ci: vendor governance-enforce — this repo was never in the A_BLOCK ruleset - #41
ci: vendor governance-enforce — this repo was never in the A_BLOCK ruleset#41yakimoto wants to merge 6 commits into
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…never in the ruleset
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ApprovabilityVerdict: Needs human review Unable to check for correctness in dfb2d1f. Adds a new governance enforcement CI workflow with security scanning. An unresolved review comment questions whether the empty-tree fallback mechanism will work correctly with the enforcer's diff implementation, raising a substantive technical concern that should be addressed. You can customize Macroscope's approvability policy. Learn more. |
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…install step Co-authored-by: Codesmith <codesmith-bot@users.noreply.github.com>
PR Summary by QodoAdd diff-scoped governance-enforce A_BLOCK gate to CI
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… exit paths Co-authored-by: Codesmith <codesmith-bot@users.noreply.github.com>
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…othing Five defects, none of them cosmetic. Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1747. 1. FAIL-OPEN DIFF BASE. `BASE=$(git rev-parse HEAD~1 2>/dev/null || git rev-parse HEAD)` — on a root commit `git rev-parse HEAD~1` prints its unresolved argument to stdout AND fails, so the `||` branch appends and BASE becomes a two-line string. `git diff` then exits 128, and the pinned enforcer turned that into zero files and a green check. Now: a reachability-checked base (a force-push can leave `github.event.before` pointing at a commit this checkout does not have), and with no resolvable base at all it diffs against the EMPTY TREE so the whole repo is scanned rather than nothing. 2. THE PINNED ENFORCER ITSELF FAILED OPEN. `^0.4.4` resolved to 0.4.4, whose file lister is `catch { return []; }` — any git error became zero files and rendered as `OK[enforce]: 0 changed file(s) scanned — 0 A_BLOCK violations`. A git error and a clean diff were byte-identical in the output. The fix had sat unreleased on claude-workstation main since 2026-07-29 because no `governance-v*` tag was ever pushed. Released now as 0.4.6 and pinned exactly here. 3. TOKEN IN SCOPE FOR THE WRONG STEPS. `NODE_AUTH_TOKEN` was job-level, so it was also in the environment of the step that executes the downloaded package. Now step-scoped, and the .npmrc holding it is removed on exit. 4. INSTALL SCRIPTS RAN WITH THAT TOKEN. `npm install` runs preinstall/postinstall by default. Added `--ignore-scripts`. 5. CANCELLED PUSH RUNS WERE SCANNED BY NOBODY. `cancel-in-progress: true` applied to push runs, and each push run only diffs its own before..HEAD range — so a cancelled run's commits were never examined by anything. Now PR-only. Also: `timeout-minutes: 10` and `set -euo pipefail`. Receipt, against a scratch repo whose root commit carries a no-hardcoded-paths violation, simulating a branch-creation push (`before` = all zeros): old logic -> malformed base -> caught error -> [] -> OK, 0 files scanned, PASS new logic -> "no diff base resolved ... scanning the whole tree" -> BLOCK, exit 1 Credit where it is due: several of these were found by the review bots on the sibling vendoring PRs and are folded in here — the step-scoped token, the .npmrc cleanup, the exact pin, `--ignore-scripts`, the force-push reachability check, `timeout-minutes`, and the concurrency hole (5), which was crest-console#7's catch and which I had missed entirely.
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| if [ -z "$BASE" ]; then | ||
| BASE="$(git hash-object -t tree /dev/null)" | ||
| echo "::notice::no diff base resolved (root commit or unreachable before-sha) — scanning the whole tree against the empty tree" | ||
| fi |
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🔍 Empty-tree fallback base may not be accepted by the enforcer's diff path
The final fallback sets the base to the empty tree object (git hash-object -t tree /dev/null → 4b825dc...) and passes it to enforce.mjs --changed BASE. This only works if the enforcer diffs with a two-dot/tree-compatible form (e.g. git diff --name-only BASE); if it uses the symmetric form git diff BASE...HEAD or git merge-base, git rejects a tree object ("not a commit") and 0.4.6 is documented here as failing closed — i.e. the job would hard-fail rather than scan. That path is only hit on a root commit or an unreachable before-sha, so it is unlikely to bite in normal PR flow, but it is worth confirming against the package's implementation before relying on it as the fail-closed behaviour.
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Verified against @wave-av/governance@0.4.6 source: both enforce.mjs and enforce-ramp.mjs diff via changedArgs(), which uses the two-argument git diff BASE HEAD form (never A...B or merge-base) and explicitly documents accepting the empty-tree object as base, citing this exact CI fallback as the motivating case. The fallback scans the whole tree as intended rather than hard-failing.
…l a false pass Correction to the previous commit on this branch. Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1747. That commit replaced the fail-open `BASE=HEAD` with a fallback to `HEAD~1`. `HEAD~1` is also wrong: it scans exactly ONE commit, so a five-commit push whose base is indeterminate (branch creation, force-push, unreachable `github.event.before`) examines the last commit and reports a confident pass on the other four. A narrowed scan reported as a full pass is the same defect in a quieter costume. Receipt — scratch repo, five-commit push, violation planted in commit 1: HEAD~1 base -> OK[enforce]: 1 changed file(s) scanned -> PASS (never saw it) empty-tree base -> 5 changed file(s) scanned -> BLOCK[enforce]: no-hardcoded-paths, exit 1 Now: with no resolvable base of any kind, diff against git's empty-tree object so every tracked file reads as added and the whole repo is scanned. Loud, never partial, never empty. Credit: wave-av/wave-rig's copy on main already had this right, with the reasoning in a comment ("HEAD~1 would skip earlier commits in a multi-commit push and let a violation through"). The fan-out copied the broken shape from elsewhere and I did not check the one repo that had already solved it. Also from wave-rig: `merge_group` is now a declared trigger and `github.event.merge_group. base_sha` joins the base chain. None of these repos runs a merge queue today, so the trigger is inert — but a required check that never reports on an event the repo actually uses is a permanent deadlock, and this closes that in advance rather than after someone hits it.
| - uses: actions/checkout@df4cb1c069e1874edd31b4311f1884172cec0e10 # v6.0.3 | ||
| with: | ||
| fetch-depth: 0 | ||
| persist-credentials: false | ||
| - uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0 | ||
| with: | ||
| node-version: "22" |
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🔍 Pinned action SHAs diverge from the sibling workflow's checkout pin
foundation-gate.yml pins actions/checkout@34e1148... # v4.3.1 while this new workflow pins actions/checkout@df4cb1c... # v6.0.3. Not a defect by itself, but the two pins should be verified to actually correspond to the tags in the trailing comments (a mislabelled SHA pin is invisible until the action behaves unexpectedly), and ideally kept consistent across the repo's workflows so bumps are a single edit.
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Adds the
governance-enforceA_BLOCK gate (secrets / hardcoded-paths, diff-scoped) to this repo. Part of claude-workstation#1624 E4 T4.9a, following thewave-av/cli#20pilot.Why this repo had no secrets scan
The org ruleset
governance-a-block-enforce(17901847) requires anenforcecheck across the fleet. Its scope is an explicit include list of 112 hand-maintained repository names — and every one of them matcheswave-*.The 16 public repos absent from that list are exactly the 16 not named
wave-*:.github,adk,api-spec,cli,companion-module-wave,create-wave-app,crest-console,dispatch-edge,examples,mcp-server,obs-wave-plugin,sdk,sdk-python,sdks,vmix-wave-integration,workflow-sdk.Read the intersection: the repos that publish our npm packages are precisely the repos running with no A_BLOCK secrets scan. Nobody excluded them. A naming convention silently became a security boundary, and it drew the line in the worst possible place.
Why the workflow lands before the ruleset entry
Adding a repo to a
required_status_checksruleset before it emits that check is a permanent deadlock — a required check that never reports can never go green, and every PR on the repo becomes unmergeable. So the order is: vendor the workflow, observe it green, then extend the list. Doing it the intuitive way round would have bricked all sixteen.This PR is also its own liveness drill. The workflow triggers on
pull_request, so it runs on the PR that adds it. Ifenforcereports green here, the vendored shape works in this repo. If it does not, nothing was required and nothing is blocked — which is the point of this ordering.Proven before fan-out, not assumed
@wave-av/governanceis aninternal-visibility package owned byclaude-workstation, so whether a public repo'sGITHUB_TOKENcan read it was the one real assumption. Rather than fan out on the inference, it was piloted on a single repo first:That is the receipt this PR rides on. The shape is copied verbatim from
wave-av/wave-moq-edge(public, 12/12 green), which matters becauseauto-approve.ymlfails silently on every public repo — it calls a reusable workflow in the privatewave-foundation, and a public repo cannot do that (parse-time failure, zero jobs, no annotation). This workflow calls nothing cross-repo, so that trap does not apply.Security properties, unchanged from the source:
actions/checkout@df4cb1c,actions/setup-node@48b55a0)persist-credentials: falseon checkoutcontents: read+packages: readRUNNER_TEMP,--no-save, so nothing touches this repo's dependency tree.npmrcis written with a literal${NODE_AUTH_TOKEN}(single-quotedprintf) which npm expands at run time — no secret value is ever written to disk or a log${{ }}inputs (base.sha,event.before) are routed throughenv:and read as"$VAR", never interpolated into the script bodyDiff-scoped by design: it blocks new violations without failing on legacy debt.
Refs wave-av/claude-workstation#1624.
Note
Low Risk
Adds CI-only enforcement with read-only repo permissions and an isolated npm install; no application or API code changes. Main operational risk is workflow correctness (base resolution and package pin), not production security surface.
Overview
Adds
.github/workflows/governance-enforce.yml, a new CI job that runs@wave-av/governanceon pull requests and pushes tomain/masterso this repo gets the same diff-scoped A_BLOCK checks (secrets in git, hardcoded paths) that orgwave-*repos already had via rulesetgovernance-a-block-enforce.The workflow installs
@wave-av/governance@0.4.6intoRUNNER_TEMPwithGITHUB_TOKENlimited to the install step,--ignore-scripts, and a trap-cleaned.npmrc. It resolves a diff base from the PR base SHA or pushbeforeSHA, validates the commit exists, then runsenforce.mjs --changed $BASE. Hardening baked into this copy includes: push runs useconcurrencywithout cancelling in-progress work (so cancelled pushes are not left un-scanned), and when no base can be resolved it diffs against the empty tree instead ofHEAD(avoids a green job with zero files scanned).The workflow comments note the repo should not be added to the required-check ruleset until this job is observed green here.
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Add governance enforcement workflow to scan diffs on PRs and pushes to main
Adds governance-enforce.yml, which runs
@wave-av/governance@0.4.6on pull requests, merge groups, and pushes to main/master. The enforcer scans only changed files using a computed diff base; if no valid base is found, it falls back to the empty tree and scans the full repository. Push and merge group runs are not cancelable to ensure no committed ranges are skipped.Macroscope summarized dfb2d1f.