Curated resources on Decentralized Governance.
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: "Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) use smart contracts to foster communities working toward common goals. Existing definitions of decentralization, however-the 'D' in DAO-fall short of capturing key properties characteristic of diverse and equitable participation. We propose a new metric called Voting-Bloc Entropy (VBE, pronounced ''vibe'') that formalizes a broad notion of decentralization in voting on DAO proposals. VBE measures the similarity of participants' utility functions across a set of proposals. We use VBE to prove a number of results about the decentralizing effects of vote delegation, proposal bundling, bribery, and quadratic voting. Our results lead to practical suggestions for enhancing DAO decentralization. One of our results highlights the risk of systemic bribery with increasing DAO decentralization. To show that this threat is realistic, we present the first practical realization of a Dark DAO, a proposed mechanism for privacy-preserving corruption of identity systems, including those used in DAO voting. Our Dark-DAO prototype uses trusted execution environments (TEEs) in the Oasis Sapphire blockchain for attacks on Ethereum DAOs. It demonstrates that Dark DAOs constitute a realistic future concern for DAO governance."
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: "Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are a new, rapidly-growing class of organizations governed by smart contracts. Here we describe how researchers can contribute to the emerging science of DAOs and other digitally-constituted organizations. From granular privacy primitives to mechanism designs to model laws, we identify high-impact problems in the DAO ecosystem where existing gaps might be tackled through a new data set or by applying tools and ideas from existing research fields such as political science, computer science, economics, law, and organizational science. Our recommendations encompass exciting research questions as well as promising business opportunities. We call on the wider research community to join the global effort to invent the next generation of organizations."
Algorithmic governance, code as law, and the blockchain common: Power relations in the blockchain-based society (2023)
[Link], [Highlights]
Summarized Abstract: The concept of "code is law," popularized in the Web3 and blockchain era, echoes ideas from Lawrence Lessig's 2000 book, "Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace." This term gained new relevance with the advent of smart contracts and the promise of algorithmic governance in Web3. While there's a belief that a world governed by algorithms and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) will be fairer, concerns remain about algorithmic bias and unfairness, issues already prevalent in Web2. The paper explores the idea that Web3's blockchain and smart contract technology, though decentralizing decision-making and power, do not fundamentally alter existing power dynamics and struggles. It analyzes power relations in blockchain society, discussing both vertical struggles (between code and individuals, governments, and corporations) and horizontal struggles (among society, corporations, and the state over code modification and governance token influence). The paper concludes that while Web3 introduces a new space for social interaction and discourse, it mirrors earlier stages of the internet in perpetuating longstanding societal power imbalances.
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: "A core puzzle for democratizing online governance systems is understanding how to incentivize long-term civic participation via rewards. Current web3 governance systems tend to use transferable tokens, but those have some clear limitations (e.g., tendency toward plutocracy, low sybil resilience, and incentives to sell tokens and exit) which might be overcome by moving beyond coin voting. In this article, I compare the tradeoffs of reputation-based and token-based reward systems for participation in governance. I outline considerations for each of these governance reward systems, and discuss how they might be earned and what powers they might translate into. "
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: "_Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are a new, rapidly-growing class of organizations governed by smart contracts. Here we describe how researchers can contribute to the emerging science of DAOs and other digitally-constituted organizations. From granular privacy primitives to mechanism designs to model laws, we identify high-impact problems in the DAO ecosystem where existing gaps might be tackled through a new data set or by applying tools and ideas from existing research fields such as political science, computer science, economics, law, and organizational science. Our recommendations encompass exciting research questions as well as promising business opportunities. We call on the wider research community to join the global effort to invent the next generation of organizations. _"
Metaverse governance: An empirical analysis of voting within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (2023)
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: "In this paper we explore the importance of platform governance. We discuss various problems of centralized architecture in the context of the metaverse or sharing economy applications which may lead to monopoly market structures. We argue that open standards and blockchain-based governance can potentially mitigate some of these issues. We then collect governance data from the first blockchain-based virtual world and conduct an empirical analysis to study voter behavior within Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). We provide empirical evidence that open standards and blockchain-based governance are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a decentralized and neutral platform. Centralization and concentrated voting power may lead to dependencies, rent extraction behavior and create hold-up problems. Consequently, producers, prosumers and service providers must evaluate the governance structure of the platform before establishing a presence."
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: "Developers may be the ones who launch Web3 apps, but the community makes or breaks their success. And sometimes, in Web3, the community even has collective ownership of the app. This deeper level of involvement from Web3 users raises a few questions: who should make decisions about the project, and how can those decisions be decentralized and equitable? Web3 governance helps answer both questions."
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: " web3 has created a new laboratory for democratic governance that interweaves civic and corporate governance traditions in a way previously impossible. Public and private incentives are entwined. Projects are open source and for-profit. Public goods coexist with private initiatives. Governance is continuous, participation is radically open, and execution is rapid."
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: " Blockchains have enabled innovation in distributed economic institutions, such as money (e.g., cryptocurrencies)and markets (e.g., decentralized exchanges), but also innovations in distributed governance, such as decentralized autonomous organizations. These innovations have generated academic interest in studying web3 governance, but as yet there is no general theory of web3 governance. In this paper, we draw on the contrast between a‘romantic view’ of governance (characterized by consensus through community voting) and the‘exchange view’ of governance from public choice theory (characterized by an entrepreneurial process of bargaining and exchange of voters under uncertainty). Our analysis is the first to argue that the latter‘exchange view’ of governance is best to understand the dynamics of governance innovation in web3, providing the foundations for a new general theory of governance in this frontier field. We apply the‘exchange view’ of governance to three case studies (Curve, Lido and Metagov), exploring how these projects enable pseudonymous, composable and permissionless governance processes to reveal value. Our approach helps illuminate how this emergent polycentric governance process can generate robustness in decentralized systems"
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: "What are blockchains and how are ongoing mutations of this ‘distributed ledger technology’ impacting Internet governance? Debates about the pros and cons of blockchains for the unity and diversity of the Internet abound. In this contribution, we examine attempts to consolidate blockchain-based activities in the push towards a so-called Web3. This push for unity, we show, emphasizes technical interoperationality at the expense of socio-economic diversity. Unity in Web3, we contend, is being achieved through highly constrained forms of diversity, a regrettable but not entirely surprising trajectory for the future of Internet governance given tendencies of blockchain applications to re-create rather than overcome existing pathologies of Web 2.0."
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: "WEB3 ADVOCATES PROMISE decentralization on an unprecedented scale. Excessive centralization can stymie coordination and erode freedom, democracy, and economic dynamism—decentralization is supposed to be the remedy. But the term on its own is too vague to be a coherent end goal. Getting the job done takes the right kind of decentralization, and we worry that Web3 is thus far heading down the wrong track."
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: "... The following blog post presents a nuanced perspective on DAOs, starting with an educational primer on the basics of DAOs before discussing the benefits and tradeoffs every DAO must optimize around if they are to achieve sustainable success."
[Link], [Highlights]
Abstract: "Certain advances in election technology, such as online voting, promise to reduce the administrative overhead of running an election. This has breathed new life into the idea of direct democracy, where voters play a more active role in setting legislation. However it is anticipated that a steady stream of referendums would generate voter fatigue. To combat this fatigue, voters could be allowed to delegate their votes to other (more knowledgeable) voters. This idea is old but has been recently reinvented under the name liquid democracy. In this paper, we consider how ballot secrecy should be defined for liquid democracy. We first show that a natural definition of full secrecy leads to several undesirable outcomes. We then show that these are very difficult to address without enabling voter coercion and vote buying. The purpose of the paper is not to affirm liquid democracy; rather, it is to raise awareness of unseen complexity hiding under our initial presumption that liquid democracy could effortlessly support a secret ballot."
[Link], [Highlights]
Summarized Abstract: Researchers and developers are exploring whether blockchains can be the solution for more secure and transparent voting processes. The authors approach this topic by analyzing it from two perspectives: first, by considering the challenges of implementing a voting system on a blockchain, and second, by examining how blockchain might enhance existing verifiable voting systems. Their conclusion is that while blockchains offer useful augmentations to verifiable voting in certain situations and may enable innovative voting methods in non-traditional settings, they are not a universal solution. Particularly for public sector elections, blockchains would likely play a supporting role within a broader security system, if used at all. This work aims to systematize existing knowledge on blockchain and verifiable voting technologies, outlining a research agenda and identifying potential applications while also recognizing limitations and impractical approaches.