fix(ci): do not persist the job token in .git/config in the public-repo guard

[yakimoto]

Why

actions/checkout without persist-credentials: false writes the job's GITHUB_TOKEN into
.git/config, where any later step — or anything those steps execute — can read it. This is the
security gate that DOWNLOADS AND EXECUTES the gitleaks binary, and the workflow's own comment
already reasons about tampered downloads ("so a tampered or MITM'd download can never execute
inside the security gate"), so the threat model is written down and only the credential half of
the mitigation is missing. Found by zizmor as warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts.

Safety

Verified this job only: checks out, installs gitleaks (pinned + checksum), runs
gitleaks detect --no-git, installs ripgrep, runs content-policy.sh. permissions: contents: read. Nothing pushes, calls gh, or reads GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN, so the token was never needed
in .git/config in the first place.

Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1870.

---

Note

Stop persisting the job token in .git/config in the public-repo guard CI workflow

Sets persist-credentials: false on the actions/checkout step in public-repo-guard.yml so the GitHub job token is not written to the local git config during the workflow run.

^{Macroscope summarized 1ba0507.}

[coderabbitai]

Warning

Review limit reached

You’ve reached a temporary PR review limit under our Fair Usage Limits Policy.

Your recent review volume is higher than typical usage, so adaptive limits are currently applied.

Next review available in: 31 minutes

Your organization has reached its usage spending cap. Adjust your spending cap in the billing tab.

How can I continue?

After more reviews become available, a review can be triggered using the @coderabbitai review command as a PR comment. Alternatively, push new commits to this PR.

To avoid repeated limits, reduce automatic review volume by pausing incremental auto-reviews earlier, using label-based review opt-in, excluding WIP or generated PR titles, or requesting reviews manually when the PR is ready. If your team needs uninterrupted high-volume reviews, an organization admin can enable usage-based reviews.

How do review limits work?

CodeRabbit enforces per-developer PR review limits for each organization. Most developers receive the normal plan review availability.

For paid Pro and Pro+ PR reviews, CodeRabbit uses adaptive limits for sustained high-volume activity. When a developer's recent PR review activity reaches the 95th percentile or higher among CodeRabbit users, additional reviews become available more gradually as earlier reviews age out of the rolling window.

Please refer docs for additional details.

Review details

⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Path: .coderabbit.yaml

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Pro Plus

Run ID: daf3e32f-dc77-4db5-b2ef-6b8b258d710f

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between d9be379 and 1ba0507.

📒 Files selected for processing (1)

• .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml

---

_{Comment @coderabbitai help to get the list of available commands.}

[devin-ai-integration]

Devin Review found 1 potential issue.

[devin-ai-integration]

🔍 Other workflows in the repo may still persist credentials

This hardening is applied only to the public-repo-guard workflow. If other workflows in .github/workflows/ also use actions/checkout without persist-credentials: false, the fix is partial; consider applying the same setting repo-wide for consistency.

---

Was this helpful? React with 👍 or 👎 to provide feedback.

[qodo-code-review]

PR Summary by Qodo

Stop persisting GITHUB_TOKEN in public-repo-guard checkout

🐞 Bug fix ⚙️ Configuration changes 🕐 Less than 5 minutes

AI Description

• Disable credential persistence during checkout to prevent GITHUB_TOKEN storage in .git/config
• Reduce token exposure for later steps that download and execute third-party binaries

Diagram

graph TD
  A["GitHub Actions job"] --> B["actions/checkout"] --> C[(".git/config")]
  C --> D["Later steps (gitleaks/content-policy)"]
  B --> E["persist-credentials: false"]

  subgraph Legend
    direction LR
    _job["Job/Step"] ~~~ _cfg[("Config/File")]
  end

Loading

High-Level Assessment

The following are alternative approaches to this PR:

1. Set actions/checkout token to empty/limited token

• ➕ Can prevent any authenticated git operations from being possible in the job
• ➖ May break checkout in some scenarios (e.g., rate limits, private submodules, LFS), depending on repo settings and future changes

2. Avoid checkout entirely (download repo archive)

• ➕ Eliminates git credential persistence concerns by not using git at all
• ➖ More workflow complexity; may not match current tooling expectations (paths, git metadata), and can regress future steps relying on git state

Recommendation: Keep the current approach (persist-credentials: false). It directly addresses the credential-persistence risk with minimal change surface and preserves normal checkout behavior while preventing the token from being written to .git/config.

Files changed (1) +2 / -0

Other (1) +2 / -0

public-repo-guard.ymlDisable checkout credential persistence for public-repo guard job +2/-0

Disable checkout credential persistence for public-repo guard job

• Configures the 'actions/checkout' step with 'persist-credentials: false' so the job token is not stored in '.git/config'. This reduces the risk of later steps reading the token, especially in a job that downloads and executes external binaries.

.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml

[macroscopeapp]

Approvability

Verdict: Approved 1ba0507

Minor CI security hardening that adds persist-credentials: false to the checkout action. The change is self-contained, follows GitHub Actions best practices, and the author owns the modified workflow file.

^{You can customize Macroscope's approvability policy. Learn more.}

[qodo-code-review]

Code Review by Qodo

🐞 Bugs (0) 📘 Rule violations (0) 📎 Requirement gaps (0)

Great, no issues found!

Qodo reviewed your code and found no material issues that require review

_{To customize comments, go to the Qodo configuration screen, or learn more in the docs.}

[qodo-code-review]

Qodo Fixer

No findings are available for this PR yet. Findings appear here once Qodo has reviewed the PR.

[cubic-dev-ai]

No issues found across 1 file

Confidence score: 5/5

• Automated review surfaced no issues in the provided summaries.
• No files require special attention.

_{Re-trigger cubic}

[yakimoto]

This PR is redundant with #37 (chore/guard-canonical-sync), which is already open and already contains this exact change.

Evidence — #37's diff to .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml includes:

+          # tree. Nothing here pushes -- the scan is `--no-git` over the working tree --
+          # so no step needs authenticated Git; drop it. (zizmor: artipacked)
+          persist-credentials: false

#37 is also broader than this PR: it syncs the whole vendored public-repo-guard trio to
the canonical source (wave-foundation/scaffolder/public-repo-guard) byte-for-byte, verified by
git blob SHA, rather than adding this one line in isolation.

Closing as redundant. This duplicate exists because the fan-out that opened this PR
(refs claude-workstation#1870) did not check for in-flight PRs touching the same file before
going out — #37 was already open. Merge #37 instead.