fix(ci): do not persist the job token in .git/config in the public-repo guard

[yakimoto]

Why

actions/checkout without persist-credentials: false writes the job's GITHUB_TOKEN into
.git/config, where any later step — or anything those steps execute — can read it. This is the
security gate that DOWNLOADS AND EXECUTES the gitleaks binary, and the workflow's own comment
already reasons about tampered downloads ("so a tampered or MITM'd download can never execute
inside the security gate"), so the threat model is written down and only the credential half of
the mitigation is missing. Found by zizmor as warning[artipacked]: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts.

Safety

Verified this job only: checks out, installs gitleaks (pinned + checksum), runs
gitleaks detect --no-git, installs ripgrep, runs content-policy.sh. permissions: contents: read. Nothing pushes, calls gh, or reads GITHUB_TOKEN/GH_TOKEN, so the token was never needed
in .git/config in the first place.

Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1870.

---

Note

^{Cursor Bugbot is generating a summary for commit a925ae0. Configure here.}

Note

Stop persisting the job token in .git/config in the public-repo guard CI workflow

Sets persist-credentials: false on the actions/checkout step in public-repo-guard.yml so the GitHub job token is not written to the local git config during the workflow run.

^{Macroscope summarized a925ae0.}

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(requestId: serverGenReqId_95a2221e-a844-4add-af30-650510d2e165)

[macroscopeapp]

Approvability

Verdict: Approved a925ae0

This is a minor CI security hardening change that prevents the job token from being persisted in git config - a standard best practice. The author is the designated code owner of this workflow file.

^{You can customize Macroscope's approvability policy. Learn more.}

[devin-ai-integration]

Devin Review found 1 potential issue.

[devin-ai-integration]

🔍 Installation instructions unchanged but hardening is workflow-local

The header comment (lines 16-19) instructs copying the three guard files into other repos verbatim. This hardening change lives only in this repo's copy; sibling public repos that already vendored the workflow will keep persisting the job token unless the same edit is propagated. Consider syncing the change across the other repos that vendored this guard.

---

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[qodo-code-review]

PR Summary by Qodo

CI: prevent GITHUB_TOKEN persistence in public-repo guard checkout

🐞 Bug fix ⚙️ Configuration changes 🕐 Less than 10 minutes

AI Description

• Disable credential persistence during checkout in the public-repo guard job.
• Prevent GITHUB_TOKEN from being written into .git/config for later steps.
• Reduce risk when downloading/executing pinned security tooling (e.g., gitleaks).

Diagram

graph TD
  A["public-repo-guard job"] --> B["actions/checkout"] --> C["repo working tree"] --> D["download + run tools"]
  B --> E[".git/config"]
  F{"persist-credentials: false?"}
  B --> F
  F -->|yes| G["no token stored"]
  F -->|no| H["GITHUB_TOKEN stored"]
  subgraph Legend
    direction LR
    _job([Job/Step]) ~~~ _file["Config file"] ~~~ _dec{Decision}
  end

Loading

High-Level Assessment

The following are alternative approaches to this PR:

1. Skip checkout in the guard job

• ➕ Eliminates git credential persistence and git metadata entirely in the security gate
• ➖ Often impractical if policy scripts or repo files are required
• ➖ May require reworking steps to fetch only needed files

2. Post-checkout token scrubbing

• ➕ Can remediate credential persistence even if a misconfigured checkout is used
• ➖ More brittle; must track all places tokens can be stored (extraheader, credential helpers, etc.)
• ➖ Token is briefly available between checkout and scrub step

3. Use a separate minimal-permissions token / OIDC flow

• ➕ Further limits impact if a token is exposed
• ➖ More complex setup; likely unnecessary here given contents:read and no token need

Recommendation: Keep the current approach (persist-credentials: false) as the primary mitigation: it prevents the token from ever being written to .git/config and aligns with the job’s threat model (downloading/executing tooling). Alternatives either add complexity (scrubbing or token redesign) or require larger workflow changes (no checkout).

Files changed (1) +2 / -0

Other (1) +2 / -0

public-repo-guard.ymlDisable actions/checkout credential persistence in public-repo guard +2/-0

Disable actions/checkout credential persistence in public-repo guard

• Configures the checkout step with persist-credentials: false so the job’s GITHUB_TOKEN is not written into .git/config. This reduces exposure to later steps executed within the same job.

.github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml

[qodo-code-review]

Code Review by Qodo

🐞 Bugs (0) 📘 Rule violations (0) 📎 Requirement gaps (0)

Great, no issues found!

Qodo reviewed your code and found no material issues that require review

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[qodo-code-review]

Qodo Fixer

No findings are available for this PR yet. Findings appear here once Qodo has reviewed the PR.

[cubic-dev-ai]

No issues found across 1 file

Confidence score: 5/5

• Automated review surfaced no issues in the provided summaries.
• No files require special attention.

_{Re-trigger cubic}

[yakimoto]

This PR is redundant with #25 (chore/guard-canonical-sync), which is already open and already contains this exact change.

Evidence — #25's diff to .github/workflows/public-repo-guard.yml includes:

+          # tree. Nothing here pushes -- the scan is `--no-git` over the working tree --
+          # so no step needs authenticated Git; drop it. (zizmor: artipacked)
+          persist-credentials: false

#25 is also broader than this PR: it syncs the whole vendored public-repo-guard trio to
the canonical source (wave-foundation/scaffolder/public-repo-guard) byte-for-byte, verified by
git blob SHA, rather than adding this one line in isolation.

Closing as redundant. This duplicate exists because the fan-out that opened this PR
(refs claude-workstation#1870) did not check for in-flight PRs touching the same file before
going out — #25 was already open. Merge #25 instead.