| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Methodology rewrite | Immutable versioned hashes on-chain + content hash |
| Compiler collusion with wrong math | Exact-hash quorum; disputes; independent replay |
| Stale/missing data treated as zero | Quality states; compiler rejects non-VALID |
| Capital intent used as deposit | Non-custodial; no token transfers; UI disclosure |
| Unauthorized SoDEX trading | Explicit approval; execution flag; API key not master wallet |
| Admin abuse | Ownable2Step-style ownership; pause emits events; no seizure of bonds |
| Secret leakage | Redacting logger; env-only secrets; no commit of .env |
- User wallets: SIWE + EIP-712 only
- Relayer:
VALUECHAIN_RELAYER_PRIVATE_KEYin secret store - SoDEX: Dedicated testnet API key; master wallet never enters infrastructure
- Compiler operators: Own keys; bonds on CompilerRegistry
- Contract
pause(owner) - API/worker
FEATURE_EMERGENCY_PAUSE/ admin pause endpoint - SoDEX execution disabled by default (
SODEX_EXECUTION_ENABLED=false)
Security issues should be reported privately to the project maintainer before public disclosure.