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Launch Claude Code in auto mode - #5

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lluisinthedesert wants to merge 2 commits into
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yolo/launch-claude-auto
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lluisinthedesert wants to merge 2 commits into
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yolo/launch-claude-auto

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@lluisinthedesert

@lluisinthedesert lluisinthedesert commented Jul 11, 2026

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What changed

  • launch the LMAB Claude Code handoff with --permission-mode auto
  • state the auto-permission mode in the installer handoff copy
  • center LMAB beneath the full ASCII wordmark in the installer and direct CLI
  • add a regression test for the exact launch command
  • preserve --no-launch for manual control

Why

The one-line installer should hand off directly into the audit without a noisy sequence of routine permission prompts. Claude Code auto mode keeps its classifier in control while making the first-run flow substantially cleaner. The terminal lockup now teaches the LMAB acronym at the first visual beat.

Verification

  • verified the installed Claude CLI supports --permission-mode auto
  • npm run check — 6/6 tests pass
  • git diff --check

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Devin Review found 1 potential issue.

View 1 additional finding in Devin Review.

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Comment thread install.sh
run claude --permission-mode auto --plugin-dir "$SOURCE_DIR" "$PROMPT"
else
exec claude --plugin-dir "$SOURCE_DIR" "$PROMPT"
exec claude --permission-mode auto --plugin-dir "$SOURCE_DIR" "$PROMPT"

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🟨 AI agent launched with automatic permission approval bypasses user confirmation for all actions

The installer now launches Claude Code with --permission-mode auto (install.sh:261), which automatically approves all permission requests (file writes, shell commands, network access, etc.) without user confirmation. The only constraint on Claude's actions is the natural-language prompt instruction to "not edit application code or call a model provider" (install.sh:257), which is not an enforceable security boundary. If the agent misinterprets the prompt or encounters an adversarial prompt injection in scanned files, it could perform destructive file operations or execute arbitrary commands with the user's full privileges.

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