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fix(desktop): restrict renderer-selected applications in FilesOpenPath #78
FilesOpenPath accepts an arbitrary application string from the renderer and passes it to execFile as the executable on Linux/Windows (or open -a on macOS). A compromised trusted renderer can cross into native application execution. V2's port binding already authenticates the renderer connection, so CM's older claim of no transport sender validation needs narrowing.
Priority: high. Reviewed CookieMonster CM-Split-v2 at dafdcd4171466050c984d524ca0d1a09d31f100e; links use the identical remote V2 source on Ubuntu 26.04.1 x64, Bun 1.4.2.
Steps to reproduce and evidence
Traced the public RPC payload -> file handler -> DesktopFiles.openPath. There is no application allowlist or main-owned application identifier; executable and its single argument come from the request. No exploit or native process execution was attempted.
Acceptance criteria and verification
Define the allowed open-with applications in main, or accept validated main-issued application identifiers rather than arbitrary executable strings.
Validate the target and option-like arguments while preserving legitimate user-selected open-with behavior.
Test the raw RPC payload and reject unapproved executable selections; retain the current authenticated renderer port boundary.
Merged into CM-Split-v2 as 290d7d6353c0c7a4a356af780b5687f2dcfe5cfc through PR #96. Its tree exactly matches reviewed source 68ab9205709350385471eb2d383b3cff3c18e678.
Implemented in PR #96, reviewed source 68ab9205709350385471eb2d383b3cff3c18e678.
Open-with requests now select from the native application allowlist and validate absolute/UNC targets before execution. Raw renderer RPC tests preserve legitimate selections and reject arbitrary executables and option-like targets. Authenticated renderer-port ownership remains enforced.
Final verification is deferred at the user's explicit request to finish and close the implementation issues before one final test pass. This closure records implementation completion, not a claim that the final combined/platform checks have passed. Any failure in that pass will be recorded against the relevant issue.
Activity
trmosala commentedon Oct 21, 2026
Merged into
CM-Split-v2as290d7d6353c0c7a4a356af780b5687f2dcfe5cfcthrough PR #96. Its tree exactly matches reviewed source68ab9205709350385471eb2d383b3cff3c18e678.Implemented in PR #96, reviewed source
68ab9205709350385471eb2d383b3cff3c18e678.Open-with requests now select from the native application allowlist and validate absolute/UNC targets before execution. Raw renderer RPC tests preserve legitimate selections and reject arbitrary executables and option-like targets. Authenticated renderer-port ownership remains enforced.
Final verification is deferred at the user's explicit request to finish and close the implementation issues before one final test pass. This closure records implementation completion, not a claim that the final combined/platform checks have passed. Any failure in that pass will be recorded against the relevant issue.