fix-forward #3938 (tsk-zgkahd): hard gh refusal still bypassed by clustered short flags (exec -la NAME, sudo -Eu USER) and chroot --userspec/--groups with a separate value

changelog.d/tsk-lzyw3v-claude-code-guard-wrappers.md

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+### Fixed
+- Wrapper programs (`env`, `nice`, `nohup`, `timeout`, `xargs`, `sudo`, `doas`, `exec`, `command`, `builtin`, `time`, `stdbuf`, `setsid`, `ionice`, `chroot`, `busybox`) no longer hide the real program in the shell profile: the wrapper's key is recorded and the wrapped program is also checked.
+- Hard refusal for `gh` and `git push` now also applies to parsed command keys, catching escapes like `g""h pr list` and `'gh' pr list`.
+- The hook's `main()` now fails closed on any exception: it prints the refusal to stderr and exits with code 2.
+- Wrapper options that take a separate value (`nice -n/--adjustment`, `ionice -c/-n/-p/--class/--classdata/--pid`, `stdbuf -i/-o/-e/--input/--output/--error`, `xargs -n/-P/-I/-L/-s/-d/-a/-E/--max-args/--max-procs/--max-lines/--max-chars/--delimiter/--arg-file`, `timeout -s/--signal/-k/--kill-after`, `env -u/--unset/-C/--chdir/-S/--split-string`) no longer hide the real program; `chroot` skips its root directory operand before finding the program.
+- Fixed three hard-refusal bypasses: `chroot` root operand mistaken for a wrapper (e.g. `/tmp/timeout`), `exec -a NAME` and `exec -aNAME` not skipping the alias value, and `env -S/--split-string` not parsing the split string for nested commands (fail closed on `$`, backslash, or unparseable).

changelog.d/tsk-r3knpi-claude-code-guard-flag-clusters.md

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+### Fixed
+
+- Fixed bypass of hard refusal for clustered short flags (e.g., `exec -la NAME`, `sudo -Eu USER`, `chroot --userspec/--groups`) by enhancing the wrapper option parsing in `tinyagentos/claude_code_guard.py`. Added short option letter sets and extended chroot wrapper options to properly handle value-taking clustered flags and GNU long options with separate values.

tests/test_claude_code_shell_profile.py

@@ -296,6 +296,239 @@ def test_control_commands_are_allowed():
         assert refusal is None, cmd
 
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Wrapper programs, gh escaping, and fail-closed main() (tsk-lzyw3v)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_wrapper_programs_expose_real_program():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import commands
+    # env
+    cmds = commands("env curl x")
+    assert "env" in cmds and "curl" in cmds, cmds
+    # timeout: first non-option is duration, then program
+    cmds = commands("timeout 60 curl x")
+    assert "curl" in cmds, cmds
+    # sudo -u bob curl x
+    cmds = commands("sudo -u bob curl x")
+    assert "curl" in cmds, cmds
+    # xargs curl
+    cmds = commands("xargs curl")
+    assert "curl" in cmds, cmds
+
+
+def test_wrapper_option_values_do_not_hide_program():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import commands
+    cases = [
+        ("nice -n 10 curl x", "10"),
+        ("ionice -c 3 curl x", "3"),
+        ("stdbuf -o 0 curl x", "0"),
+        ("xargs -n 1 curl", "1"),
+        ("timeout -s KILL 60 curl x", "60"),
+        ("chroot /newroot curl x", "newroot"),
+        ("chroot / curl x", "/"),
+    ]
+    for cmd, bad in cases:
+        cmds = commands(cmd)
+        assert "curl" in cmds, f"curl missing in {cmd!r}: {cmds}"
+        assert bad not in cmds, f"option value {bad!r} leaked as key in {cmd!r}: {cmds}"
+
+
+def test_hard_refusal_sees_program_behind_wrapper_values():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    cases = [
+        'chroot / g""h pr merge',
+        'chroot /newroot g""h pr merge',
+        'nice -n 10 g""h pr merge',
+        'timeout -s KILL 60 g""h pr merge',
+        'ionice -c 3 g""h pr merge',
+    ]
+    for cmd in cases:
+        payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": cmd}}
+        msg = refusal(payload)
+        assert msg is not None, f"should refuse but got None for {cmd!r}"
+    # positive control: sudo -u already fixed
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": 'sudo -u x g""h pr merge'}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is not None
+
+
+def test_hard_refusal_chroot_root_operand_bypass():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # chroot root operand parsed as a wrapper: /tmp/timeout has basename "timeout"
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": 'chroot /tmp/timeout g""h pr merge'}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is not None
+
+
+def test_hard_refusal_exec_a_option_bypass():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # exec -a NAME: -a takes a value but exec not in _WRAPPER_OPTS_WITH_VALUE
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": 'exec -a masked g""h pr merge'}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is not None
+    # exec -aNAME attached form
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": 'exec -amasked g""h pr merge'}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is not None
+
+
+def test_hard_refusal_env_split_string_bypass():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # env -S 'g""h pr merge' (separate value)
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": 'env -S \'g""h pr merge\''}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is not None
+    # env -Sg""h pr merge (attached value)
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": 'env -Sg""h pr merge'}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is not None
+    # env --split-string='g""h pr merge' (long form attached)
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": 'env --split-string=\'g""h pr merge\''}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is not None
+    # env -S with env var expansion (fail closed)
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": r"env -S '${X} pr merge'"}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is not None
+
+
+def test_hard_refusal_wrapper_bypass_positive_controls():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # chroot with normal root dir should still allow ls
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "chroot /srv/root ls -la"}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is None
+    # env -S with normal command should still allow ls
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "env -S 'ls -la'"}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is None
+
+
+def test_hard_gh_refusal_on_parsed_keys():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # g""h and 'gh' should be refused same as gh
+    payload_gh = {"hook_event_name": "PreToolUse", "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "gh pr list"}}
+    payload_g_empty = {"hook_event_name": "PreToolUse", "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": 'g""h pr list'}}
+    payload_g_single = {"hook_event_name": "PreToolUse", "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "'gh' pr list"}}
+    msg_gh = refusal(payload_gh)
+    msg_g_empty = refusal(payload_g_empty)
+    msg_g_single = refusal(payload_g_single)
+    assert msg_gh is not None
+    assert msg_g_empty == msg_gh
+    assert msg_g_single == msg_gh
+    # git push also
+    payload_git = {"hook_event_name": "PreToolUse", "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "git push origin main"}}
+    assert refusal(payload_git) == msg_gh
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Wrapper bypass vulnerabilities that must be REFUSED (tsk-r3knpi)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_bypass_exec_clustered_short_flag():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # These clustered short flags should be REFUSED but are currently ALLOWED
+    cases = [
+        'exec -la masked g""h pr merge',
+        'exec -ca masked g""h pr merge',
+    ]
+    for cmd in cases:
+        payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": cmd}}
+        msg = refusal(payload)
+        assert msg is not None, f"should refuse but got None for {cmd!r}"
+
+
+def test_bypass_sudo_clustered_short_flag():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # These clustered short flags should be REFUSED but are currently ALLOWED
+    cases = [
+        'sudo -Eu root g""h pr merge',
+        'sudo -nu root g""h pr merge',
+    ]
+    for cmd in cases:
+        payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": cmd}}
+        msg = refusal(payload)
+        assert msg is not None, f"should refuse but got None for {cmd!r}"
+
+
+def test_bypass_chroot_attached_forms():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # These attached forms should be REFUSED but are currently ALLOWED
+    cases = [
+        'chroot --userspec=root:root /tmp/x g""h pr merge',
+        'chroot --groups=g /tmp/x g""h pr merge',
+    ]
+    for cmd in cases:
+        payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": cmd}}
+        msg = refusal(payload)
+        assert msg is not None, f"should refuse but got None for {cmd!r}"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Positive controls that must stay ALLOWED (benign)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_benign_exec_clustered_short_flag():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # These benign cases should stay ALLOWED
+    cases = [
+        'exec -la foo ls',
+        'exec -ca foo ls',
+    ]
+    for cmd in cases:
+        payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": cmd}}
+        assert refusal(payload) is None, f"should allow but got refusal for {cmd!r}"
+
+
+def test_benign_sudo_clustered_short_flag():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # These benign cases should stay ALLOWED
+    cases = [
+        'sudo -Eu root ls',
+        'sudo -nu root ls',
+    ]
+    for cmd in cases:
+        payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": cmd}}
+        assert refusal(payload) is None, f"should allow but got refusal for {cmd!r}"
+
+
+def test_benign_chroot_attached_forms():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # These benign attached forms should stay ALLOWED
+    cases = [
+        'chroot --userspec=root:root /tmp/x ls',
+        'chroot --groups=g /tmp/x ls',
+    ]
+    for cmd in cases:
+        payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": cmd}}
+        assert refusal(payload) is None, f"should allow but got refusal for {cmd!r}"
+
+
+def test_benign_env_split_string():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # env -S 'ls -la' should stay ALLOWED
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "env -S 'ls -la'"}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is None
+
+
+def test_benign_ls():
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import refusal
+    # ls -la should stay ALLOWED
+    payload = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "ls -la"}}
+    assert refusal(payload) is None
+
+
+def test_main_fails_closed_on_exception(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    from tinyagentos.claude_code_guard import main
+    import json
+    import sys
+    from io import StringIO
+    # Monkeypatch the rules loader path to raise
+    def raise_runtime(*args, **kwargs):
+        raise RuntimeError("boom")
+    monkeypatch.setattr("builtins.open", raise_runtime)
+    # Prepare stdin with a payload that triggers profile check
+    payload = json.dumps({"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "ls"}})
+    old_stdin = sys.stdin
+    sys.stdin = StringIO(payload)
+    try:
+        # main with --rules pointing to a file (will hit the patched open)
+        rc = main(["--rules", "/nonexistent/rules.json"])
+    finally:
+        sys.stdin = old_stdin
+    assert rc == 2
+
+
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Profile store, asks -> Decisions, answers -> rules, settings routes
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------