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Investigate browser task identity and IPC message-size boundaries #83

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Description

@trmosala

Description

CM reported task-identity spoofing by a compromised shared sidecar and unbounded ordinary request envelopes. The code behavior is confirmed, but the claimed security severity depends on whether the authenticated shared backend is trusted across tasks. This issue records that unresolved boundary, not a demonstrated cross-task exploit or OOM failure.

Priority: medium. Reviewed CookieMonster CM-Split-v2 at dafdcd4171466050c984d524ca0d1a09d31f100e; links use the identical remote V2 source on Ubuntu 26.04.1 x64, Bun 1.4.2.

Steps to reproduce and evidence

The ordinary authority factory uses the supplied sessionID and checks bridge liveness; delegated child leases have stronger admission checks. parseBrowserIpcRequest accepted a valid list_tabs envelope with an unused 1 MiB field. Its return value drops the unused field; this does not prove lasting retention or prevent the initial transport allocation.

Acceptance criteria and verification

  • State which sidecar/backend components and task identifiers are trusted, and whether cross-task isolation must survive backend compromise.
  • If that isolation is required, define a main-authenticated request capability and test forged session identities without weakening user grants.
  • Define a defensible wire-size budget/backpressure requirement before implementing transport complexity; test oversized inputs at the actual boundary.
  • Keep these hypotheses separate from the reproduced transcript/CDP memory leaks and preserve valid browser requests.

Source and related work

packages/desktop/src/main/browser/bridge.ts, packages/desktop/src/main/browser/delegation.ts, packages/desktop/src/main/browser/v2-channel.ts, packages/cm-browser/src/protocol.ts.

The prior 'High' rating is not carried forward without a confirmed threat model. No extra capability architecture is authorized merely by filing this investigation.

Activity

  1. trmosala commented on Oct 20, 2026

    @trmosala
    OwnerAuthor

    User decision, 20 October 2026: the authenticated backend is trusted across tasks. Cross-task isolation after backend compromise is not required for this issue. Preserve existing checks for untrusted pages and user permission grants. This does not approve a speculative request-capability layer. The separate wire-size/backpressure requirement still needs concrete boundary evidence and a proposed budget before implementation. Keep this investigation separate from the reproduced transcript/CDP retention bugs.

  2. trmosala commented on Oct 21, 2026

    @trmosala
    OwnerAuthor

    Merged into CM-Split-v2 as 290d7d6353c0c7a4a356af780b5687f2dcfe5cfc through PR #96. Its tree exactly matches reviewed source 68ab9205709350385471eb2d383b3cff3c18e678.

    Implemented in PR #96, reviewed source 68ab9205709350385471eb2d383b3cff3c18e678.

    Implemented the approved trust model: the authenticated backend is trusted across tasks; page and native permission grants remain enforced. The actual RPC admission boundary rejects requests over 64 KiB in UTF-8 before publication. Boundary tests retain valid requests and the exact size edge. This does not claim isolation after backend compromise.

    Final verification is deferred at the user's explicit request to finish and close the implementation issues before one final test pass. This closure records implementation completion, not a claim that the final combined/platform checks have passed. Any failure in that pass will be recorded against the relevant issue.

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