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Description
Security Finding
Severity: low (the advisory is rated for a local attacker; Compass is not exposed, see below)
Type: CVE / gate state
Cargo.lock on main (d6b8d54) has libsqlite3-sys 0.38.2, and RUSTSEC-2026-0459 (CVE-2026-119375, GHSA-72w2-rjgg-q729) covers every release before 0.39.0. deny.toml does not list it. It reports a vulnerability, not an unmaintained crate, so the cargo-deny (advisories) leg fails on main the next time it runs.
That leg last ran on 2026-11-06 and passed. It has not run since: no push has touched Cargo.lock or deny.toml, and the daily schedule has not fired (a separate issue covers the schedule). I found the advisory with an OSV query over Cargo.lock, not with cargo deny, because this lane has no Rust toolchain.
The advisory
SQLite before 3.54.0 can return uninitialised page-cache memory when a process opens a database together with a -wal file whose page size differs from the database's. Someone has to craft the two files, and the victim process has to open them.
No release fixes it for Compass. rusqlite is built with bundled-sqlcipher. The advisory says that libsqlite3-sys 0.39.0 and 0.39.1 build SQLCipher from sqlcipher-src =419.0.6, which bundles SQLite 3.53.4 and is still affected. A bump to rusqlite 0.41 would silence the gate and fix nothing.
Impact
None that I can find. Every database Compass opens goes through compass_sqlcipher_sys::open or open_read_only, and each one is a file Compass itself writes in its own data directory, or the Vicinae profile the person imports:
- clipboard history (
crates/compass/src/clipboard_service.rs,crates/compass-clipboard/src/files.rs) - extension and script storage, OAuth tokens (
crates/compass/src/extension_runner/storage.rs) - the file index (
crates/compass-db/src/sqlite_reader.rs,sqlite_writer.rs,index_stats.rs) - calculator history
compass importfrom Vicinae (crates/compass/src/vicinae_import.rs)
An extension worker cannot write any of them: its Landlock policy grants writing only to its own support and assets directories (crates/compass/src/extension_runner/sandbox.rs), and no database lives there. Whoever can plant a -wal file beside one of these databases already runs as the person, which SECURITY.md puts out of scope.
Recommendation
Decision taken by hive: record the advisory in deny.toml with the reason and the condition that removes it, as the file's own rule asks ("An advisory that cannot be fixed by a lockfile bump goes in [advisories].ignore with the reason and a link, never silently"). The entry goes when libsqlite3-sys builds SQLCipher on SQLite 3.54 or later; then the fix is the rusqlite bump.
The comment above the list says that none of the ignored advisories reports a vulnerability. This one does, so the comment changes with it.
Done when
-
deny.tomllists RUSTSEC-2026-0459 with its reason and link -
cargo-deny (advisories)passes on the pull request
Filed by sec-check agent (ACMM L6 — full mode)
🐝 Hive Agent: security | Instance: reef | SHA: 2ef7dc7c08731aef8e67ec0a18309101ceceb430
— hive: agent=sec-check backend=claude model=claude-fable-5-2 effort=high claude=2.1.322
Activity
tuna-reef-hive commentedon Nov 17, 2026
Correction to the issue body: two advisories fail the
cargo-deny (advisories)leg, not one.The first run on #372 showed it. With the RUSTSEC-2026-0459 entry in place the leg still failed, on RUSTSEC-2026-0486:
rustix1.1.4 marks unwritten bytes as initialised in its xattr functions when given a zero-length buffer. I had seen it in the OSV result and wrongly took it for one cargo-deny lets pass, because it is rated "unsound" and reaches Compass only through other crates.That one has an ordinary fix.
rustix1.1.6 needs the same dependencies, so #372 now also bumps the lockfile entry andpackaging/flatpak/cargo-sources.json. The pull request says how the hand edit was checked.The same run warns that
async-executoris yanked.deny.tomlsets that to a warning, so it does not fail the leg.— hive: agent=sec-check
deps: bump rusqlite to 0.43 (SQLite 3.54.1) and rustix to 1.1.6 (tuna…