feat(sandbox): drop root privileges after initialization on macOS#457
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macOS counterpart of #456. Under sudo, rustnet kept euid 0 for its whole lifetime even though root is only needed to open the BPF/PKTAP capture devices.
After capture init the process now drops to SUDO_UID/SUDO_GID (or nobody for plain root), before Seatbelt is applied so the profile needs no setuid allowances. Pre-created export files are chowned to the target user so PCAP/JSONL reopens keep working. Opt out with --no-uid-drop or --no-sandbox; --sandbox-strict fails if the drop fails.
The default PKTAP attribution path is unaffected (process metadata arrives in-band on the open capture fd); the lsof fallback then only sees the target user's processes (documented in SECURITY.md).
Verified on macOS 26.5: sudo run at uid 501 with Seatbelt fully enforced and exports written post-drop, nobody fallback (-2) for plain root, and --no-uid-drop keeping root. fmt/clippy/tests clean; Linux build cross-checked.
Rebased on main after #456: the uid-drop wiring in cli.rs/main.rs is now shared with Linux (privdrop re-exported at the platform level). Expect a trivial conflict with #458 for whichever merges second; I'll rebase.