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feat(browser): generate strong passwords #8

Closed

Description

@trmosala

Problem

There is no password generator.

Implementation order

Browser backlog item 04 of 29. Phase: Passwords and autofill. This is ordered planning, not a claim that Codex implements every item. Items 24–29 are optional additions.

Acceptance criteria

  • Reuse existing cryptographic random APIs and support reasonable site constraints.
  • Integrate generation with registration/change flows and confirmed persistence.
  • Keep generated secrets out of logs, sidecar and app renderer; test cancellation and lock races.

Dependencies

Engineering and validation

Reuse existing Chromium/Electron/OS facilities where available. Preserve main-process ownership and permission enforcement, add no placeholder controls, use existing i18n patterns, and test behavior with synthetic fixtures. Document platform limitations. Baseline: browser-tabs at 47fef3e; see packages/cm-browser/README.md and password-security.md.

Activity

  1. trmosala commented on Sep 16, 2026

    @trmosala
    OwnerAuthor

    Implemented on browser-tabs in c148c22; remote hash verified after recovering the Windows Update interruption. Existing commit was pushed once, with no replay of implementation.

    Scope: Node crypto.randomInt, length 16-64 (default 20), optional symbols, explicit new-password registration/change fields, default-cancel native fill confirmation. Renderer/sidecar receive no generated secret. Generation never submits or saves; later trusted submission and separate native confirmation govern persistence.

    Evidence: focused generation/offers/registration fixtures, 31 browser tests, desktop/app typechecks, 8 native-i18n tests and full isolated native smoke passed after final race fixes. Source re-review found no actionable findings. Regressions cover unsafe image submitters, disabled fieldsets, detached views, immediate submission, capture renewal during pending cleanup and stale CDP acknowledgements across navigation. Push hook: 31/31 typechecks. Scoped lint: 66 warnings, 0 errors.

    Keeping this issue open: fixture authentication/dialogs are stubbed; native usability/accessibility, translations, macOS/packaged validation and #34 external security assurance remain outstanding. Capture/success detection is heuristic, CDP stalls can interrupt it, and already-dispatched fills cannot be recalled. No installed app/server/bridge restart or release.

  2. trmosala commented on Sep 21, 2026

    @trmosala
    OwnerAuthor

    Closing the scoped password-generator implementation after the September 21 follow-up.

    Published on browser-tabs:

    • e1a1fcd fixes stale generation consent and adds main-owned recovery guidance.
    • ef71fe3 merges the approved remote resilience changes, preserves published translation-key order, and adapts the synthetic fixtures. Remote hash verified; worktree clean.

    Acceptance evidence:

    • Existing Node crypto.randomInt generation retains length 16-64, default 20, optional symbols, and bounded site constraints without silent weakening.
    • Registration/change flows retain default-cancel fill consent, separate trusted submission and separate save/update confirmation. Generation itself never submits or saves.
    • Document-root replacement now invalidates the one-use ticket even when original form/field objects survive. Six Chromium regression cases cover replacement, removal/reinsertion and document.open/write during consent and immediately before delivery.
    • Recovery guidance stays in main, uses typed native i18n, and never reflects raw exceptions or generated secrets. Tests cover cancellation, lock revocation, cleanup, invalid bounds and secret-bearing execution errors.

    Final macOS arm64 verification:

    • Desktop bun test: 569 pass, 4 skip, 0 fail.
    • Focused native --generation, --registration and --offers fixtures: pass.
    • Desktop/app typechecks and all 31 pre-push typecheck tasks: pass.
    • Formatting and diff checks: pass. Scoped lint: 75 warnings, 0 errors.
    • Standards, Spec and integration source reviews: no actionable findings.

    Broader checks are not entirely green: native-i18n has 12 passing tests and the pre-existing pa-PK ICU detection failure. Full native smoke still stops in unchanged contenteditable filling with olsafe instead of safe. Neither failure is claimed fixed. Incoming download-recovery tests now canonicalize only their disposable temporary directory for the macOS /var alias; production filesystem safeguards remain unchanged.

    This supersedes the earlier decision to hold #8 open for wider release validation. Real OS authentication ceremonies, native accessibility/usability, reviewed translations and packaged-platform validation remain separate under #19 and #34. Source reviews are not external security assurance. Capture/success detection remains heuristic, and dispatched fills cannot be recalled. No installed app/server/bridge restart or release.

    Detailed evidence and limits: packages/cm-browser/password-security.md, Password generation section.

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