feat(sandbox): drop root privileges after initialization on FreeBSD#458
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FreeBSD counterpart of #456 and #457. FreeBSD has no sandbox yet (Capsicum is planned), so under sudo a DPI compromise ran as unconstrained root for the whole process lifetime; this drop is the primary containment in the meantime.
After the BPF capture devices are open, the process drops to SUDO_UID/SUDO_GID (or nobody for plain root; doas does not set SUDO_UID) via setgroups + setresgid + setresuid, verified. Pre-created export files are chowned to the target user so PCAP/JSONL reopens keep working. Opt out with --no-uid-drop.
Trade-off (documented in SECURITY.md): sockstat-based process attribution then only sees the target user's processes.