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π fix: smuggling and header hygiene coverage for proxy relays - #19228
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Table-test proxyHTTPHost, forwardPlainDirect and the sandbox read relay against CL+TE, duplicate and malformed Content-Length, unknown or listed Transfer-Encoding, obs-fold, bare LF, absolute-form vs Host mismatch and dot-segment paths. Two gaps the tables exposed are closed, fail closed: - proxyHTTPHost forwarded a request whose Host header or absolute-form URL named a host other than the CONNECT target; it is now refused with 400. - Dot segments (in any percent-encoded spelling) let the gates match one path while an upstream resolving them acts on another; both inspected relays now refuse them. Header stripping is left to #19212. Closes #19223 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: scanner <280983584+hivecommons-hive[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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[APPROVALNOTIFIER] This PR is NOT APPROVED This pull-request has been approved by: The full list of commands accepted by this bot can be found here. DetailsNeeds approval from an approver in each of these files:Approvers can indicate their approval by writing |
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Hive status β updated in place; edits do not notify. Full history is in the Activity Monitor. hive/awaiting-ci: CI pending - sweep will merge when green. π Hive Agent: Review findings from Routing, not a defect report: this edits the egress proxy relay rules ( What I read at head
Looks correct to me; I found no defect. The decision for a maintainer is whether to accept the behaviour change (requests that previously rode the CONNECT-host decision with a mismatched Host, or contained a dot segment, now get 400/403 and a closed connection). Review findings from Read This touches the credential-bearing egress gate, so it is routed rather than waved through: the dot-segment refusal is a behaviour change for any client that sends a |
Open PR overlap checkBase branch: Conflicts are checked with every PR merged onto the current tip of
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: scanner <280983584+hivecommons-hive[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The direct plain-forward path returns 502 for this input because the transport rejects the invalid field name. That is safe; assert framing only (anyForward) instead of demanding a 200. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: scanner <280983584+hivecommons-hive[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Decision needed: @clubanderson should decide whether the new fail-closed request-target refusals (400 on host mismatch, refusal of any dot segment) on the MITM and sandbox read relays may land, since they change proxy policy behaviour for every agent session.
Routing, not rejecting: I read the change at head 2443937 and found no defect, but it edits Hive proxy rules (src/crux/proxy/github_proxy_mitm.go, sandbox_read_relay.go), which I do not approve on my own.
What I verified in the tree:
relayRequestTargetRefusal(relay_request_target.go) reusessandboxReadRequestTargetsHost(sandbox_read_relay.go:487), which checks bothreq.Hostandreq.URL.Hostagainst the canonicalised CONNECT host and tolerates a port, case and trailing dot. The new tests cover those spellings as allowed.relayPathHasDotSegmentsplits the escaped path, decodes each segment, then splits again on a decoded/, so%2e%2e,.%2Eand..%2Fare caught; an undecodable segment is refused (fail closed). Query strings and..inside a longer segment are correctly left alone.- The refusal is placed before any gate reads the request in
proxyHTTPHost, and the connection is closed behind the 400, so nothing pipelined is processed. - In the sandbox relay the dot-segment check only runs when
d.Allowed, so it cannot turn a refusal into an allow. - The body matches the diff: the framing tests assert, rather than change, net/http behaviour, and the two gaps named are the two code changes.
Open question for the maintainer: a client that legitimately sends a dot segment, or a Host differing from the CONNECT target, will now get a hard 400 or 403 with no opt-out. I found no such caller in the tests, but I did not audit every agent client.
Suggestion, not a defect: the changelog fragment is accurate but long; one bullet per behaviour would read better.
Looks correct to me otherwise; CI is green except tide pending.
-- hive: agent=reviewer backend=claude model=claude-sonnet-5-5 claude=2.1.327
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Needs a decision, not a merge:
Head: verdict requires_human @2443937, 74/74 checks green, DCO yes, soak 0s of 10m0s. What to do: approve this head ( How to release it:
Clear the cause and the hive re-evaluates on its next pass; the stage moves to |
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/approve Posted by @clubanderson from the Hive dashboard; the merge gate decides from here. |
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/hive decision approve #19228: green head, reviewer question answered with the reversible default β proceed as implemented Rationale: no owner rule holds this back; a merge is reversible and keeps work moving. Hive decided: Approved for merge. Decided by the hive at @clubanderson's request as the owner's delegate under the owner-delegate policy (rule |
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Approved by @clubanderson for Hive auto-merge on green CI. |
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Hive queued this PR but could not set the |
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New changes are detected. LGTM label has been removed. |
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Correctness re-review at 93d8796: approve. The delta is a base merge and touches none of this PR's five files, so the earlier analysis stands. The prior security finding (forwardPlainDirect lacks the dot-segment refusal) is still present. It has no path gate to bypass (github_proxy_connect.go:658 only applies the destination guard), so I treat it as non-blocking from correctness. Header stripping is deferred to #19212 per the PR body. Tests were not run.
-- hive: agent=adjudicator backend=claude model=claude-sonnet-5-5 claude=2.1.328
| // Transfer-Encoding, folded headers, bare LF) is settled by net/http before a | ||
| // request reaches any gate: ReadRequest refuses what it cannot frame and | ||
| // req.Write regenerates one framing for the next hop, so the gates and the | ||
| // upstream always agree on where a request ends. relay_smuggling_test.go pins |
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Header comment is truncated mid-sentence ("so the gates and the" / "that, per relay."). Please reword; comment-only.
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Decision needed: @clubanderson should decide whether the inspected relay should hard-refuse (400 + close) every request whose Host/absolute-form names a host other than the CONNECT target, and every dot segment, given this changes egress-gate behaviour for all agents.
Routing to a human because this edits the agent egress gates (src/crux/proxy), a trust surface; I found no defect in the code I read.
What I read at head b600dc4:
relay_request_target.go:relayPathHasDotSegmentsplits on/, percent-decodes each segment, and re-splits on decoded/, so..%2F,%2e%2Eand undecodable segments are all caught (fail closed). Ordinary names likerepo.git,.github,a..bare not matched.github_proxy_mitm.go:48: the check runs right afterhttp.ReadRequestand before any gate, then closes the connection. Both callers (github_proxy_connect.go:223,545) pass the CONNECT host; the implied-GitHub caller passes"", which correctly skips the host comparison and applies only the path check.- It reuses the existing
sandboxReadRequestTargetsHost(sandbox_read_relay.go:482), which handles ports, case and trailing dots, and compares bothreq.Hostandreq.URL.Host. The sandbox relay change adds the same dot-segment refusal only when the policy had allowed the request. - Tests cover matching and mismatching hosts, encoded dot segments, the empty-host form and the smuggling tables per relay.
Open points for the decision (not defects):
- Behaviour change: a request that previously proceeded with a mismatched Host now gets a 400 and the connection is dropped. Any client that legitimately sends a different Host over a forged session (for example a redirect-following client reusing a connection) would now fail; the PR body does not say whether that was checked.
github_proxy_mitm.go:51passes the refusal reason as thepathargument ofrecordViolation(agentName, method, path)(github_proxy_violations.go:233), so violation records for this case will carry prose where other records carry a path. Worth a glance if anything parses that field.
-- hive: agent=reviewer backend=claude model=claude-sonnet-5-5 claude=2.1.328
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Security delta review at b46bfd9: no exploitable flaw found in the new code, but it does not belong in this PR.
Scope gap. The delta adds a new github-user-token ownership proof for hub registration: src/pkg/hub/selfservice_v1_proof.go, repoAdminDetail in selfservice_api.go, hooks in selfservice_v1_patch.go. It also adds docs and changelog entries for #19238 and Ask-AI. Issue #19223 and the PR body cover only smuggling and header-hygiene fixes for the agent relays. A new credential-accepting path is a trust-boundary change that the contract does not request. Please drop these changes and land them in their own PR.
Code observations. The method is off by default, the token is bound to the signed-in login via GET /user, it is never echoed, and the GitHub calls are read-only. I could not check whether infrastructure in front of the hub logs the X-Hive-Proof-Token header.
-- hive: agent=ci-maintainer backend=claude model=claude-sonnet-5-5 claude=2.1.328
Why
Egress audit section 4 (#18986) asks for smuggling and request-target table tests on the agent relays, with a fix for any gap they expose.
What
relay_smuggling_test.go) forproxyHTTPHost,forwardPlainDirectand the sandbox read relay: CL+TE in both orders, duplicate CL (same and differing), CL list/sign/hex, unknown/listed/duplicated/identity TE, space before colon, obs-fold (on TE and on an end-to-end header), leading-whitespace header, bare LF in headers and chunk lines, HTTP/1.0 with TE. Each asserts the upstream only ever sees unambiguous regenerated framing and that a request smuggled behind an allowed GET is gated, never forwarded. RFC 9112 rejections net/http guarantees are pinned as refusals.proxyHTTPHostforwarded a request whose Host header or absolute-form URL named a host other than the CONNECT target (the rule engine and credential were chosen for the CONNECT host). It now refuses with 400 and closes, reusing the sandbox relay's existingsandboxReadRequestTargetsHost../..path segment in any percent-encoded spelling (%2e%2e,.%2E,..%2F) let the gates match one path while an upstream resolving dot segments acts on another (e.g./repos/allowed/r/../../paused/r/..., orgit-receive-pack/../git-upload-packpassing the sandbox suffix match). Both inspected relays now refuse it; undecodable segments fail closed.forwardPlainDirect: pinned that absolute-form overrides the Host header and that the destination guard keys on the target, not Host. No code change needed there.Header stripping (Proxy-Authorization, X-Forwarded-, X-Hive-, Connection-named hop-by-hop, both directions) is covered by open PR #19212 and deliberately not duplicated here; this PR touches different hunks.
Verification
gofmt -lclean. Go tests run in CI per AGENTS.md.Closes #19223
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-- hive: agent=scanner backend=claude model=claude-sonnet-5-5 claude=2.1.327