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feat(e2e): qualify the GHA VM with SELinux enforcing instead of selinux=0 #1024

Description

@castrojo

What would you like to see?

A hosted qualification lane exercises the candidate's SELinux policy in enforcing mode. The current GHA workflow explicitly adds selinux=0 to KERNEL_ARGS, so passing desktop/SSH scenarios cannot detect enforcing-policy regressions.

Evidence / why a new issue

Baseline main 6d36c72f52ec891ed66a8d947073854338581e38: e2e.yml kernel arguments. Closed #1 targeted the older lab bib-disk-configure BLS path; its closure does not cover this current GHA path. Security suite reachability is separately tracked by #704.

Scope

Design and prove enforcing execution with the existing disposable QEMU/KVM runner and candidate image. Inspect guest disk labels, injected SSH/user/session files, automation-container mounts and required contexts before removing the bypass. Fix harness labeling/behavior rather than disabling enforcement, blanket-permissive domains, broad allowlisting, swallowing AVCs or changing the candidate policy just to pass. Candidate policy defects must remain product failures or be tracked in their owning image repo. Preserve runner/guest trust boundaries.

What does done look like?

  • getenforce returns Enforcing during the actual scenario run and after any required lifecycle reboot; detect unsupported/disabled enforcement rather than silently passing.
  • Run required smoke/common behavior under enforcing mode with real SSH, GNOME, AT-SPI, input and artifact capture. Record base/test-overlay identity and labeling differences.
  • Unexpected scenario-relevant AVC denials fail qualification. Any allowlist is narrow, justified and reviewed; pre-existing accepted events are not a blanket exemption.
  • A controlled denied operation proves policy failures reach the mandatory verdict; a real valid candidate passes. Retain audit/journal/context evidence without secrets.
  • Exercise full affected helper modules and hosted VM runs, not only a source assertion that selinux=0 disappeared.
  • Update matching skills/consumer contract; coordinate with Expose the unreachable suites via e2e.yml #704 and the parent rollout policy before expanding required checks.

Decision boundary

This is a GHA-executable coverage change, not GPU/lab hardware work. Changes to runner trust boundaries, workflow inputs, permissions, secrets or release requirements need explicit human review before implementation. Parent: #1021.

Activity

  1. added theissue type on Oct 26, 2026
  2. Danathar commented on Oct 27, 2026

    @Danathar
    Contributor

    Accepting: e2e.yml boots test VMs with selinux=0, so enforcing-policy regressions are never caught. Note that e2e.yml is a human-merge path, so the PR will need a maintainer merge.

    /triage accepted
    /kind feature

  3. hivecommons-hive commented on Oct 27, 2026

    @hivecommons-hive
    Contributor

    PR #1037 covers this issue: #1037

    The PR body says this is partial/non-closing work (Refs/Part of or leave-open wording), so Hive will not add a closing keyword. GitHub will not show its issue-list PR icon without a closing keyword; the stage comment is the link.

  4. added
    hive/partially-addressedA merged PR addressed only part of this issue; remainder still actionable
    stage/010-actionableTriaged; eligible for the hive to pick up
    and removed on Nov 5, 2026
  5. 15 remaining items

  6. hivecommons-hive commented on Nov 7, 2026

    @hivecommons-hive
    Contributor

    Summary: This is still open. The code from #1109 is on main, but nobody has yet run a full test with SELinux enforcing on an image that ships SELinux, and that run is what the "done" list asks for. That test is the only thing left. There is no further code to write in this repo, so I did not open another PR.

    What I need from you: Run manual.yml with selinux_enforcing=true against a Bluefin (Fedora-based) image, first for smoke and then for lifecycle. Then decide when to make this the default (#1021).


    Evidence, checked once:

    • feat(e2e): keep Linux security protections on during desktop tests and fail on blocked actions #1109 merged at 2026-11-05T21:38Z. The opt-in input, the enforcing check, the denial gate and the canary are all in e2e.yml.
    • Every manual.yml run since then used dakota@sha256:e9918fd7 (runs 42124147912, 42124153048, 42126521360, 42129446403, 42221191543). Dakota does not ship SELinux, so its results/selinux/mode.txt reports expected=unsupported after-boot=Disabled. None of those runs exercised enforcing mode, the AVC gate or the canary.
    • The unchecked items "Run required smoke/common under enforcing" and "a real valid candidate passes / controlled denial reaches the verdict" therefore have no hosted evidence yet.

    🐝 Hive Agent: scanner | Instance: hosted-projectbluefin-knuckle-gjvq | SHA: 729baa93b43efa947af63be7f1ea2b58e6f39be9

    — hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=claude-opus-5.5 copilot=1.0.88

  7. hivecommons-hive commented on Nov 7, 2026

    @hivecommons-hive
    Contributor

    🛠️ Hive agent scanner (hive hosted-projectbluefin-knuckle-gjvq) started work on this issue at 2026-11-07T17:38:50Z. A pull request referencing this issue supersedes this mark; it lapses on its own at 2026-11-07T19:38:50Z if none appears.

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