feat(security): fail-closed destination policy for outbound HTTP by seonghobae · Pull Request #96 · ContextualWisdomLab/wardnet

seonghobae · 2026-08-23T14:12:17Z

Summary

Restores issue #79 on a stack above #95. A non-loopback / RFC1918 / metadata upstream is rejected at route upsert and at request time. The Coraza sidecar URL uses the same policy.

src/destination.rs is the single checker (hermetic HostResolver fixtures).
Wired through route upsert, gateway proxy, threat-intel fetch, Clearfolio, SOC LLM, and consult_proven_engine.
HTTP clients: no redirects, no_proxy().
Test: create_route_fail_closes_metadata_upstream (POST http://169.254.169.254/ → 400).

Stacked on #95 so sidecar outbound is covered. Merge #95 first.

Tests

cargo fmt --check, cargo test --locked --workspace, cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings

Refs #79.

One DestinationPolicy mediates gateway upstreams, threat-intel fetches, Clearfolio, SOC LLM, and the Coraza sidecar URL. Private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT, and metadata classes are denied unless DESTINATION_ALLOWLIST (or loopback development) permits them; DESTINATION_DENYLIST wins. Clients ignore ambient HTTP proxies and do not follow redirects. Refs #79.

coderabbitai · 2026-08-23T14:12:24Z

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…rder CIDR allowlist matches apply per resolved address, authorize non-default ports, and reject prefixes outside the address-family width. IPv6 site-local is a denied class. Hostnames that merely contain 0x are not hex IP literals. AppState constructors default to production policy; seeded fixtures opt into development. Blocking DNS runs on spawn_blocking with a timeout. Persistence and destination-list validation complete before the readiness line.

After destination policy allows a host, the reqwest client resolves only those IPs so a rebinding answer cannot reach loopback, private, or metadata classes. Host and SNI stay on the original name. Unpinned hostnames fail closed instead of falling back to OS DNS.

Issue #86 remainder: dlopen operator-supplied libcoraza and drive the C ABI on each /gateway request. Missing library or empty ruleset fail closed before bind. CI stays hermetic with a fixture cdylib that exports the same symbols.

# Conflicts: # docs/product-technical-gap-baseline.md # src/lib.rs

In-process transactions now receive the same forwarded-header allowlist as the sidecar path (host, user-agent, accept, content-type, referer, origin, x-requested-with, x-forwarded-for, x-real-ip, cookie — never Authorization; 32 headers / 8 KiB caps enforced by proven_engine::engine_forwarded_headers). Each header crosses the C ABI via coraza_add_request_header before process_request_headers, so CRS rules that inspect headers evaluate real client input instead of a synthetic Host only. Brings in the PR #95 sidecar hardening via merge so both engines share one allowlist implementation and one status/bound contract. Behavioral header-battery evidence lands with the issue-11 battery fixture (PR #110); this slice ships the plumbing and keeps the stub contract unchanged.

opencode-agent

Pull request overview

OpenCode cannot approve yet because required coverage evidence did not pass.

Review outcome

1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence

Problem: The required coverage-evidence job result was failure, so OpenCode cannot establish approval sufficiency for this head.
Root cause: Automated approval is only valid when the same-head coverage-evidence job proves supported repository test suites passed and configured docstring gates passed or were advisory, or reports not applicable because no supported source files or package manifests exist. Missing, failed, skipped, unavailable, or unsupported-tooling test evidence is a blocker.
Fix: Install or configure the repository test/docstring evidence tooling when source files or package manifests exist, rerun the current-head coverage-evidence job, and approve only after it reports success with required evidence or explicit no-source not-applicable evidence.
Regression test: Keep the approval branch checking needs.coverage-evidence.result == success before posting APPROVE, and publish REQUEST_CHANGES when coverage-evidence blocker states such as cancelled, skipped, failed, unsupported-tooling, or below-100 evidence are present.
Result: REQUEST_CHANGES
Reason: coverage-evidence result was failure, so required test/docstring evidence was not proven for current head 7cacaf135179bf0c8b45cd5ccf9b7b9510bed2b1.
Head SHA: 7cacaf135179bf0c8b45cd5ccf9b7b9510bed2b1
Workflow run: 32702407090
Workflow attempt: 1

Coverage evidence

Coverage Decision

Result: FAIL
Test evidence: not proven passing
Docstring evidence: not proven passing when configured
Failure count: 1

Changed-File Evidence Map

flowchart LR
  PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
  Evidence --> S1["Changed file (6 files)"]
  S1 --> I1["repository behavior"]
  I1 --> Conflict["Merge conflict blocks this path"]
  Conflict --> V1["required checks"]
  Evidence --> S2["Docs (4 files)"]
  S2 --> I2["operator or user guidance"]
  I2 --> Conflict["Merge conflict blocks this path"]
  Conflict --> V2["docs review"]
  Evidence --> S3["Test: binary.rs"]
  S3 --> I3["regression suite"]
  I3 --> Conflict["Merge conflict blocks this path"]
  Conflict --> V3["targeted test run"]

opencode-agent · 2026-08-24T14:15:04Z

OpenCode Review Overview

Head SHA: 7cacaf135179bf0c8b45cd5ccf9b7b9510bed2b1
Workflow run: 32702407090
Workflow attempt: 1
Gate result: REQUEST_CHANGES (approval step)

Pull request overview

OpenCode cannot approve yet because required coverage evidence did not pass.

Review outcome

1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence

Problem: The required coverage-evidence job result was failure, so OpenCode cannot establish approval sufficiency for this head.
Root cause: Automated approval is only valid when the same-head coverage-evidence job proves supported repository test suites passed and configured docstring gates passed or were advisory, or reports not applicable because no supported source files or package manifests exist. Missing, failed, skipped, unavailable, or unsupported-tooling test evidence is a blocker.
Fix: Install or configure the repository test/docstring evidence tooling when source files or package manifests exist, rerun the current-head coverage-evidence job, and approve only after it reports success with required evidence or explicit no-source not-applicable evidence.
Regression test: Keep the approval branch checking needs.coverage-evidence.result == success before posting APPROVE, and publish REQUEST_CHANGES when coverage-evidence blocker states such as cancelled, skipped, failed, unsupported-tooling, or below-100 evidence are present.
Result: REQUEST_CHANGES
Reason: coverage-evidence result was failure, so required test/docstring evidence was not proven for current head 7cacaf135179bf0c8b45cd5ccf9b7b9510bed2b1.
Head SHA: 7cacaf135179bf0c8b45cd5ccf9b7b9510bed2b1
Workflow run: 32702407090
Workflow attempt: 1

Coverage evidence

Coverage Decision

Result: FAIL
Test evidence: not proven passing
Docstring evidence: not proven passing when configured
Failure count: 1

Changed-File Evidence Map

flowchart LR
  PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
  Evidence --> S1["Changed file (6 files)"]
  S1 --> I1["repository behavior"]
  I1 --> Conflict["Merge conflict blocks this path"]
  Conflict --> V1["required checks"]
  Evidence --> S2["Docs (4 files)"]
  S2 --> I2["operator or user guidance"]
  I2 --> Conflict["Merge conflict blocks this path"]
  Conflict --> V2["docs review"]
  Evidence --> S3["Test: binary.rs"]
  S3 --> I3["regression suite"]
  I3 --> Conflict["Merge conflict blocks this path"]
  Conflict --> V3["targeted test run"]

Merge Conflict Guidance

Current merge state: DIRTY
Base branch: feat/issue-86-in-path-coraza
Head branch: feat/issue-79-destination-policy
Fix direction: merge or rebase origin/feat/issue-86-in-path-coraza into feat/issue-79-destination-policy, resolve conflict markers in the changed files, rerun the focused checks, then push the same branch.
Repair commands:

gh pr checkout 96 --repo ContextualWisdomLab/wardnet
git fetch origin feat/issue-86-in-path-coraza
git merge --no-ff origin/feat/issue-86-in-path-coraza  # or: git rebase origin/feat/issue-86-in-path-coraza
git status --short
# resolve files, then git add <resolved-files>
# merge path: git commit
# rebase path: git rebase --continue
git push origin HEAD:feat/issue-79-destination-policy
# rebase path only: git push --force-with-lease origin HEAD:feat/issue-79-destination-policy

…ion-policy Resolves fresh conflicts against the (correct, non-main) stacked base branch: docs/product-technical-gap-baseline.md merged additively (both loops' shipped-gap entries kept, chronologically ordered), and src/lib.rs merged to compose #96's assert_outbound destination-policy pin with #86's new forwarded_headers parameter on evaluate_sidecar. Verified: cargo fmt --check clean, cargo test 138 passed (0 failed).

…rocess-libcoraza Resolves a fresh conflict against the (non-main) stacked base branch: docs/product-technical-gap-baseline.md merged additively, keeping both loops' shipped-gap entries. src/lib.rs and src/proven_engine.rs auto-merged cleanly. Verified: cargo fmt --check clean, cargo test 144 passed (0 failed).

…ess-libcoraza feat(waf): evaluate live gateway transactions with in-process libcoraza

Stale review: coverage-evidence now passes on this head; all required checks green.

* feat(store): require PostgreSQL as the production control plane Non-loopback binds fail closed without CONTROL_PLANE_DATABASE_URL. Migrations create 3NF two-word tables with default-deny RLS. Snapshot persist commits policy rows and audit records in one transaction. Loopback still uses the JSON file or memory adapter. * feat(store): transactional outbox and leased workers Issue #81 first slice on the PostgreSQL control plane. Security events append with an outbox row in one transaction instead of rewriting the snapshot. Workers claim with SKIP LOCKED, retry, dead-letter, and record unique receipts. Stdout SIEM is at-least-once; the receipt is the exactly-once ack. Also deterministic ORDER BY on postgres loads (still-valid #98 finding). Do not re-implement the postgres gate. * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require (#100) * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require Issue #80 remainder. sslmode=require/verify-ca/verify-full connect with rustls and Mozilla roots; certificates are always verified. allow/prefer are still rejected so the process cannot silently drop to plaintext. Live test against plaintext CI postgres proves fail-closed. Do not re-implement the postgres gate or the outbox. * docs: record PR #100 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): rewrite verify-full sslmode for tokio-postgres 0.7 Still-valid #100 Devin finding. tokio-postgres 0.7 only parses disable/prefer/require. Map verify-ca/verify-full to require before connect; rustls still verifies certificates. Password query-lookalikes are left untouched. * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows (#101) * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows Still-valid #99 finding. GET /api/outbox returns at most EVENT_LIMIT rows (dead letters, then pending, then leased, then processed). Processed outbox_message rows prune to that cap; receipts and dead letters stay. Do not re-implement the outbox, postgres gate, or rustls. * docs: record PR #101 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): prune processed outbox to EVENT_LIMIT on save and ack Still-valid #101 Devin finding. Snapshot save and worker ack used LIST_LIMIT (1000) while append used operator EVENT_LIMIT. Store the configured cap on PostgresPlane so all three paths retain the same processed-row bound. Receipts and dead letters stay. * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill (#102) * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill Issue #80 remainder stacked on #101. GET /api/backup exports a hashed tenant snapshot; POST /api/backup restores after schema and payload-hash checks; POST /api/backup/drill restores into an isolated tenant, compares unmasked invariants, and drops the drill rows. Declared RPO is last successful export; declared RTO is 60s. File/memory adapters report backup=disabled. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, or retention. * docs: record PR #102 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate (#103) * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate Still-valid #98 finding. CI connects as a superuser, which bypasses FORCE RLS. Migrations stay on the login role, then SET ROLE wardnet_runtime (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS, not table owner). Missing tenant GUC yields no rows; DROP TABLE and DISABLE RLS are denied. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, retention, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #103 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): restore logical backups across role-only schema versions v3 only provisions wardnet_runtime and does not change table shape. verify() accepts schema 2 through the current migration version so a role-only upgrade cannot void the last pre-upgrade logical backup. * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant (#104) * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant Convert unpartitioned security_event to PARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id) with eight children under pg_advisory_lock. Rows keep unmasked client IPs and paths. /healthz.event_partitions reports the child count. Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current version. * docs: record PR #104 in the product-technical gap baseline

* feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API * fix(security): isolate fetch DNS pins per request

* feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API * feat(security): route browser DNS and HTTPS through Wardnet * fix(security): isolate fetch DNS pins per request * fix(dns): bound concurrent UDP query handling

devin-ai-integration

Devin Review found 2 new potential issues.

⚠️ 1 issue in files not directly in the diff

⚠️ IPv6-literal destinations never reuse the approved-DNS cache

resolve_outbound looks up the egress DNS cache with parsed.host_str(), which keeps the brackets for an IPv6 literal ([::1]), while the cache is written under the bracket-stripped host (::1) via parse_outbound_url (destination.rs). Every IPv6-literal outbound URL misses the cache and re-runs full policy evaluation, holding a bounded resolver permit each time.

devin-ai-integration · 2026-08-26T13:35:59Z

control_plane.rs

+            "WITH picked AS (
+                SELECT message_id FROM outbox_message
+                WHERE tenant_id = $1
+                  AND (
+                    (message_status = $2 AND next_available_unix <= $5)
+                    OR (message_status = $3 AND COALESCE(lease_expires_unix, 0) <= $5)
+                  )
+                ORDER BY aggregate_id, aggregate_version, created_unix
+                FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED
+                LIMIT $6
+             )


📝 Info: Outbox claim orders by stringified aggregate id

claim_batch orders by aggregate_id, aggregate_version, created_unix, and aggregate_id for security events is the stringified event id (control_plane.rs), so ordering is lexicographic ("10" before "2"). Delivery is at-least-once and idempotent, so this affects dispatch order, not correctness.

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* feat(security): fail-closed destination policy for outbound HTTP One DestinationPolicy mediates gateway upstreams, threat-intel fetches, Clearfolio, SOC LLM, and the Coraza sidecar URL. Private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT, and metadata classes are denied unless DESTINATION_ALLOWLIST (or loopback development) permits them; DESTINATION_DENYLIST wins. Clients ignore ambient HTTP proxies and do not follow redirects. Refs #79. * docs: record PR #96 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(security): harden destination policy per-IP CIDR and readiness order CIDR allowlist matches apply per resolved address, authorize non-default ports, and reject prefixes outside the address-family width. IPv6 site-local is a denied class. Hostnames that merely contain 0x are not hex IP literals. AppState constructors default to production policy; seeded fixtures opt into development. Blocking DNS runs on spawn_blocking with a timeout. Persistence and destination-list validation complete before the readiness line. * feat(security): pin outbound HTTP to evaluated destination addresses After destination policy allows a host, the reqwest client resolves only those IPs so a rebinding answer cannot reach loopback, private, or metadata classes. Host and SNI stay on the original name. Unpinned hostnames fail closed instead of falling back to OS DNS. * feat(waf): evaluate live gateway transactions with in-process libcoraza Issue #86 remainder: dlopen operator-supplied libcoraza and drive the C ABI on each /gateway request. Missing library or empty ruleset fail closed before bind. CI stays hermetic with a fixture cdylib that exports the same symbols. * docs: record PR #97 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): require PostgreSQL as the production control plane Non-loopback binds fail closed without CONTROL_PLANE_DATABASE_URL. Migrations create 3NF two-word tables with default-deny RLS. Snapshot persist commits policy rows and audit records in one transaction. Loopback still uses the JSON file or memory adapter. * feat(store): transactional outbox and leased workers Issue #81 first slice on the PostgreSQL control plane. Security events append with an outbox row in one transaction instead of rewriting the snapshot. Workers claim with SKIP LOCKED, retry, dead-letter, and record unique receipts. Stdout SIEM is at-least-once; the receipt is the exactly-once ack. Also deterministic ORDER BY on postgres loads (still-valid #98 finding). Do not re-implement the postgres gate. * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require (#100) * feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require Issue #80 remainder. sslmode=require/verify-ca/verify-full connect with rustls and Mozilla roots; certificates are always verified. allow/prefer are still rejected so the process cannot silently drop to plaintext. Live test against plaintext CI postgres proves fail-closed. Do not re-implement the postgres gate or the outbox. * docs: record PR #100 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): rewrite verify-full sslmode for tokio-postgres 0.7 Still-valid #100 Devin finding. tokio-postgres 0.7 only parses disable/prefer/require. Map verify-ca/verify-full to require before connect; rustls still verifies certificates. Password query-lookalikes are left untouched. * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows (#101) * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows Still-valid #99 finding. GET /api/outbox returns at most EVENT_LIMIT rows (dead letters, then pending, then leased, then processed). Processed outbox_message rows prune to that cap; receipts and dead letters stay. Do not re-implement the outbox, postgres gate, or rustls. * docs: record PR #101 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): prune processed outbox to EVENT_LIMIT on save and ack Still-valid #101 Devin finding. Snapshot save and worker ack used LIST_LIMIT (1000) while append used operator EVENT_LIMIT. Store the configured cap on PostgresPlane so all three paths retain the same processed-row bound. Receipts and dead letters stay. * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill (#102) * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill Issue #80 remainder stacked on #101. GET /api/backup exports a hashed tenant snapshot; POST /api/backup restores after schema and payload-hash checks; POST /api/backup/drill restores into an isolated tenant, compares unmasked invariants, and drops the drill rows. Declared RPO is last successful export; declared RTO is 60s. File/memory adapters report backup=disabled. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, or retention. * docs: record PR #102 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate (#103) * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate Still-valid #98 finding. CI connects as a superuser, which bypasses FORCE RLS. Migrations stay on the login role, then SET ROLE wardnet_runtime (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS, not table owner). Missing tenant GUC yields no rows; DROP TABLE and DISABLE RLS are denied. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, retention, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #103 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): restore logical backups across role-only schema versions v3 only provisions wardnet_runtime and does not change table shape. verify() accepts schema 2 through the current migration version so a role-only upgrade cannot void the last pre-upgrade logical backup. * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant (#104) * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant Convert unpartitioned security_event to PARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id) with eight children under pg_advisory_lock. Rows keep unmasked client IPs and paths. /healthz.event_partitions reports the child count. Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current version. * docs: record PR #104 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): optimistic concurrency on postgres snapshots Issue #80 last remainder. tenant_account.snapshot_version must match the loaded token or persist fails closed (HTTP 409). Restores overwrite. File/memory stay single-writer. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, runtime role, HASH, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #105 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): keep postgres snapshot_version aligned after startup save load_postgres was saving with OCC and leaving the in-memory token one behind the database, so every later management write returned HTTP 409. Advance the loaded snapshot_version to the value save() wrote. * feat(store): outbox consumers for TAXII, Clearfolio, and orchestrator Enqueue operator-triggered TAXII polls, Clearfolio submits, and contextual-orchestrator SOC analysis on the PostgreSQL leased outbox. Request path returns 202; GET /api/outbox/{id} exposes receipt evidence. Secrets stay in the credential registry. Startup postgres save advances snapshot_version so the first management write cannot false-conflict. * docs: record PR #106 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(release): tagged GitHub Release with SHA-256 and immutable GHCR (#107) * feat(release): tagged GitHub Release with SHA-256 and immutable GHCR Issue #84 first slice. A vX.Y.Z tag builds a locked binary, checksums, a GitHub Release, and ghcr.io/contextualwisdomlab/waf-ids-ai-soc:vX.Y.Z with no moving latest tag. Promotion and rollback are tag-for-tag. Do not re-implement store slices or OCC. * docs: record PR #107 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(release): basename checksums and serialize postgres GRANTs SHA256SUMS recorded dist/ prefixes so sha256sum -c failed next to the downloaded binary. Emit basenames. Parallel PostgresPlane connects raced HASH convert GRANT with SET ROLE GRANT (tuple concurrently updated); hold the advisory lock across both. Do not re-implement HASH layout. * feat(release): keyless cosign, SPDX SBOM, and SLSA on the same tag Issue #84 remainder. GitHub OIDC signs the binary, checksums, SBOMs, and the GHCR image by digest. Release is created only after signatures. Syft SPDX fails closed without syft or non-SPDX JSON. NIST SP 800-218 is attached. Do not re-implement checksums or store slices. * feat(release): refuse lightweight tags and pin k8s by digest Issue #84 remainder. Annotated vX.Y.Z tags only; lightweight tags fail closed before the release job builds. Kubernetes pin is the GHCR content digest; tag aliases are refused. Do not re-implement checksums or cosign/SBOM. * docs: record PR #109 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(waf): detect OWASP CRS attack battery on the live binary Issue #11 first slice. The build-script libcoraza ABI stub gains a deterministic battery covering SQLi (942100), XSS (941100), path traversal (930100), Unix RCE (932100, with first-match ordering so '; cat /etc/passwd' attributes to RCE over traversal), and Log4j JNDI (944120) in raw and percent-encoded forms across URI and POST-body phases. tests/binary.rs now starts the real gateway with the stub engine, creates a block route through the admin API, fires nine cases over HTTP, and asserts each is 403-blocked citing the expected CRS rule id while a benign request still forwards; /api/events must record one event per attempt with the forwarded client IP kept unmasked. Doctoring: docs/doctoring/ci-attack-evidence-battery.md grounds the split between detection-path evidence (CI) and detection efficacy (operator-supplied libcoraza + Core Rule Set), APA 7th. * fix(control-plane): close OCC and credential race gaps * fix(release): capture pushed image digest

docs: record PR #96 in the product-technical gap baseline

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seonghobae mentioned this pull request Aug 23, 2026

feat(waf): evaluate live gateway transactions with in-process libcoraza #97

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docs: record PR #97 in the product-technical gap baseline

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seonghobae added 2 commits August 24, 2026 15:07

merge: pull sidecar header/bound hardening into the in-process stack

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# Conflicts: # docs/product-technical-gap-baseline.md # src/lib.rs

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seonghobae mentioned this pull request Aug 25, 2026

docs(adr): accepted architecture decisions with verified APA 7th citations #111

Open

Merge pull request #97 from ContextualWisdomLab/feat/issue-86-in-proc…

6132678

…ess-libcoraza feat(waf): evaluate live gateway transactions with in-process libcoraza

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This was referenced Aug 26, 2026

feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API #113

Merged

feat(security): route browser DNS and HTTPS through Wardnet #116

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seonghobae added 2 commits August 26, 2026 06:04

feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API (#113)

55d8025

* feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API * fix(security): isolate fetch DNS pins per request

feat(security): route browser DNS and HTTPS through Wardnet (#116)

9c70961

* feat(security): add bounded outbound fetch API * feat(security): route browser DNS and HTTPS through Wardnet * fix(security): isolate fetch DNS pins per request * fix(dns): bound concurrent UDP query handling

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seonghobae added 2 commits August 26, 2026 22:23

fix(security): close destination policy review gaps

b20153b

fix(runtime): make worker shutdown durable

57ca05b

seonghobae merged commit ad3675a into feat/issue-86-in-path-coraza Aug 26, 2026
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seonghobae deleted the feat/issue-79-destination-policy branch August 26, 2026 13:27

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feat(security): fail-closed destination policy for outbound HTTP - #96

feat(security): fail-closed destination policy for outbound HTTP#96
seonghobae merged 16 commits into
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Pull request overview

Review outcome

1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence

Coverage evidence

Coverage Decision

Changed-File Evidence Map

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OpenCode Review Overview

Pull request overview

Review outcome

1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence

Coverage evidence

Coverage Decision

Changed-File Evidence Map

Merge Conflict Guidance

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⚠️ IPv6-literal destinations never reuse the approved-DNS cache

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devin-ai-integration Bot Aug 26, 2026

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seonghobae commented Aug 23, 2026 •

edited by devin-ai-integration Bot

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coderabbitai Bot commented Aug 23, 2026 •

edited

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