feat(store): optimistic concurrency on postgres snapshots - #105
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One DestinationPolicy mediates gateway upstreams, threat-intel fetches, Clearfolio, SOC LLM, and the Coraza sidecar URL. Private, loopback, link-local, CGNAT, and metadata classes are denied unless DESTINATION_ALLOWLIST (or loopback development) permits them; DESTINATION_DENYLIST wins. Clients ignore ambient HTTP proxies and do not follow redirects. Refs #79.
…rder CIDR allowlist matches apply per resolved address, authorize non-default ports, and reject prefixes outside the address-family width. IPv6 site-local is a denied class. Hostnames that merely contain 0x are not hex IP literals. AppState constructors default to production policy; seeded fixtures opt into development. Blocking DNS runs on spawn_blocking with a timeout. Persistence and destination-list validation complete before the readiness line.
After destination policy allows a host, the reqwest client resolves only those IPs so a rebinding answer cannot reach loopback, private, or metadata classes. Host and SNI stay on the original name. Unpinned hostnames fail closed instead of falling back to OS DNS.
Issue #86 remainder: dlopen operator-supplied libcoraza and drive the C ABI on each /gateway request. Missing library or empty ruleset fail closed before bind. CI stays hermetic with a fixture cdylib that exports the same symbols.
Non-loopback binds fail closed without CONTROL_PLANE_DATABASE_URL. Migrations create 3NF two-word tables with default-deny RLS. Snapshot persist commits policy rows and audit records in one transaction. Loopback still uses the JSON file or memory adapter.
Issue #81 first slice on the PostgreSQL control plane. Security events append with an outbox row in one transaction instead of rewriting the snapshot. Workers claim with SKIP LOCKED, retry, dead-letter, and record unique receipts. Stdout SIEM is at-least-once; the receipt is the exactly-once ack. Also deterministic ORDER BY on postgres loads (still-valid #98 finding). Do not re-implement the postgres gate.
* feat(store): rustls for production PostgreSQL sslmode=require Issue #80 remainder. sslmode=require/verify-ca/verify-full connect with rustls and Mozilla roots; certificates are always verified. allow/prefer are still rejected so the process cannot silently drop to plaintext. Live test against plaintext CI postgres proves fail-closed. Do not re-implement the postgres gate or the outbox. * docs: record PR #100 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): rewrite verify-full sslmode for tokio-postgres 0.7 Still-valid #100 Devin finding. tokio-postgres 0.7 only parses disable/prefer/require. Map verify-ca/verify-full to require before connect; rustls still verifies certificates. Password query-lookalikes are left untouched. * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows (#101) * feat(store): bound outbox listing and prune processed rows Still-valid #99 finding. GET /api/outbox returns at most EVENT_LIMIT rows (dead letters, then pending, then leased, then processed). Processed outbox_message rows prune to that cap; receipts and dead letters stay. Do not re-implement the outbox, postgres gate, or rustls. * docs: record PR #101 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): prune processed outbox to EVENT_LIMIT on save and ack Still-valid #101 Devin finding. Snapshot save and worker ack used LIST_LIMIT (1000) while append used operator EVENT_LIMIT. Store the configured cap on PostgresPlane so all three paths retain the same processed-row bound. Receipts and dead letters stay. * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill (#102) * feat(store): logical backup and isolated restore drill Issue #80 remainder stacked on #101. GET /api/backup exports a hashed tenant snapshot; POST /api/backup restores after schema and payload-hash checks; POST /api/backup/drill restores into an isolated tenant, compares unmasked invariants, and drops the drill rows. Declared RPO is last successful export; declared RTO is 60s. File/memory adapters report backup=disabled. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, or retention. * docs: record PR #102 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate (#103) * feat(store): non-owner PostgreSQL runtime role after migrate Still-valid #98 finding. CI connects as a superuser, which bypasses FORCE RLS. Migrations stay on the login role, then SET ROLE wardnet_runtime (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS, not table owner). Missing tenant GUC yields no rows; DROP TABLE and DISABLE RLS are denied. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, retention, or backup/restore. * docs: record PR #103 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(store): restore logical backups across role-only schema versions v3 only provisions wardnet_runtime and does not change table shape. verify() accepts schema 2 through the current migration version so a role-only upgrade cannot void the last pre-upgrade logical backup. * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant (#104) * feat(store): HASH-partition security_event by tenant Convert unpartitioned security_event to PARTITION BY HASH (tenant_id) with eight children under pg_advisory_lock. Rows keep unmasked client IPs and paths. /healthz.event_partitions reports the child count. Logical restore still accepts schema 2 through the current version. * docs: record PR #104 in the product-technical gap baseline
Issue #80 last remainder. tenant_account.snapshot_version must match the loaded token or persist fails closed (HTTP 409). Restores overwrite. File/memory stay single-writer. Do not re-implement rustls, outbox, runtime role, HASH, or backup/restore.
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load_postgres was saving with OCC and leaving the in-memory token one behind the database, so every later management write returned HTTP 409. Advance the loaded snapshot_version to the value save() wrote.
Enqueue operator-triggered TAXII polls, Clearfolio submits, and
contextual-orchestrator SOC analysis on the PostgreSQL leased outbox.
Request path returns 202; GET /api/outbox/{id} exposes receipt evidence.
Secrets stay in the credential registry. Startup postgres save advances
snapshot_version so the first management write cannot false-conflict.
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Pull request overview
OpenCode cannot approve yet because required coverage evidence did not pass.
Review outcome
1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence
-
Problem: The required coverage-evidence job result was
failure, so OpenCode cannot establish approval sufficiency for this head. -
Root cause: Automated approval is only valid when the same-head coverage-evidence job proves supported repository test suites passed and configured docstring gates passed or were advisory, or reports not applicable because no supported source files or package manifests exist. Missing, failed, skipped, unavailable, or unsupported-tooling test evidence is a blocker.
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Fix: Install or configure the repository test/docstring evidence tooling when source files or package manifests exist, rerun the current-head coverage-evidence job, and approve only after it reports
successwith required evidence or explicit no-source not-applicable evidence. -
Regression test: Keep the approval branch checking
needs.coverage-evidence.result == successbefore posting APPROVE, and publish REQUEST_CHANGES when coverage-evidence blocker states such as cancelled, skipped, failed, unsupported-tooling, or below-100 evidence are present. -
Result: REQUEST_CHANGES
-
Reason: coverage-evidence result was
failure, so required test/docstring evidence was not proven for current headf84ece0c91b647cbfcba3ba9f6441de0a1559c7c. -
Head SHA:
f84ece0c91b647cbfcba3ba9f6441de0a1559c7c -
Workflow run: 32702424435
-
Workflow attempt: 1
Coverage evidence
Coverage Decision
- Result: FAIL
- Test evidence: not proven passing
- Docstring evidence: not proven passing when configured
- Failure count: 1
Changed-File Evidence Map
flowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Changed file (4 files)"]
S1 --> I1["repository behavior"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Changed file (4 files)"]
R1 --> V1["required checks"]
Evidence --> S2["Docs (3 files)"]
S2 --> I2["operator or user guidance"]
I2 --> R2["Review risk: Docs (3 files)"]
R2 --> V2["docs review"]
OpenCode Review Overview
Pull request overviewOpenCode cannot approve yet because required coverage evidence did not pass. Review outcome1. HIGH .github/workflows/opencode-review.yml:1 - Coverage evidence did not prove required test/docstring evidence
Coverage evidenceCoverage Decision
Changed-File Evidence Mapflowchart LR
PR["PR changed files"] --> Evidence["OpenCode bounded evidence"]
Evidence --> S1["Changed file (4 files)"]
S1 --> I1["repository behavior"]
I1 --> R1["Review risk: Changed file (4 files)"]
R1 --> V1["required checks"]
Evidence --> S2["Docs (3 files)"]
S2 --> I2["operator or user guidance"]
I2 --> R2["Review risk: Docs (3 files)"]
R2 --> V2["docs review"]
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…-consumers feat(store): outbox consumers for TAXII, Clearfolio, and orchestrator
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Stale review: coverage-evidence now passes on this head; all required checks green.
…107) * feat(release): tagged GitHub Release with SHA-256 and immutable GHCR Issue #84 first slice. A vX.Y.Z tag builds a locked binary, checksums, a GitHub Release, and ghcr.io/contextualwisdomlab/waf-ids-ai-soc:vX.Y.Z with no moving latest tag. Promotion and rollback are tag-for-tag. Do not re-implement store slices or OCC. * docs: record PR #107 in the product-technical gap baseline * fix(release): basename checksums and serialize postgres GRANTs SHA256SUMS recorded dist/ prefixes so sha256sum -c failed next to the downloaded binary. Emit basenames. Parallel PostgresPlane connects raced HASH convert GRANT with SET ROLE GRANT (tuple concurrently updated); hold the advisory lock across both. Do not re-implement HASH layout. * feat(release): keyless cosign, SPDX SBOM, and SLSA on the same tag Issue #84 remainder. GitHub OIDC signs the binary, checksums, SBOMs, and the GHCR image by digest. Release is created only after signatures. Syft SPDX fails closed without syft or non-SPDX JSON. NIST SP 800-218 is attached. Do not re-implement checksums or store slices. * feat(release): refuse lightweight tags and pin k8s by digest Issue #84 remainder. Annotated vX.Y.Z tags only; lightweight tags fail closed before the release job builds. Kubernetes pin is the GHCR content digest; tag aliases are refused. Do not re-implement checksums or cosign/SBOM. * docs: record PR #109 in the product-technical gap baseline * feat(waf): detect OWASP CRS attack battery on the live binary Issue #11 first slice. The build-script libcoraza ABI stub gains a deterministic battery covering SQLi (942100), XSS (941100), path traversal (930100), Unix RCE (932100, with first-match ordering so '; cat /etc/passwd' attributes to RCE over traversal), and Log4j JNDI (944120) in raw and percent-encoded forms across URI and POST-body phases. tests/binary.rs now starts the real gateway with the stub engine, creates a block route through the admin API, fires nine cases over HTTP, and asserts each is 403-blocked citing the expected CRS rule id while a benign request still forwards; /api/events must record one event per attempt with the forwarded client IP kept unmasked. Doctoring: docs/doctoring/ci-attack-evidence-battery.md grounds the split between detection-path evidence (CI) and detection efficacy (operator-supplied libcoraza + Core Rule Set), APA 7th.
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f6eabf3
into
feat/issue-86-in-path-coraza
| pub extern "C" fn coraza_add_request_header( | ||
| _tx: usize, | ||
| _name: *const c_char, | ||
| tx: usize, | ||
| name: *const c_char, | ||
| _name_len: c_int, | ||
| _value: *const c_char, | ||
| value: *const c_char, | ||
| _value_len: c_int, | ||
| ) -> c_int { | ||
| let (Ok(name), Ok(value)) = (c_str(name), c_str(value)) else { | ||
| return CORAZA_ERROR; | ||
| }; | ||
| let mut store = store().lock().expect("stub lock"); | ||
| let Some(tx) = store.txs.get_mut(&tx) else { | ||
| return CORAZA_ERROR; | ||
| }; | ||
| tx.headers.push_str(name); | ||
| tx.headers.push(':'); | ||
| tx.headers.push_str(value); | ||
| tx.headers.push('\n'); | ||
| if let Some(entry) = battery_match(&tx.headers) { | ||
| tx.interrupted = true; | ||
| tx.rule_id = entry.rule_id; | ||
| tx.message = entry.message.to_string(); | ||
| } |
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📝 Info: Stub battery matching is test-only, header-scoped
The coraza ABI stub now interrupts on substrings across URI, accumulated headers, and body. It is a test-only cdylib, so there is no production effect. Header accumulation means any forwarded header value containing a needle would block; the benign requests in the live-gateway test carry only X-Forwarded-For/Content-Type and default reqwest headers, none matching. First-match ordering puts RCE/Log4j before traversal so ; cat /etc/passwd attributes to 932100.
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| ) -> Result<String, String> { | ||
| let created_unix = unix_now_i64(); | ||
| let hash = outbox::payload_hash(&payload_json); | ||
| let unique = format!("{created_unix}:{hash}"); | ||
| let (message_id, idempotency_key) = | ||
| outbox::effect_ids(event_type, &self.tenant_id, &unique); |
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🔍 enqueue_effect idempotency key embeds a timestamp
effect_ids builds the key as {event_type}:{tenant}:{created_unix}:{hash} (control_plane.rs:847-851, outbox.rs:101-104). Identical payloads submitted more than a second apart get distinct keys and distinct messages; only same-second resubmissions dedupe. A client HTTP retry after a >1s timeout can therefore enqueue a duplicate external effect.
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1 participant
Summary
Issue #80 last remainder. Does not re-implement #78, sidecar #95, pin #96, libcoraza #97, postgres gate #98, outbox #99/#101, rustls #100, backup/restore #102, runtime role #103, or HASH partitions #104.
tenant_account.snapshot_versionis the optimistic-concurrency token. Snapshot persist increments it only when the loaded version still matches; a stale replica getscontrol plane snapshot conflictmapped to HTTP 409. Operator restores overwrite the token. File/memory adapters stay single-writer (persist_lock).#100/#103/#104 were squash-merged into #99. This PR stacks on #99 (
feat/issue-81-outbox-workers). Merge order: #95, then #96, then #97, then #98, then #99, then this PR. Org ruleset 18156473 still requires two independent approvals; do not--adminmerge.Tests
cargo fmt --checkcargo test --locked --workspace(includes livepostgres_stale_snapshot_save_conflicts)cargo clippy --locked --workspace --all-targets -- -D warningsscripts/smoke.shruns (/healthz+/admin, 2B KRW readiness)Doctoring:
docs/doctoring/postgres-control-plane.md(APA 7th).Remaining on #81: additional consumers (TAXII poll, Clearfolio, contextual-orchestrator).