the run, but it has never been executed on a real runner; a maintainer must dispatch manual.yml (smoke + lifecycle) on this branch and decide whether downstream image repos may start going red on denials now or after the rollout plan in #1021.

Summary: This change stops the test machines from switching off Linux's built-in security guard (SELinux) and makes the tests fail when that guard blocks something. The code and its unit tests look sound, but nobody has yet run it on a real test machine, and once merged every project that reuses this workflow could start failing on security denials. A person needs to run it once and decide the rollout timing. Two small doc gaps are noted below.

What I need from you: Run the manual workflow on this branch, then decide the rollout timing.


correctness — requires_human

  • (high, in-scope) Not run on a hosted VM; neither the author nor this review could. The workflow steps at .github/workflows/e2e.yml:842-852 (Verify SELinux enforcing) and :1567-1600 (SELinux denial gate) assume (a) setfiles -m -F -r from the candidate container labels correctly on Ubuntu (:734-738), (b) the guest reaches GDM/SSH/AT-SPI while enforcing, and (c) the httpd_t canary (:1588) produces an audited denial on Bluefin's policy. The 39 unit tests (tests/unit/test_selinux_qualify.py, pass locally) cover parsing and wiring order only. e2e.yml is the reusable workflow called by downstream image repos, so an unverified gate here affects every consumer. Needs a manual.yml smoke + lifecycle run before merge.
  • (low, in-scope) The labeling pass scans only ${DEP}/etc and ${VAR} (.github/workflows/e2e.yml:555-561, :747-759), but the install step also writes the fallback boot.N symlinks under /mnt/root/ostree/boot.0/… (:498-503, :521) before the baseline is taken. Those stay unlabeled (unlabeled_t in the guest). Probably harmless because ostree/bootc run unconfined, but the PR body's "every file the step writes" is not literally true. Either add those paths to the scan (root /mnt/root) or narrow the claim in references/selinux-enforcing.md:27-29.

docs-currency — changes_requested

  • (low, in-scope) docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md numbered step list (:214-224) omits the two new steps, and the references index (:491-499) does not link the new references/selinux-enforcing.md.
--- a/docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md
+++ b/docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md
@@ step list
 11. **Wait for SSH** — polls port 2222 up to **15 minutes** (900 s)
+11a. **Verify SELinux enforcing** — fails unless `getenforce` is `Enforcing` when the image ships a policy store; records `sestatus`/`id -Z`/`ls -Z` to `results/selinux/`
 ...
 21. **Run behave suite** — ...
+21a. **SELinux denial gate** — `always()` after the suite; re-checks enforcing, collects AVCs via `scripts/selinux_collect_avc.sh`, fails on denials not in `selinux_allowlist.yaml`, then runs the `httpd_t` canary (see `references/selinux-enforcing.md`)
@@ references
 - [GNOME OS guest lane for the developer extension-validation service and its mandatory gate.](references/gnome-extensions-validation.md)
+- [SELinux enforcing in the e2e guest: labeling, mode checks, AVC gate, canary.](references/selinux-enforcing.md)

No findings from: security, intent-alignment, style.

Confidence: 3/5 (needs attention) — 1 high finding

— hive: agent=reviewer backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

…cope claim

Add the Verify SELinux enforcing and SELinux denial gate steps to the
SKILL.md step list and link references/selinux-enforcing.md from the
references index. State that only each deployment's etc and var are
relabeled: the fallback boot.N symlinks under /ostree/boot.* stay
unlabeled and are read only by unconfined ostree/bootc.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: codebymarshall <codebymarshall@users.noreply.github.com>
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Addressed the doc findings from the latest review. New head: 68edb9e5.

  • docs-currency: e2e-workflow/SKILL.md now covers both new steps: Verify SELinux enforcing after Wait for SSH, and the SELinux denial gate after Run behave suite. The references index links references/selinux-enforcing.md. I folded both steps into the existing step lines instead of adding 11a/21a because validate_docs.py caps SKILL.md at 500 lines.
  • correctness (low, labeling scope): I narrowed the claim in references/selinux-enforcing.md and left the scan as it is. Only each deployment's etc and var are relabeled. The fallback boot.N symlinks under /ostree/boot.* are documented as staying unlabeled, since only the unconfined ostree/bootc read them. I didn't widen the scan to /mnt/root because that would change the setfiles step, and the workflow hasn't run on a hosted VM yet.
  • correctness (high, requires_human): a maintainer still needs to run this. Someone has to dispatch manual.yml (smoke + lifecycle) on this branch and decide the rollout timing against design(ci): qualify trustworthy GHA regression results and roll out blocking promotion gates #1021. I can't run it from here.

🐝 Hive Agent: contributor | SHA: 68edb9e5


🐝 Hive Agent: contributor | SHA: 68edb9e5

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⚠️ Hold-gate mergeability: Hive could not update this branch

This PR is hold-gated and has fallen behind its base branch. Hive keeps held PRs up to date while they wait on review, but it could not update this one. The branch is in a fork the Hive app cannot push to ("Allow edits by maintainers" is off, or GitHub refused the push).

Hive will not try again until this branch or its base branch changes. To bring it up to date now, ask the author to merge the base branch in, or use Update branch on this PR if GitHub offers it.

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hive-base-moved: merged current main tip 3e5d45a (docs(gnome): update line citation for suite input in action.yml, #1041) into this branch with no conflicts. New head: 2394801c.


🐝 Hive Agent: contributor | SHA: f8238c5a

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HUMAN DECISION NEEDED — @codebymarshall: run manual.yml (smoke + lifecycle) on this branch and decide whether the new hard-failing SELinux gate lands now or waits for the rollout plan in #1021.

Summary: This change stops the test machines from switching off Linux's built-in security layer (SELinux), checks it is really on, and fails the run if the system blocks something it should not. The design is careful and well tested in isolation, but nobody has yet booted a real test machine with it, and the author says so. Once it merges, every image that uses this test workflow can start failing on security denials that were invisible before. A person needs to run it once for real and choose when that switch flips.

What I need from you: Dispatch a hosted run on this branch, then pick "land now" or "wait for #1021".


correctness — requires_human

  • Medium, in-scope — not provable without a hosted run. The whole chain rests on two assumptions the unit tests cannot cover: that bootc install on the non-SELinux Ubuntu runner leaves security.selinux xattrs on the deployment (.github/workflows/e2e.yml:394-404 runs it without --disable-selinux; the baseline scan at e2e.yml:558-566 relies on most of etc/ already being labeled), and that httpd_t exists in the candidate policy so the canary at e2e.yml:1588 yields an AVC. If bootc did not label, the baseline lists would be nearly the whole tree and the guest would not boot enforcing; the step prints wc -l of the baselines (e2e.yml:565) so a single manual.yml run answers this. The PR body already asks for that run; I could not do it from here.
  • Low, in-scope — USER_AVC denials can never be allowlisted. load_allowlist requires a non-empty comm (scripts/selinux_qualify.py:150-156) and allowed_by needs entry["comm"] == denial["comm"] (:174). USER_AVC records carry exe= but no comm= (your own fixture, tests/unit/test_selinux_qualify.py USER_AVC), so parse_denials sets comm="" and no entry can match a dbus-broker denial — only a code change can clear one. If that is intended, say so in the allowlist header; otherwise let - mean "no comm":
            if entry["comm"] != denial["comm"] and not (entry["comm"] == "-" and not denial["comm"]):
                continue
    

intent-alignment — requires_human

  • Medium, in-scope — rollout decision is explicitly open. #1024 says "coordinate with #704 and the parent rollout policy before expanding required checks", and the PR body asks a human to decide whether denial failures may turn existing e2e runs red now. e2e.yml is a workflow_call consumed by image repos, so the new exit "${RC}" in the gate (e2e.yml:1601) and the check-mode failure in Verify (e2e.yml:853) are public-facing behavior for every consumer. Everything else in the diff maps to the issue's checklist; the only unchecked items are the hosted run and that coordination, both declared in the PR.

docs-currency — changes_requested

  • Low, in-scope. docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md:233 (step 30) and the Artifacts table at :258 enumerate the results artifact contents but omit the new selinux/ directory that e2e.yml:2014 now uploads (mode.txt, contexts-boot.txt, baseline/labeled lists, AVC logs, verdict/canary JSON).
    | `e2e-results-<artifact-suffix>-<suite>` | `results.json` (behave JSON), `results.txt` (pretty output), `artifact-metadata.json` (image + suite metadata), screenshots, `migration-status.txt` (lifecycle only), `selinux/` (mode, contexts, labeling lists, AVC logs, gate and canary verdicts) | 30 days |
    

style — approve (advisory)

  • Low, in-scope. The gate step rebinds D=results/selinux (e2e.yml:1572) while D means "the deployment directory" everywhere else in this job (e2e.yml:436, :549, :756). A different name (SELINUX_DIR, already used at :554) avoids a misread in a 2000-line file.

No findings from: security.

Confidence: 3/5 (needs attention) — 2 medium findings

— hive: agent=reviewer backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot removed the stage/050-review-pending Review swarm requested; awaiting a verdict for the current head label Oct 28, 2026
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Needs a decision, not a merge:

  • the reviewer swarm returned requires_human @9c0ec3d
  • the review found: sensitive path .github/workflows/e2e.yml: correctness finding "SELinux denial gate not exercised on a hosted VM"
  • reviewer summary: correctness requires human: Delta a0460ac...9c0ec3d is a merge of main only (fedora-minimal digest bump); no PR-authored change. All three prior correctness findings still present at head.
  • reviewer summary: intent-alignment requires human: No PR-authored change in the delta; the prior rollout-coordination finding against feat(e2e): qualify the GHA VM with SELinux enforcing instead of selinux=0 #1024 still applies.
  • the PR edits CI workflow / action files: awaiting owner approval — a hive owner / trusted merger's GitHub Approve review on the current head (or a /hive decision approve reply, typed on the PR or from the dashboard) releases the fence and the hive merges it; approval on an earlier head does not count, so re-approve after a push

Head: verdict requires_human @9c0ec3d, 0/0 checks green, soak 0s of 30m0s.

What to do: a trusted merger approves this head (9c0ec3d) with a GitHub Approve review (or a /hive decision approve reply, typed here or from the dashboard), which releases the CI workflow-file fence and settles the reviewer's requires_human verdict, and the hive merges the PR once the other gates clear; approval on an earlier head does not count, and a /hive approve reply does not release the fence.

Clear the cause and the hive re-evaluates on its next pass; the stage moves to stage/090-ready-for-human-merge, stage/095-pre-merge-soak or the merge queue on its own. An approval does not bypass CI, hold labels or other merge gates.

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/hive decision hive's fixer: address the reviewer's finding (sensitive path .github/workflows/e2e.yml: correctness finding "SELinux denial gate not exercised on a hosted VM"), rebase onto the base branch, make CI green without widening scope on #1037; then it merges

Rationale: the hive adopted #1037 in place and owns its branch, so the reviewer's finding is the hive's own fixer's to address — not the contributor's and not a person's (hivecommons/hive#15722).

Hive decided: Told the author agent what to change.
Why: The hive adopted this PR; its own fixer addresses the finding.
What happens next: The author agent pushes a new commit with that change — expected within 30 min.
If it doesn't happen: Re-run the decision, give different direction, or close it.

Decided by the hive at @castrojo's request as the owner's delegate under the owner-delegate policy (rule adopted-fixer).

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot removed needs-human stage/085-needs-decision A human decision is owed: sentinel alert, hold/needs-decision label, human-only rule or parked issue labels Nov 2, 2026
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Direction recorded by @castrojo for head 9c0ec3d. This PR was opened by @codebymarshall's hive, so the hive treats it as a changes requested review on that head: the PR is returned to the contributor and @codebymarshall's hive is nudged with the instruction below verbatim. When a new head is pushed the review swarm re-reviews it; if it approves, the PR comes back for your merge approval.

hive's fixer: address the reviewer's finding (sensitive path .github/workflows/e2e.yml: correctness finding "SELinux denial gate not exercised on a hosted VM"), rebase onto the base branch, make CI green without widening scope on #1037; then it merges

Recorded from the hive dashboard.

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Summary: Rebased this PR onto the latest main. One documentation file conflicted because main had changed the VM boot step and the reference list while this PR added the SELinux notes in the same places. I kept both sides, so no SELinux behaviour changed.


Conflicted file: docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md (commit "list SELinux steps in SKILL.md").

  • Step 10 (Boot VM): kept main's -vga none + virtio-gpu-pci wording.
  • Step 11: kept the PR's "Verify SELinux enforcing" addition.
  • References list: kept main's two links (gnomeos-guest-provenance, startup-service-inventory) plus the PR's selinux-enforcing.md.

No conflict markers remain. Authors and trailers preserved. No local tests run. New head 1cff984f.

hive/awaiting-ci: CI pending — sweep will merge when green.


🐝 Hive Agent: scanner | Instance: hosted-projectbluefin-knuckle-gjvq | SHA: 05905a03491b7c63d2e864f0fad457fbd2c96264

— hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=claude-opus-5.5 copilot=1.0.88

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Summary: Correction: my previous comment was wrong, the rebased branch was NOT pushed. GitHub refused the push because the rebase touches .github/workflows/e2e.yml and the hive App has no workflows permission. The PR head is still 9c0ec3d, so it is still conflicted and needs a human or the author to rebase.


The only conflict was docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md (Boot VM step wording and references list), resolvable by keeping both sides. Not worked around. Rebased result was local only and has been discarded.

hive/needs-human: push needs workflows permission or author rebase.


🐝 Hive Agent: scanner | Instance: hosted-projectbluefin-knuckle-gjvq | SHA: 05905a03491b7c63d2e864f0fad457fbd2c96264

— hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=claude-opus-5.5 copilot=1.0.88

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Summary: This PR conflicts with main, and a maintainer needs to merge main into it. The merge brings workflow-file changes that the hive app has no permission to push. The only conflicting file was the e2e-workflow skill doc, and it resolves cleanly.


  • docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md: kept main's single-display VM boot text and added this PR's SELinux enforcing verification to the SSH-wait step. In the reference list, kept the SELinux enforcing link together with main's two new links.
  • Push rejected for missing workflows permission, so the head is unchanged at 9c0ec3d0.

🐝 Hive Agent: scanner | Instance: hosted-projectbluefin-knuckle-gjvq | SHA: 05905a03491b7c63d2e864f0fad457fbd2c96264

— hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=claude-opus-5.5 copilot=1.0.88

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hive: rebase needs a human because main changed workflow files (push of .github/workflows/e2e.yml rejected: GitHub App lacks workflows permission). Only conflict was docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md (resolved cleanly locally, not pushed).


🐝 Hive Agent: scanner | Instance: hosted-projectbluefin-knuckle-gjvq | SHA: 382071228abfb9544ab8c542e5b018fce89ae39a

— hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=claude-opus-5.5 copilot=1.0.88

Danathar and others added 2 commits November 3, 2026 20:37
Signed-off-by: Danathar <berths-purger-0g@icloud.com>

# Conflicts:
#	docs/skills/ci-ops/e2e-workflow/SKILL.md
The enforcing boot, harness labeling, enforcing check and AVC denial
gate have not run on a hosted VM yet, and e2e.yml is called by every
image repo. Gate them behind a selinux_enforcing input (default false,
also exposed by manual.yml): without it the guest keeps selinux=0 and
the SELinux steps are skipped, so existing runs are unchanged. A
manual dispatch from main with selinux_enforcing=true qualifies the
lane; the rollout plan in projectbluefin#1021 then flips the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SnzFs53Qcer1xDySyxv1Vj
Signed-off-by: Danathar <berths-purger-0g@icloud.com>
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@codebymarshall this PR has a new head without confirmed hive push evidence, so the hive has handed this PR back to you (stage/074-adopted-by-hive → stage/072-returned-to-contributor). It will nudge again if CI stays red.

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@codebymarshall this PR is back in your court (stage/072-returned-to-contributor). The hive will not merge it until the head changes.

Review asks:

  • 1 commit is signed off as the hive App instead of you, so a squash merge would misattribute it — set git config user.email to your own address, then run git rebase --exec 'git commit --amend --no-edit --reset-author -s' HEAD~5 && git push --force-with-lease

Reply here or push a new head to this branch (same sign-off); CI and the review swarm re-run automatically and the PR returns to the normal path.

Queued in your relay fix queue (1 waiting): fixes are handed out before new work as soon as you have capacity.

@Danathar Danathar added the adoption/supersede Owner-delegate request: adopt now in supersede mode label Nov 5, 2026
@Danathar

Danathar commented Nov 5, 2026

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Adopting this into a hive branch: the author's agent has been offline since 10-28, and the hive could not push fixes to the fork. The branch is rebased on main and green, and I reviewed the diff for a trusted run (the e2e additions only drive the local test VM; the new scripts read the guest's audit log). It edits e2e.yml, so a maintainer still merges the hive's copy by hand.

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The hive will not publish head 7d9d3b0a2fd7 upstream: it edits GitHub workflow / action files, which would run with this repository's context once pushed to a branch here. The hive will not re-home or supersede this head.

Ask: a maintainer pushes the fix to this PR's branch and merges it, or cherry-picks the change onto a maintainer-owned branch. Moving to stage/085-needs-decision so a person sees it.

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot removed the adoption/supersede Owner-delegate request: adopt now in supersede mode label Nov 5, 2026

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Summary: Re-review of the change since the last look (head 7d9d3b0). The new work makes the stricter security mode something a caller has to switch on, so nobody's existing test runs change — that settles the earlier "coordinate the rollout first" concern, since the maintainer decision is recorded in the PR. Two small defects in the new denial-checking helper are still there, and one page of documentation now says the opposite of what the workflow does.

What I need from you: @codebymarshall apply the three fixes below (or say why not).


Delta reviewed: be4561c (merge of main, no PR-specific changes) + 7d9d3b0 (opt-in input). Unit tests at head: tests/unit/test_selinux_qualify.py 41 passed; validate_docs.py and generate_skill_index.py --check pass.

Previous findings:

  • [intent-alignment] rollout coordination before the gate becomes required — fixed: e2e.yml:69-76 adds selinux_enforcing (default false), e2e.yml:563-565 keeps selinux=0 unless set, e2e.yml:876 / e2e.yml:1616 skip verify/gate. Maintainer decision cited in the PR body.
  • [correctness] gate not exercised on a hosted VM — still present but no longer blocking: the untested path is now opt-in only; the PR body records the manual.yml qualification plan.
  • [correctness] USER_AVC can never be allowlisted — still present (below).
  • [correctness] same denial counted twice across sinks — still present (below).

correctness

  1. (medium) scripts/selinux_qualify.py:150-153 requires every allowlist entry to carry a non-empty comm, but USER_AVC records (dbus/systemd userspace object managers) have no comm= field, so parse_denials sets comm="" (:133) and allowed_by (:172) can never match them. Any enforced USER_AVC denial fails the gate with no allowlist remedy. Suggested fix — make comm optional and match it only when the entry gives one:
--- a/scripts/selinux_qualify.py
+++ b/scripts/selinux_qualify.py
@@ def load_allowlist(path: Path) -> list[dict]:
-    required = ("source_context", "target_context", "permission", "comm", "reason")
+    required = ("source_context", "target_context", "permission", "reason")
@@ def allowed_by(denial: dict, entries: list[dict]) -> dict | None:
-        if entry["comm"] != denial["comm"]:
+        if entry.get("comm", "") != denial["comm"]:
             continue

(An entry without comm then matches only denials that also lack one, so kernel AVCs still need an exact comm.) Update the header of selinux_allowlist.yaml and the "comm required" tests accordingly.

  1. (low) scripts/selinux_qualify.py:137-140 keys a denial on the audit serial when present, else on the raw line. scripts/selinux_collect_avc.sh:12 (ausearch --raw, has msg=audit(...)) and :17 (journalctl -o cat, no serial) both feed the same log, so one kernel denial appears under two different keys and is reported twice in avc-verdict.json. Verdict is unchanged, counts are inflated. Fix: key on content fields plus pid instead of the serial, e.g. add pid to _FIELD (:41) and build the key from (pid, permissions, scontext, tcontext, tclass).

docs-currency

  1. (low) docs/skills/test-authoring/uefi-boot/SKILL.md:108 still says "e2e.yml no longer passes selinux=0, so direct and UEFI boot both run enforcing" — contradicted by e2e.yml:563-565 after this delta (default appends selinux=0).
- **SELinux is enforcing only when opted in** — with `selinux_enforcing: true`, `e2e.yml` omits `selinux=0`, so direct and UEFI boot both run enforcing; the default still boots with `selinux=0`. Do not re-add the bypass in BLS entries or on-disk config; harness files are labeled before unmount instead. See [selinux-enforcing.md](../../ci-ops/e2e-workflow/references/selinux-enforcing.md).

intent-alignment (advisory, non-blocking): the PR body's "What changed" still says "No new workflow inputs" while the delta adds one (e2e.yml:69, manual.yml:23); the Summary paragraph above it is correct. Worth one edit so the body matches the diff.

No findings from: security, style.

Confidence: 3/5 (needs attention) — 1 medium finding; 2 perspectives requested changes

— hive: agent=reviewer backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5.1 copilot=1.0.88

@Danathar

Danathar commented Nov 5, 2026

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Superseded by #1109, which carries these exact commits (authorship and sign-offs unchanged) on a branch in this repository. The hive will not move fork PRs that edit workflow files, and your agent has been offline since 10-28, so a maintainer brought it in. Thank you for the work.

@Danathar Danathar closed this Nov 5, 2026
Danathar added a commit to Danathar/hive that referenced this pull request Nov 5, 2026
A fork branch takes no workflow-file push from the App whatever the
installation grants (projectbluefin/testsuite#1037: three refused fixer
pushes), so the ledger check is per item: CapabilityAvailable reads the
issue/PR and refutes a workflows blocker only on an issue or a same-repo
PR. An unreadable item keeps its blocker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BQYnPGFJx81c8JXR3o1sg1
Signed-off-by: Danathar <Danathar@users.noreply.github.com>
hivecommons-hive Bot pushed a commit to hivecommons/hive that referenced this pull request Nov 5, 2026
…d branch (#16820)

projectbluefin/utah#919 (fork-rehome-refused on its head) and
projectbluefin/testsuite#1037 (a fork changing .github/workflows/e2e.yml;
the fixer's pushes were refused three times) were decided "hive's fixer: …
then it merges" and read "the hive is fixing it" for days.

- delegatedecision: Input.AdoptedPushRefused; a connected author gets the
  fix list back (return-to-contributor), otherwise recommend-only
  adopted-push-refused keeps the park with the person who asked.
- dashboard: adoptedPushFacts (fork without maintainer edits, fork with a
  workflow-file diff, fork-rehome-refused or workflow-path escalation on the
  head, capability blocker); gathered for the delegate; ownership keeps an
  answered review on such an adopted head your turn (adopted_push_refused).
- glossary (Go + SPA mirror), advisor wording, docs, changelog.


Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BQYnPGFJx81c8JXR3o1sg1

Signed-off-by: Danathar <Danathar@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Danathar <Danathar@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
hivecommons-hive Bot pushed a commit to hivecommons/hive that referenced this pull request Nov 6, 2026
…ng on it (#16811)

* 🐛 fix(workflows): verify "the App cannot push workflows" before parking on it

projectbluefin/testsuite#1059 and #1073: scanner (ISSUES_PRS_MERGE, whose
token asks for workflows: write) parked "the hive app cannot push
.github/workflows/" the same day the App pushed e2e.yml (a017ce1), and the
issues sat as "Blocked · App lacks workflows permission" for four days.

- relay: a merger/trusted-tier lane's workflow-only park is refused when the
  installation grants workflows: write (cached 5 min); a contributor-tier
  hand-off is skipped when the installation is known to lack it.
- blocker ledger: SetCapabilityCheck records a workflows blocker only when
  no capable lane can push on that repo; RecheckCapabilities releases
  existing ones, run with the un-park sweep, which adds hive/workflows-lane
  through the writeback gate.
- config.AgentPushesWorkflows; merger/trusted-tier kicks say the token can
  push .github/workflows/**.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BQYnPGFJx81c8JXR3o1sg1
Signed-off-by: Danathar <Danathar@users.noreply.github.com>

* 🐛 fix(workflows): keep a fork PR's workflows blocker

A fork branch takes no workflow-file push from the App whatever the
installation grants (projectbluefin/testsuite#1037: three refused fixer
pushes), so the ledger check is per item: CapabilityAvailable reads the
issue/PR and refutes a workflows blocker only on an issue or a same-repo
PR. An unreadable item keeps its blocker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BQYnPGFJx81c8JXR3o1sg1
Signed-off-by: Danathar <Danathar@users.noreply.github.com>

* 🐛 fix(workflows): a park quoting GitHub's rejection stands

Reviewer finding on #16811: the self-push note tells a merger-tier lane to
park again quoting GitHub's error when a push still bounces, but the same
check refused that park too, looping the lane. A park or report quoting
"refusing to allow a GitHub App to create or update workflow" is evidence:
the relay lets it park, and the ledger records the blocker as Proven, which
neither the record-time check nor the scheduled re-check releases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BQYnPGFJx81c8JXR3o1sg1
Signed-off-by: Danathar <Danathar@users.noreply.github.com>

* 🐛 fix(workflows): proven blockers survive re-reports; only a pushing lane's quote proves

Review on #16811 (adjudicator, 6ed16c0):
- Record keeps Proven when a later unquoted report of the same kind lands
  while the capability check could not refute it.
- intent-alignment: Proven was tier-blind. A contributor-tier lane quoting
  GitHub's refusal proves only its own token lacks workflows; the ledger's
  new proof check (Client.WorkflowsRejectionProves, by the report's
  `— hive: agent=` trailer) keeps such a blocker refutable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BQYnPGFJx81c8JXR3o1sg1
Signed-off-by: Danathar <Danathar@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Danathar <Danathar@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Danathar <Danathar@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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