chore(guard): sync vendored public-repo-guard to canonical

[wave-av-release-bot]

Syncs the vendored public-repo-guard trio to the canonical source in wave-foundation/scaffolder/public-repo-guard.

• adds the internal-ip leak rule (Tailscale-CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10), lockstep with the pre-publish mirror gate
• reconciles accumulated drift in the vendored copy

Each changed file is byte-for-byte identical to canonical (verified by git blob SHA). The repo's own Secrets + content policy gate re-scans this PR.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

---

Note

Update public-repo-guard workflow to use actions/checkout v7 without persisted credentials

Syncs public-repo-guard.yml to the canonical version. Upgrades actions/checkout from v5.0.1 to v7.0.0 and sets persist-credentials: false so the GITHUB_TOKEN is no longer stored in the repository's Git config after checkout.

^{Macroscope summarized 0699010.}

---

Summary by cubic

Synced the vendored public-repo-guard to wave-foundation/scaffolder/public-repo-guard and added an internal IP leak rule for 100.64.0.0/10 (Tailscale CGNAT). Hardened the guard workflow by upgrading to actions/checkout@v7 and disabling persisted credentials for scans.

• Refactors
  • Reconciled drift; files now match canonical byte-for-byte.
  • Set persist-credentials: false for actions/checkout since scans run --no-git and need no Git auth.

^{Written for commit 0699010. Summary will update on new commits.}

[greptile-apps]

PR author is in the excluded authors list.

[macroscopeapp]

Approvability

Verdict: Needs human review

Unable to check for correctness in 0699010. This PR makes a minor CI security improvement (bumping actions/checkout and adding persist-credentials: false), but the author does not own the modified workflow file which is designated to wave-av/core-team. The code owners should review changes to their workflow.

^{You can customize Macroscope's approvability policy. Learn more.}

[devin-ai-integration]

Devin Review found 1 potential issue.

[devin-ai-integration]

🔍 persist-credentials: false is safe for this job's steps

Verified that no step in this job performs an authenticated git operation: gitleaks runs with --no-git --source . over the working tree (line 65), and content-policy.sh is invoked on the checkout directory only. Disabling credential persistence therefore does not break the scan. Worth confirming scripts/public-repo-guard/content-policy.sh never shells out to git fetch/git log against the remote, which would now fail for private-repo contexts.

---

Was this helpful? React with 👍 or 👎 to provide feedback.