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feat(browser): support explicit cross-origin SSO account workflows #18

Closed

Description

@trmosala

Problem

Saved-login steps are restricted to the same exact origin.

Implementation order

Browser backlog item 14 of 29. Phase: Compatibility and recovery. This is ordered planning, not a claim that Codex implements every item. Items 24–29 are optional additions.

Acceptance criteria

  • Allow explicit selection of credentials belonging to each actual login origin.
  • Never automatically share a credential across unrelated origins or infer affiliation.
  • Cover redirects, popup SSO, cancellation and origin changes during consent.

Dependencies

Engineering and validation

Reuse existing Chromium/Electron/OS facilities where available. Preserve main-process ownership and permission enforcement, add no placeholder controls, use existing i18n patterns, and test behavior with synthetic fixtures. Document platform limitations. Baseline: browser-tabs at 47fef3e; see packages/cm-browser/README.md and password-security.md.

Activity

  1. trmosala commented on Sep 17, 2026

    @trmosala
    OwnerAuthor

    Published regression evidence

    Commit: b69d5e0 on browser-tabs, based on 0e89d57. Normal push completed; local and remote SHAs match. Exactly three test/documentation files changed, 324 insertions / 15 deletions. Production account routing, dependencies, configuration and installed processes are unchanged.

    Existing exact-origin selection already supports fresh, explicit selection at each actual top-level login origin. This slice adds integrated evidence rather than automatic SSO routing or inferred affiliation:

    • Three actual loopback origins, matching usernames and distinct synthetic secrets; HTTP redirect and real private popup/opener/callback/close.
    • Exact receiving-origin account menus, wrong-origin credential IDs rejected before consent, cancellation and fresh retry.
    • Navigation during consent, including return to the exact original URL, and popup open/select/close invalidating pending parent consent.
    • Blank unrelated fields, unchanged sentinels, no automatic submission and secret-boundary assertions.
    • Review corrections separate fixture/setup failures from expected command rejection and require completed approval/popup witnesses. The callback remains open for field/ticket/submission checks; a DOM-only negative control proves the field assertion detects injected synthetic credentials.

    Final uninstrumented serial verification from packages/desktop passed: bun typecheck; bun scripts/browser-smoke.ts --account-fill; bun test src/main/browser/ (154 passed, 2252 expectations). Three-path Prettier and staged whitespace checks passed. Root-scoped native-smoke.ts oxlint: 49 warnings, zero errors. Normal pre-push typechecks: 31/31 passed, 29 cached. Standards review was clear; final correctness re-review cleared both findings and the cumulative corrected slice.

    An earlier parent run timed out opening the mounted account menu before the new SSO cases. A temporary trace run and final uninstrumented run passed; the trace was removed. Cause remains unexplained, not a fixed production bug or proof of fixture stability. Earlier duplicate invocations are not serial evidence. No production RED/GREEN claim.

    App suites and default native smoke were not rerun for this test/docs-only slice. Native authentication/dialog answers are controlled fixture seams. Real providers, physical/native accessibility, packaged builds, macOS/Linux and external #34 assurance remain unverified. Child passwords, foreign form destinations and automatic cross-origin sharing remain unsupported. Issue remains open for documented validation gates; #19 manual matrix: #19 (comment) .

  2. trmosala commented on Sep 22, 2026

    @trmosala
    OwnerAuthor

    Validated the existing #18 implementation and pushed ed29579 (docs(browser): record SSO workflow validation) to browser-tabs. This follow-up updates only the validation documentation; no production or fixture changes were needed. Dependencies #10 and #17 are closed.

    Acceptance criteria are covered by exact receiving-origin account selection, no inferred affiliation or automatic sharing, and integrated redirect/popup/callback/cancellation/stale-consent tests. Independent correctness/spec and standards reviews found no actionable gaps.

    Current validation on macOS arm64 / Electron 44.3.0 / Chromium 152.0.7977.78:

    • Focused --account-fill native suite PASS, including feat(browser): support explicit cross-origin SSO account workflows #18 redirects, popup/callback, cancellation, origin A-B-A and parent-consent invalidation.
    • Desktop browser suite: 257 PASS / 3,087 expectations.
    • App browser-panel unit tests: 19 PASS / 75 expectations.
    • Complete app test:browser suite: 43 PASS / 283 expectations.
    • Desktop/app typechecks PASS; normal push hook 31/31 successful (30 cached).
    • Documentation formatting and whitespace checks PASS.

    The historical account-menu timeout did not recur; its cause remains unestablished. Authentication and native-dialog answers use controlled synthetic seams. Real-provider authentication, physical/accessibility, packaged builds, Linux and external #34 assurance remain separate work. Child passwords, foreign form destinations and automatic cross-origin credential sharing remain unsupported. No new production RED/GREEN claim; default native/root lint were not repeated for this documentation-only follow-up. Closing #18 for its validated bounded acceptance criteria. Evidence is in packages/cm-browser/README.md and password-security.md.

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