fix(ci): do not persist the job token in .git/config in the public-repo guard

[yakimoto]

Why

actions/checkout without persist-credentials: false writes the job's GITHUB_TOKEN into
.git/config, where any later step — or anything those steps execute — can read it. This is the
security gate that DOWNLOADS AND EXECUTES the gitleaks binary, and the workflow's own comment
already reasons about tampered downloads ("so a tampered or MITM'd download can never execute
inside the security gate"), so the threat model is written down and only the credential half of
the mitigation is missing. Found by zizmor as warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts.

Safety

Verified this job only: checks out, installs gitleaks (pinned + checksum), runs
gitleaks detect --no-git, installs ripgrep, runs content-policy.sh. permissions: contents: read. Nothing pushes, calls gh, or reads GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN, so the token was never needed
in .git/config in the first place.

Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1870.

---

---

Note

Low Risk
Single workflow hardening with no behavior change to scans; aligns with existing checkout settings elsewhere in the repo.

Overview
Sets persist-credentials: false on the actions/checkout step in the public-repo-guard workflow so the job’s GITHUB_TOKEN is not written into .git/config.

That matters because later steps download and run the pinned gitleaks binary and execute content-policy.sh; without this flag, anything in those steps could read the token from git config even though the job only needs contents: read and never pushes or uses gh. This matches how other workflows in the repo (e.g. _checks.yml, lint.yml) already configure checkout.

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 606f2ad. Configure here.}

[cursor]

Bugbot couldn't run - usage limit reached

Bugbot is counted against Cursor usage for this user or team, and this run hit a usage or spend limit.

A user or team admin can review and increase usage limits in the Cursor dashboard.

(requestId: serverGenReqId_80eb961a-d52e-4fdb-b469-130a0b0d08b0)

[devin-ai-integration]

✅ Devin Review: No Issues Found

Devin Review analyzed this PR and found no bugs or issues to report.

[coderabbitai]

Warning

Review limit reached

You’ve reached a temporary PR review limit under our Fair Usage Limits Policy.

Your recent review volume is higher than typical usage, so adaptive limits are currently applied.

Next review available in: 31 minutes

Your organization has reached its usage spending cap. Adjust your spending cap in the billing tab.

How can I continue?

After more reviews become available, a review can be triggered using the @coderabbitai review command as a PR comment. Alternatively, push new commits to this PR.

To avoid repeated limits, reduce automatic review volume by pausing incremental auto-reviews earlier, using label-based review opt-in, excluding WIP or generated PR titles, or requesting reviews manually when the PR is ready. If your team needs uninterrupted high-volume reviews, an organization admin can enable usage-based reviews.

How do review limits work?

CodeRabbit enforces per-developer PR review limits for each organization. Most developers receive the normal plan review availability.

For paid Pro and Pro+ PR reviews, CodeRabbit uses adaptive limits for sustained high-volume activity. When a developer's recent PR review activity reaches the 95th percentile or higher among CodeRabbit users, additional reviews become available more gradually as earlier reviews age out of the rolling window.

Please refer docs for additional details.

Review details

⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Organization UI

Review profile: ASSERTIVE

Plan: Pro Plus

Run ID: 5994902b-8efc-4756-a686-23dfdc20f1ca

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between f905017 and 606f2ad.

📒 Files selected for processing (1)

• .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml

---

_{Comment @coderabbitai help to get the list of available commands.}

[macroscopeapp]

Approvability

Verdict: Approved 606f2ad

Minor CI security hardening that adds persist-credentials: false to prevent token persistence in git config. The change is a well-known best practice, affects only CI execution, and the author owns the modified workflow file.

^{You can customize Macroscope's approvability policy. Learn more.}

[qodo-code-review]

PR Summary by Qodo

CI: disable credential persistence in public-repo-guard checkout

🐞 Bug fix ⚙️ Configuration changes 🕐 10-20 Minutes

AI Description

• Disable Actions checkout credential persistence to avoid writing GITHUB_TOKEN into .git/config.
• Reduce token exposure to later steps that download and execute third-party binaries.

Diagram

graph TD
  A["public-repo-guard workflow"] --> B["actions/checkout"] --> C[(".git/config")]
  B -->|"persist-credentials: false"| D["No token stored"]
  B --> E["Download gitleaks"] --> F["Run policy checks"]

Loading

High-Level Assessment

Setting persist-credentials: false on actions/checkout is the most direct mitigation for preventing GITHUB_TOKEN from being written to .git/config, without changing job permissions or behavior.

Files changed (1) +2 / -0

Other (1) +2 / -0

public-repo-guard.ymlDisable checkout credential persistence +2/-0

Disable checkout credential persistence

• Adds 'persist-credentials: false' to the 'actions/checkout' step so the workflow job token is not stored in '.git/config'. This limits token exposure to later workflow steps.

.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml

[qodo-code-review]

Code Review by Qodo

🐞 Bugs (0) 📘 Rule violations (0) 📎 Requirement gaps (0)

Great, no issues found!

Qodo reviewed your code and found no material issues that require review

_{To customize comments, go to the Qodo configuration screen, or learn more in the docs.}

[cubic-dev-ai]

No issues found across 1 file

Confidence score: 5/5

• Automated review surfaced no issues in the provided summaries.
• No files require special attention.

_{Re-trigger cubic}

[qodo-code-review]

Qodo Fixer

No findings are available for this PR yet. Findings appear here once Qodo has reviewed the PR.

[yakimoto]

This PR is redundant with #60 (chore/guard-canonical-sync), which is already open and already contains this exact change.

Evidence — #60's diff to .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml includes:

+          # tree. Nothing here pushes -- the scan is `--no-git` over the working tree --
+          # so no step needs authenticated Git; drop it. (zizmor: artipacked)
+          persist-credentials: false

#60 is also broader than this PR: it syncs the whole vendored public-repo-guard trio to
the canonical source (wave-foundation/scaffolder/public-repo-guard) byte-for-byte, verified by
git blob SHA, rather than adding this one line in isolation.

Closing as redundant. This duplicate exists because the fan-out that opened this PR
(refs claude-workstation#1870) did not check for in-flight PRs touching the same file before
going out — #60 was already open. Merge #60 instead.