Ayo authenticates you with GitHub, holds a session token on your machine, and routes messages and work context between teammates through a relay. Anything that could leak a token, let someone send or read as another person, or expose one team's traffic to another, I take seriously.

Please do not open a public issue for a security problem. Instead, either:

• Use GitHub's private Report a vulnerability form, or
• Email wkoverfield@gmail.com with ayo security in the subject.

Include the smallest repro you can, the version (ayo --version), and what you expected versus what happened. I aim to acknowledge within a few days.

The relay is the only place identity is verified, and the Durable Object never trusts a client-supplied identity (see the protocol spec). Reports that especially matter:

• Identity / authorization: sending or reading as someone you aren't, injecting or forging the trusted x-ayo-* identity into the DO, joining or reading a team you're not a member of, or a webhook/handoff path that re-rosters or impersonates a member.
• Token exposure: a session or webhook token that leaks into a log, an error message, a rendered page, or another user's response.
• The public surfaces: injection or XSS on the handoff share page, or abuse of the anonymous reply / inbound webhook / GitHub webhook endpoints (rate-limit bypass, forged signatures, amplification).
• Path traversal or injection through handles, tokens, team/handoff ids, or webhook and handoff-page content.

Sessions expire 90 days after their last use (rolling), and ayo logout revokes this machine's token immediately. Listing/revoking OTHER machines' sessions isn't built yet — flagged in docs/FOLLOWUPS.md.

Ayo is pre-1.0 and moves fast. Fixes land on the latest published @ayo-dev/cli release and a redeploy of the relay; please reproduce against the current version before reporting.