fix(security): harden command injection, path traversal & auth surfaces - #3018
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fix(security): harden command injection, path traversal & auth surfaces#30187feilee wants to merge 2 commits into
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Audit of the backend attack surface and fixes for the web-reachable CRITICAL/HIGH issues. Adds back/shared/security.ts with centralized hardening helpers (shellEscape, assertSafeDependenceName, SUBSCRIPTION_PATTERNS, safeCompare, isSafeSshConfigValue). - Subscription fields (url/branch/whitelist/blacklist/extensions/proxy) are now shell-escaped before reaching spawn() and validated with strict Joi patterns at the API, closing OS command injection and the downstream shell eval/git-arg-injection paths. - Dependency names are validated before interpolation into pnpm/pip/apk/apt commands (incl. the embedded Python source). - SSH config generation rejects newline/metachar injection in host/proxy (prevents injected ProxyCommand execution). - ConfigService.getFile resolves the real path before containment check, fixing data/scripts/../db traversal that leaked the SQLite DB. - /configs/save containment check fixed (sibling-dir write bypass). - Script/env uploads use path.basename, preventing arbitrary file write (crontab.list/env.sh overwrite -> RCE) via multer originalname. - JWT secret is generated and persisted per-install instead of the public default 'whyour-secret'; production refuses to boot without one. - Token comparison is now constant-time (safeCompare). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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What
Hardens the backend against the web-reachable injection / traversal / auth issues found in a defensive attack-surface audit. Adds
back/shared/security.tswith centralized helpers (shellEscape,assertSafeDependenceName,SUBSCRIPTION_PATTERNS,safeCompare,isSafeSshConfigValue).Fixes
url/branch/whitelist/blacklist/extensions/proxyreachingspawn(...,{shell})name(pnpm/pip/apk/apt + embedded Python)ProxyCommand/host injection (services/sshKey.ts)proxymust behost:portdata/scripts/../db/database.sqliteleaked the SQLite DBoriginalname(overwritecrontab.list/env.sh)path.basename, reject./../configs/savesibling-dir write bypasspath.sepcontainment checkwhyour-secret→ forgeable admin tokenssafeCompare(hash +timingSafeEqual)The API-boundary validation also neutralizes the web-reachable shell
eval/git-arg-injection paths downstream.Notes
host:portproxies). Security logic verified with standalone runtime tests.systemscope, SSRF in notify, error-message leakage, rate-limit, self-update integrity) tracked in Security hardening follow-ups (deferred from injection/traversal/auth audit) #3017.