docs(adr): keep anti-bot acquisition outside Wardnet - #171
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Caution Review failedThe pull request is closed. ℹ️ Recent review info⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: Organization UI Review profile: CHILL Plan: Team Run ID: 📒 Files selected for processing (2)
📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughanti-bot 획득과 챌린지 처리를 Wardnet 외부 책임으로 정의하는 ADR을 추가했습니다. Wardnet의 평판·보안 승인 책임, EgressWeave 전송 경계, 향후 통합 검증 조건을 문서화했습니다. ADR 목록도 갱신했습니다. Changes독립 엔진 아키텍처
Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to This PR does not change runtime behavior, but its proposed evidence and adapter contracts could guide future implementations toward stale reputation decisions or insufficient network protections. Clarifying provenance, SSRF prevention, and encrypted transport before merge keeps the ADR safe to implement. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 4
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/adr/2026-09-05-independent-access-and-reputation-engines.md`:
- Line 43: Update the TTL-without-authoritative-anchor guidance to require
InsufficientProvenance unconditionally; remove the option to retain incomplete
evidence, or explicitly state that any retained record is audit-only and must
not influence reputation decisions.
- Line 88: ADR의 References와 관련 설명을 업데이트하여 ThreatObservationV1 및 site-reputation
decision의 제한을 뒷받침하는 malicious-URL 또는 anomaly-detection 학술 문헌을 직접 인용하고 링크하세요. 각
문헌의 핵심 제한과 이 ADR에 적용되는 의미를 간략히 요약하고, PDF는 재배포 허가가 확인된 경우에만 추가하세요.
- Line 49: Update the original-provider contract section to require SSRF
protections for permitted fetching: define a destination allowlist, validate
resolved IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, and reapply allowlist plus private, loopback,
and link-local blocking on every redirect and DNS re-resolution. Prohibit
adapter-side fetching when these controls cannot be guaranteed.
- Line 35: Update the proposed consumer-owned optional provider adapter contract
around ThreatObservationV1 to explicitly require authenticated encrypted
transport on every provider-adapter transmission hop, separately from
authentication requirements. Preserve the existing provenance, subject
sufficiency, no-secret-leakage, and tenant-isolation conditions.
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Fix all unresolved CodeRabbit comments on this PR:
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ℹ️ Review info
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Configuration used: Organization UI
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Team
Run ID: dd7c5f20-4bde-4b09-b852-05d141809ee8
📒 Files selected for processing (2)
docs/adr/2026-09-05-independent-access-and-reputation-engines.mddocs/adr/README.md
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Purpose
Repair the ownership contradiction exposed by concurrent Wardnet design work. The first proposal placed both outbound anti-bot acquisition and destination site reputation outside Wardnet. Four minutes later, the explicit Wardnet product request in #173 assigned destination maliciousness, evidence lifecycle, organizational admission policy, and SOC accountability to Wardnet while preserving EgressWeave as transport-policy owner. That later product decision is the applicable security bounded-context authority.
This PR now preserves only the still-valid unique delta: browser acquisition/challenge handling stays outside Wardnet. It does not discard the site-reputation work; #173 or its verified successor carries that Wardnet-owned design.
Causal repair
independent-access-and-reputation-enginesADR withdocs/adr/2026-09-05-anti-bot-acquisition-boundary.md;InsufficientProvenancefor TTL-only evidence; audit-retained incomplete evidence is non-decision-bearing;Review findings
The original path had four valid CodeRabbit findings. The replacement incorporates the still-applicable controls directly: encrypted authenticated transport, strict TTL-only provenance semantics, no adapter-side SSRF-capable fetching, and direct academic traceability for the modular ownership decision. The site-reputation-specific research request is carried by #173's dedicated research register instead of duplicating a second reputation authority in this ADR.
Exact state
Protected/default base was re-read as
main@5829a0f08d78de464dd24393ce5d0f25fba9d126. Current candidate isd94a4a6207a0d3ea79547a57fb0a7c5f6b2b30d5. The protected-main-relative delta remains documentation-only and consists of the new anti-bot ADR plusdocs/adr/README.md; the superseded file is absent from the effective diff.All predecessor workflow/review conclusions are historical after this source movement. Keep this PR Draft until the unchanged exact head obtains current review/thread and then-live repository/security/governance evidence. No runtime source, dependency, workflow, branch protection, credential, foreign-owner source, or product-gap ledger is changed. No self/model approval, routine bypass, force push, gate weakening, or predecessor-evidence reuse.
Summary by CodeRabbit