This repository must never contain, in any file or commit history:

• WiFi credentials, ESPHome API encryption keys, OTA passwords, fallback-AP passwords;
• the UDP meter key (the XXTEA key protecting the meter → charger link - whoever holds it can forge the measurements the wallbox acts on);
• private IP addresses, MAC addresses, or entity ids of a real installation;
• tokens or credentials of any kind.

Mechanics:

• every ESPHome YAML references secrets via !secret only;
• esphome/secrets.yaml.example documents the required keys with dummy values; the real secrets.yaml is listed in .gitignore and never committed;
• reference/example configs are sanitised (placeholders such as <IP_NOEUD_BORNE>); when copying anything from a live installation, re-apply the sanitisation - never assume it carries over.

If a secret ever lands in a commit: treat it as compromised. Rotate it at the source (new WiFi password, regenerate the ESPHome API key, new UDP key on both nodes, new OTA password), then rewrite/remove the offending history before any push. Rotation comes first; history cleanup second.

The meter → charger measurement link is broadcast on the LAN. It is protected by ESPHome packet_transport encryption (XXTEA, key hashed SHA-256) with rolling code (anti-replay, flash-persisted). Without the key, forging the measurements published to the wallbox from the LAN is not possible; replayed packets are rejected. Defence in depth, not a substitute for a sane LAN: keep the key secret and rotate it if in doubt.

Fail-safe posture: if the measurement chain is silenced or tampered into silence, the charger node publishes the main-breaker value → zero margin → charging blocked. The failure mode of the system is "no charge", never "uncontrolled charge".

Please do not open a public issue for security-relevant findings (anything enabling measurement forgery, bypass of the fail-safe, or extraction of secrets). Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting ("Report a vulnerability" on the Security tab) so the report stays private while it is assessed. You should get a first response within a week. Coordinated disclosure appreciated: give us a reasonable window to ship a fix before publishing details.

Electrical-safety caveat: this project supervises a 230 V charging appliance. Software mitigations never replace the electrical protections (breakers, RCDs) of the installation - see the safety warnings in the README and docs/fr/INSTALL.md.