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test: install a network-booted server from its own screen, and check unknown firmware keys refuse to start it - #644

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Karibhou:test/diskless-console-entry-450
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Karibhou wants to merge 1 commit into
projectbluefin:mainfrom
Karibhou:test/diskless-console-entry-450

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@Karibhou

@Karibhou Karibhou commented Nov 9, 2026 •

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Summary: Bluefin Server can be installed onto a disk from a machine that started over the network with no disk of its own. This adds an automatic check that does it the way a person at that machine's screen would: it logs in, types the install command from our guide, and answers the installer's questions about which disk to use, whether to wipe it and whether to add it to the boot menu. A second new check confirms that a computer which trusts only other companies' security keys refuses to start Bluefin at all, rather than starting it unprotected. Before this, nothing tested the typed network install or that refusal.

What I need from you: Add the full-build label so the boot test runs both new checks, then review.


What changes

Follows the approved direction on #450 (@jeefy's recommendation from 11-03, approved by @Danathar): reuse the existing console harness instead of writing a new one; a random root password for each run, sent to the machine only as a hash; firmware fixtures stay out of scope until shim is Microsoft-signed, plus one cheap refusal check.

Typed install from a diskless boot (DOGFOOD_INSTALL=diskless-console in scripts/dogfood-installer.sh)

  1. Enrolls the Secure Boot keys from the netboot ESP (which is also the boot medium in this mode; no USB stick).
  2. Boots the netboot ESP diskless (the OS DDI comes from a local HTTP server through import.pull), with the target disk and a second disk attached.
    • Root password: 12 random bytes. Only the SHA-512 crypt hash reaches the guest, as passwd.hashed-password.root through the existing cred() SMBIOS helper. The hash file is mode 0600 and never uploaded. The plain text stays in the shell and is masked with ::add-mask:: on GitHub Actions. How production root is locked does not change.
    • Logs in at tty1 through QEMU sendkey and the existing virtio tty1 mirror.
    • Types the bash block under "From a diskless node" in docs/skills/ddi-installer.md, read from the doc at run time, so the doc and the test cannot drift apart.
    • Answers stock systemd-sysinstall (v261 prompt strings): the target by its number in the disk list, erase, firmware registration yes, then yes at the summary. Before checking for "Installation succeeded.", it checks that the summary shows Selected Disk: <target>, Erase Disk: yes and Register in Firmware: yes. Then it powers off.
    • On the host it checks that the target has exactly 3 partitions (ESP plus usr slot A and its verity, no _empty slot B yet) and that the second disk still has no partition table or filesystem.
  3. Boots the installed disk with the same check_disk_boot / check_issue checks as the unattended path.

Supporting changes:

  • type_keys now covers the full US layout (shifted symbols and capitals) plus Ctrl-U, which clears the answer systemd's ask_string_full fills in ahead of time. The disk prompt prefills the disks' common /dev/disk/by- prefix, and the registration prompt prefills yes. An unmapped character now fails before any key is sent.
  • wait_question matches a question in the newest screen snapshot with all whitespace removed, because sysinstall's keep/erase question (about 125 columns) wraps on the console.
  • The doc's command block loses the /dev/sdX placeholder, so sysinstall asks for the disk. The doc now explains the questions and how to name the disk to skip the first one.

Foreign-key firmware refusal (DOGFOOD_FIRMWARE=foreign-keys in scripts/dogfood-diskless.sh)

  • Starts from Fedora's OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd (already in user mode, vendor keys enrolled, no Bluefin db). install-qemu-ovmf.sh extracts it from the same pinned RPM and exports it as OVMF_VARS_FOREIGN. I checked the pinned RPM's header and the file is listed there. ovmf_vars_foreign in dogfood-firmware.sh also looks in the Debian/Ubuntu *.ms.fd paths.
  • Passes only if OVMF prints BdsDxe: failed to load Boot#### ...: Access Denied (or Security Violation). It fails if successfully enrolled or Secure boot enabled appear, meaning systemd-boot or the kernel ran. This branch skips the "kernel ran with Secure Boot" check that the other refusals use.

CI wiring

  • scripts/ci/boot-test.sh: the firmware check goes in the diskless bucket, and the console install goes in the installer bucket, whose logs are kept even on success. Both run for releases and for everything else (16 → 18 scenarios outside releases, 12 → 14 in releases).
  • build.yml: the installer bucket now downloads image-set-{core,netboot,installer}.
  • Preflight requires openssl and OVMF_VARS_FOREIGN. openssl is added to the apt install.
  • Docs: ci-tooling.md describes both scenarios (reflowed to stay within its 500-line limit), and the shim section of ddi-installer.md points to the refusal check.

Verification

  • python3 -m pytest (whole unit suite, Python 3.11 here): 1812 passed. The 6 failures and 17 errors match a clean upstream/main checkout on this machine exactly. They come from Python 3.11 (PurePosixPath.full_match, test_track_binaries.py) and the local shellcheck 0.9.0.
  • New and updated tests:
    • every character of the documented block, plus Ctrl-U, reaches a stand-in monitor as the right sendkey and reads back as the same text
    • an unmapped character sends nothing
    • the documented sysinstall call names no disk
    • wait_question finds a question split across 40-column lines and ignores one that is no longer on screen
    • the scenario counts
    • the diskless run's hash, credentials and disks stay out of the uploaded logs
    • a bucket downloads the netboot part when it runs diskless-console
    • the ovmf_vars_foreign lookup and preflight
  • python3 .github/scripts/docs-checks.py passes.
  • Host-side smoke runs with a stand-in qemu-system-x86_64 (no KVM on this machine):
    • firmware: refusal → PASS; a store that enrolls our keys first → FAIL; DOGFOOD_BOOT=http combined with it → refused.
    • diskless console: step 1 and the whole of step 2 passed against an emulated monitor, tty1 mirror and sysinstall questions (login, typed block, disk 3 of 4 picked, erase/yes/yes, poweroff, host partition checks). Step 3 was not emulated.
  • Not run: a real boot on real QEMU. These things are known only from source, not from a live run: sysinstall's wording (read from systemd v261 sysinstall.c / prompt-util.c / terminal-util.c), OVMF's message (PlatformBmPrintScLib with DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION), and the device names in the disk list. A full-build run will confirm them.

Partially addresses #450. Pre-Linux profile selection/capture, the external
console-driver contract, and expanded resource/screenshot measurements
remain tracked there.

— hive: backend=omp model=anthropic/claude-opus-5-5


🐝 Hive Agent: contributor | SHA: dbcb244

…key firmware

Add DOGFOOD_INSTALL=diskless-console to scripts/dogfood-installer.sh: it
enrolls the keys from the netboot ESP, boots it diskless with the target and
a second disk, and logs in as root at tty1 with a password made for that run
(passed only hashed, as passwd.hashed-password.root, and masked in the CI
log; the image's root stays locked). It types the "From a diskless node"
block of docs/skills/ddi-installer.md as written, answers systemd-sysinstall's
disk (by number), keep/erase, firmware registration and confirmation
questions on the console mirror, powers off, checks both disks from the
host and boots the installed disk. type_keys now types a full US layout and
Ctrl-U, which clears the answer systemd's prompts preselect.

The documented block drops the /dev/sdX placeholder so sysinstall asks for
the disk; the docs say how to name it instead.

Add DOGFOOD_FIRMWARE=foreign-keys to scripts/dogfood-diskless.sh: on Fedora's
OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd (vendor keys enrolled, not the Bluefin db) the firmware
must refuse the netboot ESP's loader before systemd-boot or the kernel runs.
install-qemu-ovmf.sh exports it as OVMF_VARS_FOREIGN; the preflight checks
it and openssl. Full installs on such firmware stay out of scope until shim
is Microsoft-signed.

Both run in the boot test: the firmware check in the diskless bucket, the
console install in the installer bucket, which now also downloads the
netboot part of the image set.

Closes projectbluefin#450

Assisted-by: claude-opus-5-5 via omp
Hive-Run: projectbluefin#450
Hive-Plan: approved-direction (jeefy 11-03 recommendation, approved by Danathar)
Hive-Spec: projectbluefin#450#diskless-console-entry
Signed-off-by: Karibhou <Karibhou@users.noreply.github.com>
@jeefy
jeefy requested review from bketelsen and hanthor November 9, 2026 14:32
@jeefy

jeefy commented Nov 9, 2026

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[APPROVALNOTIFIER] This PR is NOT APPROVED

This pull-request has been approved by:
To complete the pull request process, please assign ahmedadan after the PR has been reviewed.
You can assign the PR to them by writing /assign @ahmedadan in a comment when ready.

Needs approval from an approver in each of these files:

Approvers can indicate their approval by writing /approve in a comment
Approvers can cancel approval by writing /approve cancel in a comment

@hivecommons-hive

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dbcb244

⚠️ Sentinel alert — maintainer review required

Hive flagged this PR (author @Karibhou, head dbcb244689a0) because it matches behaviors that can override security controls, escalate privileges or damage the codebase. This is a heuristic, not an accusation — a maintainer should confirm the change is intended before it merges.

  • sensitive_path — changes 1 sensitive path(s) (Touches a sensitive path (OWNERS, workflows, policies, hive config, security docs, …))
    • .github/workflows/build.yml
  • remote_code_execution — adds a remote-fetch-and-execute, decoded payload, reverse shell or embedded credential (Adds curl|sh, eval of encoded payloads, reverse shells or embedded private keys)
    • tests/unit/test_dogfood_installer.py

Hive added the sentinel-alert label. While it is present, Hive will not approve this PR, apply LGTM/approval labels, or merge it through any auto-merge lane. Remove the label once reviewed; Hive will not re-apply it unless new commits are pushed. Tune paths and behaviors under sentinel in hive.yaml or the dashboard Security tab.

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HUMAN DECISION NEEDED — @Karibhou: a maintainer must authorize this contributor's workflow execution to obtain native boot evidence.

Summary: These checks exercise installation from a computer started over the network and rejection when its firmware does not trust Bluefin. I found no concrete defect after reading the surrounding boot, credential and console code. The new paths still need a real virtual-machine run before their behavior is established.

What I need from you: Have a maintainer authorize the build and retain successful results for both new boot scenarios.


Reviewed dbcb244689a0a76b92ab0a0453de5c572d841728.

Review limit: The interactive sequence at scripts/dogfood-installer.sh:878-914 and firmware refusal at scripts/dogfood-diskless.sh:327-357 remain unverified in native QEMU/KVM. The focused unit tests pass, but the keyboard and wrapped-question tests use stand-ins (tests/unit/test_dogfood_installer.py:151-177,191-205). This environment has neither QEMU nor /dev/kvm; the matching-head build run concluded action_required, not a boot result. Correctness remains requires_human pending authorization and native evidence.

The PR body now explicitly leaves the remaining work in the installer investigation (#450) open; that broader work is not a blocker for this partial contribution.

No findings from: correctness, security, intent-alignment, style, docs-currency.

Confidence: 3/5 (needs attention) — 1 perspective requires a human decision

— hive: agent=reviewer backend=copilot model=gpt-6.1-sol copilot=1.0.88

@Danathar

Danathar commented Nov 9, 2026

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Sentinel reviewed at dbcb244 (the head it scanned). Neither flag holds:

  • sensitive_path .github/workflows/build.yml: one matrix value (image-set-{core,netboot,installer} for the installer bucket) plus a comment. Trigger is pull_request, permissions and uses: pins unchanged.
  • remote_code_execution tests/unit/test_dogfood_installer.py: the tests run bash -c on functions taken from the repo's own scripts/dogfood-installer.sh, against a local AF_UNIX stand-in for the QEMU monitor. Nothing is fetched, decoded or executed from outside the repo.
  • Also checked: the new OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd comes from the same sha256-pinned edk2 RPM (install-qemu-ovmf.sh); the per-run root password is random, ::add-mask::ed and reaches the guest only as a SHA-512 crypt hash in a 0600 file that the log upload (dist/dogfood-installer-*/*.log) does not include; http.server binds 127.0.0.1 and is killed by the EXIT trap; import.pull uses verify=signature.

Removing sentinel-alert. This is not an approval: the boot jobs have not run on this head yet, and the reviewer's point that "Closes #450" claims more than this PR covers still stands.

@Karibhou

Karibhou commented Nov 9, 2026

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Addressed review: replaced Closes #450 with Partially addresses #450 in the PR body (pre-Linux profile capture, external console-driver contract and resource/screenshot measurements remain open there). No code change. Native QEMU evidence and workflow authorization remain with a maintainer.

@hivecommons-hive

hivecommons-hive Bot commented Nov 11, 2026 •

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Needs a decision, not a merge: the hive's GitHub App is not permitted to rerun shared ci (GitHub answered 403 Resource not accessible by integration); the hive:unauthorized note above names the permission and the step a maintainer must take.

Clear the cause and the hive re-evaluates on its next pass; the stage moves to stage/090-ready-for-human-merge, stage/095-pre-merge-soak or the merge queue on its own. Approval does not bypass CI, hold labels or other merge gates.

Updated 2026-11-18 02:44 UTC.

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The code reads correctly to me (password handling, cleanup, the ESP enrollment path). Before approving I'd like the boot evidence: the fork's workflow runs need approval and the full-build label so both new scenarios run on dbcb244. Note this conflicts with #647 in type_keys.

@hivecommons-hive

hivecommons-hive Bot commented Nov 11, 2026 •

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@Karibhou this PR is back in your court (stage/072-returned-to-contributor). The hive will not merge it until the head changes.

Failing checks:

  • zizmor
  • unit

Reply here or push a new head to this branch (same sign-off); CI and the review swarm re-run automatically and the PR returns to the normal path.

Queued in your relay fix queue (0 waiting): fixes are handed out before new work as soon as you have capacity.

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@Karibhou the hive has adopted this PR (stage/074-adopted-by-hive): your hive has been offline since the nudge. The hive will rebase this branch on main and fix CI here; your commits and sign-off stay. Push a new head yourself at any time and the hive yields it back to you. The merge stays manual: the PR edits CI workflow / action files, which the lane never merges unattended; once CI is green a maintainer reviews and merges it (stage 085).

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Summary: An automated security check (zizmor) fails on many open pull requests in this repository at once, so the cause is shared, not this change. It is tracked in one place (#651); this PR is deferred until that is fixed.


Baseline triage: DEFER_TO_INCIDENT (sibling PRs red on same check). See #651.


🐝 Hive Agent: scanner | Instance: hosted-projectbluefin-knuckle-gjvq | SHA: 7e2cb431a6cf2cfe5bbd41cfce10714205a6285e

— hive: agent=scanner backend=copilot model=claude-sonnet-5.5 copilot=1.0.88

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The hive adopted this PR (stage/074-adopted-by-hive) but its head dbcb244689a0 has not moved for 23h19m and the hive has nothing it can push: adoption-stalled:check-failing:unit.

Blocker: the review swarm asked for a human decision.

The hive would move this to stage/085-needs-decision, but the write-back gate keeps its labels off this PR (backfill-off — #644 was created 2026-11-09T14:32:20Z, before hive could write to projectbluefin/server (2026-11-10T17:52:55Z); writeback.unsolicited.backfill is off), so no label changes here. The hive tracks it at stage/085-needs-decision and lists it on the dashboard so a person sees it. This is not a merge-approval wait: the lane has not admitted this head.

@Karibhou

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Thanks for reviewing. The requested native boot evidence is still unavailable for head dbcb244689a0a76b92ab0a0453de5c572d841728: the boot-test jobs are skipped, this environment has no /dev/kvm, and the PR does not have the full-build label. A maintainer needs to authorize the fork workflow and apply full-build so both boot scenarios can run. I have not claimed the scenarios passed.

@Karibhou

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The cancelled unit job did not reach the tests: package installation repeatedly reported temporary DNS resolution failures for the Ubuntu mirrors before cancellation (job log). I attempted to rerun that job, but GitHub reported that it cannot be rerun. A maintainer will need to restart the workflow alongside the previously requested native boot runs.

@Danathar Danathar added the full-build Run the full image build and boot test on this pull request label Nov 14, 2026
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The hive adopted this PR (stage/074-adopted-by-hive) but its head dbcb244689a0 has not moved for 70h10m and the hive has nothing it can push: adoption-stalled:check-failing:zizmor.

Blocker: the review swarm asked for a human decision.

The hive would move this to stage/085-needs-decision, but the write-back gate keeps its labels off this PR (backfill-off — #644 was created 2026-11-09T14:32:20Z, before hive could write to projectbluefin/server (2026-11-10T17:52:55Z); writeback.unsolicited.backfill is off), so no label changes here. The hive tracks it at stage/085-needs-decision and lists it on the dashboard so a person sees it. This is not a merge-approval wait: the lane has not admitted this head.

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The hive adopted this PR (stage/074-adopted-by-hive) but its head dbcb244689a0 has not moved for 75h9m and the hive has nothing it can push: adoption-stalled:check-failing:build.

Blocker: the review swarm asked for a human decision.

The hive would move this to stage/085-needs-decision, but the write-back gate keeps its labels off this PR (backfill-off — #644 was created 2026-11-09T14:32:20Z, before hive could write to projectbluefin/server (2026-11-10T17:52:55Z); writeback.unsolicited.backfill is off), so no label changes here. The hive tracks it at stage/085-needs-decision and lists it on the dashboard so a person sees it. This is not a merge-approval wait: the lane has not admitted this head.

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The hive's GitHub App lacks actions: write, so it cannot rerun shared ci for head dbcb244689a0. A repository maintainer with Actions write can re-run failed jobs at https://github.com/projectbluefin/server/actions/runs/42635674359 . Alternatively, the App owner can request Actions read and write for this recovery installation and its owner must accept the update. This is a CI recovery permission block, not a source-code failure or merge approval. Hive retries after its bounded permission cooldown; no alternate credential is selected. Hive will resume automatically once the step is done; this label and note clear themselves.

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Verdict: COMMENT. I found no secret leak, no hardcoded internal host or IP, and no definite correctness bug in the diff. I am not approving: nothing here has booted, so it needs maintainer boot evidence first. Reviewed at dbcb244, from the diff, the checked-out PR scripts and the CI logs.

Password handling and temp secrets

  • scripts/dogfood-installer.sh:863-866: the password is 12 random bytes from /dev/urandom, masked with ::add-mask:: on Actions. It is hashed with openssl passwd -6 -stdin, so the plain text never reaches argv, and the hash file is written under umask 077. Good.
  • scripts/dogfood-installer.sh:872: only the hash goes to the guest, through the existing cred().
  • The hash file is not named *.log, so it is not matched by build.yml's dist/dogfood-installer-*/*.log upload. tests/unit/test_ci_boot_test.py lists it, import.pull, decoy.raw and target.raw as private.
  • scripts/dogfood-installer.sh:886 types the password only after wait_prompt 'Password:$', so it is not echoed into screen.log.
  • Nit: scripts/dogfood-installer.sh:255-258: cleanup() kills QEMU and the HTTP server but leaves diskless-root.hash, import.pull and the 8G decoy.raw in ${state}. This is harmless on an ephemeral runner. For local runs, a rm -f of the hash in cleanup() would be tidier.
  • Nit: scripts/dogfood-installer.sh:507 (type_keys) and :872 (cred()) expose the plain text and the base64 hash in argv. The plain text is already exposed that way at :1166-1205, and the hash on its own is not crackable from 96 bits of entropy. I would not block on it.

Hardcoded hosts and secrets

  • 10.0.2.2 is QEMU's user-net gateway, the same as in dogfood-diskless.sh. The listener binds 127.0.0.1. There are no internal hostnames and no keys in the diff.

ESP enrollment path

  • scripts/dogfood-installer.sh:309-316, 605-611: step 1 enrolls from the netboot ESP, which carries secure-boot-enroll if-safe (elements/oci/bluefin-server-image.bst:227). It uses the same successfully enrolled gate as the stick path. The ESP is attached with snapshot=on, so the artifact stays untouched. The enrolled store is then reused for the diskless boot at :878. This looks right.
  • I checked the pinned RPM: OVMF_VARS.secboot.fd is a regular 128 KiB file (not a symlink), so bsdtar extraction in scripts/ci/install-qemu-ovmf.sh:32 will work.

Does the foreign-keys test prove that unknown keys refuse to start the server?

Mostly yes, with two caveats:

  • scripts/dogfood-diskless.sh:115 requires a positive BdsDxe: failed to load Boot#### ...: Access Denied|Security Violation line, and probe_done is checked first (:315), so a node that boots fails the test. :79-83 rejects combinations that would make it meaningless.
  • The negative check at :345 (successfully enrolled|Secure boot enabled) is close to vacuous. stop() returns at the first refusal line, so the log is read before anything later could run. It is a belt-and-braces check, not the evidence. The positive regex is what carries the test.
  • There is no positive control in this scenario. Access Denied would also come from a corrupt or unsigned ESP, and nothing shows that the same ESP boots under the Bluefin db. The sibling diskless scenarios cover that, and the PR body says as much.
  • Per the PR body and docs/skills/ddi-installer.md, the test encodes "shim is not yet Microsoft-signed". When shim is, this scenario must change. The comment at boot-test.sh:59 could say so.
  • The message text is read from edk2 source, not observed. It is the main thing a real run has to confirm.

Console install test

  • diskless_install_command reads the documented block, and the unit test checks that it names no disk. This is a good doc-drift guard.
  • Everything about sysinstall's prompts (:891-912), the by-id names in the disk list (:891, :897) and the summary fitting on one 25-row screen (:905-908) is unverified. The summary check reads only the last screen snapshot. If the summary scrolls off, the test fails closed with "summary lacks ...", which is acceptable but would be confusing.
  • 4096 MiB (DOGFOOD_MEM) with the whole DDI pulled into RAM plus an install is the same sizing as the diskless runs. Check it in the first real run.

CI status (fork PR)

  • zizmor (run 42635674359, 2026-11-11, dbcb244): the only output is warnings, action's hash pin has mismatched or missing version comment at build.yml:142,182,222,297, reproducibility.yml:64, track-junctions.yml:45 and unit-tests.yml:45. All are taiki-e/install-action@3a3daaf... # v2, whose floating v2 tag has moved. None of these files or lines are touched by the PR. The branch is 23 commits behind main, and main now pins taiki-e/install-action@ab49d3c... # v2.90.5; recent main Lint workflows runs are green. A rebase should clear it. This is staleness, not this change.
  • build (run 43601216323, build job, step "Build and export the image set"): cancelled at 5h00m. The log shows a cold BuildStream build with no cache hits, with nothing after 14:35 until the 300-minute timeout (build.yml:281) hit at 18:44 UTC. boot-test, image-check and release-dry-run were skipped. This is a fork PR without cache access, not a defect in the diff. Result: no boot evidence exists for either new scenario.
  • changes, validate, unit, docs and actionlint are green.

Needed before merge

  1. Rebase on main to clear zizmor.
  2. A maintainer runs the boot test with cache access (for example from an in-repo branch), then confirms from the logs that both new scenarios pass. That covers sysinstall's prompt strings, the OVMF Access Denied line and the device names.

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The hive will not publish head dbcb244689a0 upstream: it edits GitHub workflow / action files, which would run with this repository's context once pushed to a branch here. The hive will not re-home or supersede this head.

Ask: a maintainer pushes the fix to this PR's branch and merges it, or cherry-picks the change onto a maintainer-owned branch. The hive would move this to stage/085-needs-decision, but the write-back gate keeps its labels off this PR (backfill-off — #644 was created 2026-11-09T14:32:20Z, before hive could write to projectbluefin/server (2026-11-10T17:52:55Z); writeback.unsolicited.backfill is off), so no label changes here. The hive tracks it at stage/085-needs-decision and lists it on the dashboard so a person sees it.

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot added author/clanker A contributor's own hive authored this PR under their login dco All commits are DCO signed-off stage/085-needs-decision A human decision is owed: sentinel alert, hold/needs-decision label, human-only rule or parked issue labels Nov 18, 2026

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3 participants