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feat(catalog): check release inputs and verify signed community releases - #19

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Quick104 merged 2 commits into
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feat/signed-plugin-releases
Nov 13, 2026
Merged

Quick104 merged 2 commits into
mainfrom
feat/signed-plugin-releases

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@Quick104 Quick104 commented Nov 13, 2026 •

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Problem

Related issue: N/A (maintainer-directed; ports Silo-Server/silo-plugins#21)

The community catalog tells Silo servers which plugin binaries to download, and servers update plugins unattended. update-catalog builds an entry from whatever repository and tag a repository_dispatch names. It put the tag into the release and manifest request URLs without checking its form, so a crafted tag could make those requests resolve to another repository's release. It also took asset URLs as returned, let an older release replace the listed one, read manifest.json at a tag that can be moved, and had no way to record or check a release signature. The official catalog fixed the same problems in Silo-Server/silo-plugins#21.

Approach

update-catalog now refuses a release unless all of these hold, and writes manifest.json only after the last check:

  • The repository and tag match strict patterns before either goes into a URL, and the release's tag_name equals the requested tag.
  • The repository is listed in approved-plugins.json, spelled exactly as there. The tool resolves the plugin ID from the registry before any request, and the release's manifest.json must name that ID. The registry stays the binding between plugin ID and repository; entries still carry approval, PruneUnapproved still runs on every write, and check-catalog is unchanged.
  • Every catalogued asset URL (binaries, checksums.txt, plugin.sigstore.json) is exactly that release's download URL for that asset. Other assets, such as the tailscale plugin's .zip archives, are ignored.
  • The release is not a draft or prerelease, and its version is newer than the listed one. Re-running for the listed version is a no-op. A manual workflow_dispatch run can set allow_rollback; a dispatch payload cannot.
  • manifest.json is read at one commit: the commit in the signing certificate for a signed release, or the commit the tag resolves to (following annotated tags) for an unsigned one.
  • For a release with plugin.sigstore.json, every binary must pass gh attestation verify and every binary must name the same commit. The tool also requires the public-good Sigstore issuer and a transparency-log entry, which gh alone does not.
  • Binary assets are plugin-<os>-<arch> with lowercase alphanumeric parts, so plugin-linux-amd64.zip is not read as a binary.

Signing identity works the same way as the official catalog by default: the certificate must name Silo's shared workflow, https://github.com/Silo-Server/.github/.github/workflows/plugin-release.yml@refs/heads/main, checked with an exact --cert-identity. A community plugin may instead be signed by a workflow in its own repository, but only when its approved-plugins.json entry names that file in a new optional signer_workflow field (a plain .yml or .yaml file name). The catalog then accepts exactly https://github.com/<repo>/.github/workflows/<signer_workflow>@refs/tags/<tag>, stops accepting the shared workflow for that plugin, and requires the signed commit to be on the repository's default branch: GitHub's compare API, with the default branch looked up from the repository, must report the commit as identical or behind. Setting the field is an approval decision, documented in APPROVAL_POLICY.md; check-catalog validates its format. This pull request does not set it on any entry, so every plugin currently needs the shared workflow.

For both signers, --repo is the approved repository. With --bundle, --repo checks the certificate's source repository, not the signer's, so the shared workflow is accepted only when it built the approved repository. The issuer, --source-ref=refs/tags/<tag>, --deny-self-hosted-runners, and SLSA provenance v1 are always required.

Signed entries gain a package-level bundle_url next to checksums_url, and each binary gains checksum: the SHA-256 of the file gh verified. Silo servers prefer that value over checksums_url, so the listed bytes stay pinned even if release assets are replaced later. Unsigned entries are unchanged. Unsigned releases stay accepted for a plugin whose entry has no bundle_url; once an entry is signed, an unsigned release of that plugin is refused.

update-catalog.yml drops its concurrency group, gives the workflow token no permissions (CATALOG_PUSH_TOKEN pushes), passes payload values through env:, and pins actions/checkout and actions/setup-go by commit SHA at the v6 releases the workflow already used. Each push attempt resets to the current main, reruns the update, and runs check-catalog. That replaces the old git pull --rebase.

README.md documents the rules and what each kind of signer proves. CONTRIBUTING.md is new, since the repository had no contribution guide.

Validation

  • go test ./..., go vet ./..., go build ./..., go run ./cmd/check-catalog (all with GOWORK=off): pass. gofmt -l .: no output. actionlint 1.7.12: no findings.
  • Unit tests cover each refusal: input patterns, the registry lookup (unlisted repository, other case, other owner), a manifest naming another plugin ID, tag mismatch, drafts and prereleases, asset URLs on another repository, host, tag, or name, binary asset names, version order and both override cases, the commit check, annotated-tag resolution and its nesting limit, the download size cap and checksum, a signed release without binaries, the signed-entry ratchet, the gh arguments for both signers, the output check, and the signer_workflow format. Signer tests cover the default (shared only), a registry-declared workflow, another workflow file, a branch ref, another tag, another repository, and, through a stubbed GitHub lookup, a commit ahead of or diverged from the default branch. The private Sigstore instance case was confirmed to fail when the issuer check is disabled.
  • Before the change, the old tool sent a tag containing path segments to the release endpoint, and the release it fetched for Silo-Community/silo-plugins-requests-arr was requests-seerr's. After the change, the same input is refused before any request.
  • Run against a copy of the catalog: the listed release of each of the four plugins (requests-arr v0.1.11, requests-seerr v0.2.1, tailscale v0.2.2, watchprovider-scrob v0.3.1) is a no-op. With -allow-rollback, each entry is rebuilt and the catalog copy is byte-identical to manifest.json. requests-arr v0.1.10 is refused as older.
  • No community release is signed yet. As a sanity check, the generated shared-signer arguments verified the signed Silo-Server/silo-plugin-metadata-tmdb v1.2.30 linux/amd64 binary against its bundle, and the output check returned its commit. gh refused the same bundle with own-workflow arguments, with another repository, and with another tag. update-catalog itself refuses that release because the repository is not in the approval registry.

Risks

  • The signed path, including the per-binary checksum and the default-branch check, has not run on a real community bundle. The first signed community release will exercise it.
  • The workflow changes (permissions: {}, the allow_rollback input, the retry loop) have not run on Actions.
  • The requests-arr v0.1.11 and requests-seerr v0.2.1 tags point at a commit one ahead of main. If either plugin is later given a signer_workflow without changing how it tags releases, its signed releases will be refused by the default-branch rule.
  • An own-workflow signature proves the build came from the approved repository's default branch through the named workflow, not that the workflow or source was reviewed. Anyone who can push to that branch and tag can change both, which is why the field needs an approval decision.
  • When two releases of one plugin race, the newer one is listed whichever pushes first, and the older run ends as failed.
  • A no-op run no longer rewrites manifest.json, so removing a plugin from the registry takes effect on the next real update, not on a re-run of a listed release.

Checklist

  • I read and can explain the complete diff.
  • This pull request addresses one concern.

AI Disclosure

  • Harness: Claude Code (in T3 Code)
  • Tool(s): Claude Code
  • Model(s): claude-opus-5-5, claude-fable-5-2
  • Involvement: Fully AI-generated, human verification pending
  • Adversarial review: The official implementation this ports (feat(catalog): bind plugins to their repositories and check release signatures Silo-Server/silo-plugins#21) was adversarially reviewed. An independent review of this port's first commit found no bypass; it found five issues (a too-permissive own-repository signer, unpinned verified bytes, a loose asset-name check, a test that passed for the wrong reason, and missing refusal tests), all fixed in the second commit. The second commit has not been reviewed again.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Quick104 and others added 2 commits November 13, 2026 15:50
update-catalog now validates the repository and tag before building any
request URL, looks the repository up in approved-plugins.json before
fetching, refuses drafts, prereleases, mismatched tags, older versions,
and asset URLs outside the release, and reads manifest.json at one
commit. Releases that carry plugin.sigstore.json are verified with
gh attestation verify against either Silo's shared release workflow or a
workflow in the plugin's own repository run from the release tag, and
the entry records bundle_url. Once an entry is signed, unsigned releases
of that plugin are refused. A manual run can roll back with
allow_rollback.

The update workflow drops its concurrency group, gives the workflow
token no permissions, pins actions by SHA, and rebuilds on the current
main for each push attempt.

Ports Silo-Server/silo-plugins#21.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review follow-up. A signed release now must be signed by Silo's shared
release workflow, checked with an exact --cert-identity. A plugin may be
signed by a workflow in its own repository only when its
approved-plugins.json entry names that file in the new optional
signer_workflow field; the catalog then accepts exactly that workflow
run from the release tag, and only for a commit GitHub reports as on
the repository's default branch. check-catalog validates the field.
No entry sets it, so every plugin requires the shared workflow.

Signed entries now record each binary's SHA-256 in
binaries.<platform>.checksum, computed from the file gh verified, so
the listed bytes stay pinned if release assets change. Unsigned entries
are unchanged.

Binary asset names must have lowercase alphanumeric os and arch parts,
so plugin-linux-amd64.zip is no longer read as a binary. The private
Sigstore instance test now fails on the issuer check, and new tests
cover the manifest plugin ID, a signed release without binaries, the
download size cap, annotated tag resolution, and the signer rules.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@Quick104
Quick104 merged commit e410077 into main Nov 13, 2026
1 check passed
@Quick104
Quick104 deleted the feat/signed-plugin-releases branch November 13, 2026 21:09
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