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Tab consent, host rules, history and transfer rules are separate interfaces.
Implementation order
Browser backlog item 07 of 29. Phase: Agent browsing. This is ordered planning, not a claim that Codex implements every item. Items 24–29 are optional additions.
Acceptance criteria
Show defaults, exceptions and effective access in one coherent settings interface.
Preserve main-process enforcement and document how tab grants and tool approvals combine.
Test revocation and pending operations; do not advertise unsupported permission modes.
Dependencies
No prerequisite backlog issue.
Engineering and validation
Reuse existing Chromium/Electron/OS facilities where available. Preserve main-process ownership and permission enforcement, add no placeholder controls, use existing i18n patterns, and test behavior with synthetic fixtures. Document platform limitations. Baseline: browser-tabs at 47fef3e; see packages/cm-browser/README.md and password-security.md.
Read-only preparation identifies a minimal interface: one Agent access section in existing Browser settings for global/tab consent, actual allowed hosts, history policy and transfer defaults/exact-origin exceptions. Effective tab eligibility should come from main using the actual WebContents URL, not a renderer fallback. OpenCode tool approvals remain independent and cannot be labelled approved from seeded defaults. Uploads support Choose files each time/Block, not Allow; transfer guarding can remain after tab revocation, and active downloads need explicit cancellation.
Two source-level gaps to reproduce and fix with this work: (1) registry global disable increments revisions but does not clear driver snapshots, so off -> on -> fresh consent may allow an old ref against an unchanged page; invalidate snapshots or bind access epochs. (2) tools.ts askWrite obtains host A then awaits approval, but press_key lacks approved URL/revision binding; navigation to allowlisted host B while approval is pending can dispatch a key under consent requested for A. Bind approved page/access context and revalidate in main.
These are source findings, not yet runtime reproductions. Use router and plugin deferred-approval tests plus isolated native checks; do not weaken host/tab enforcement or claim unsupported permission modes. #34 strict storage work is currently the sole-editor slice; #11 follows.
Published on browser-tabs at e55b0a1, based on 80d7a6b. Commit: e55b0a1. git ls-remote origin refs/heads/browser-tabs equals HEAD.
Scope: exactly 22 owned files (21 tracked changes plus the new mounted settings test). Unified existing Agent access controls for global/current-task tab grants, actual hosts, history and transfer defaults/exceptions. Main-owned live-URL eligibility, snapshot invalidation, prepare-before-approval source/access bindings, loading guards and abortable native consent remain enforced. The final cancellation guard rechecks current destination policy synchronously before loadURL; the shared constructor bounds complete UTF-8 Response JSON to 65,536 bytes without truncating URL identity. Main and plugin must ship together; missing/incompatible bindings fail closed. OpenCode approval remains independent; no unsupported upload Allow or implicit grant.
Independent final complete source review ses_f5905c6a3ffeYlhAvgmZBvPSmg found NO actionable findings across the entire scope, including the final destination-policy race and response-budget fixes. Source review is not external security assurance. README and password-security.md contain the final review record and precise limits.
Applicable checks, not rerun unnecessarily during documentation-only publication:
Final pre-fix driver/router reproduction was 24 PASS / 3 FAIL (one forbidden destination load; 65,656/65,697-byte responses); protocol boundary reproduction was 4 PASS / 1 FAIL. Passing native witnesses: loads=0, requested=false, sourceUnchanged=true; real Chromium history.replaceState produced a 65,568-byte source URL with page/list failures of 84 bytes each and successful fresh plugin-approved short recovery.
Evidence limits: the cancellation race holds a deterministic loading/cancellation seam with real temporary policy, Electron load observation and loopback requests, not naturally timed Chromium cancellation. Windows uses the real unparented native consent dialog and Electron-injected fixture-renderer Cancel, not physical input, packaged settings, keyboard/screen-reader or macOS/Linux validation. Other native/authentication choices remain controlled fixtures. Oversized inventories fail as a whole; recovery requires a known tab ID or manual navigation. The budget excludes internal memory/storage, renderer state, outer IPC framing and plugin formatting; dispatched actions cannot be recalled.
#11 remains OPEN for outstanding real native/accessibility, packaged/platform and verified-localization evidence; #34 assurance gates remain open. Publication produced one commit and one normal push. The commit call reported index.lock; status/log/process/remote reconciliation confirmed the completed commit, so no duplicate commit or lock deletion was attempted. All 22 owned files are clean; the two excluded files remain untouched/uninspected. No #12 code, installed app/server/bridge restart, release or deployment.
Implemented and published on browser-tabs: 97ab8bd, following the existing unified settings implementation e55b0a1. Local and remote revisions match; worktree clean.
Acceptance:
One Agent access interface shows global/current-task tab grants, actual hosts, history policy and transfer defaults/exceptions, with main-owned effective status.
Main enforcement and source/access bindings remain intact; documentation explains independent native grants and OpenCode approvals. Fixed a reproduced bypass: navigation returned a destination snapshot despite browser_read_state denial. It now checks read approval before preparation and destination approval, without reading the source page or removing approved recovery.
Revocation and pending-consent coverage passes; unsupported upload Allow remains absent.
Verification: the new deny/abort/allow regression failed 3/3 before the one-line fix; cm-browser typecheck, 91 tests / 3653 assertions and bundle build passed afterward. Mounted settings passed 95 assertions. Desktop typecheck and full rerun passed 533 / skipped 1 / failed 0, 3691 assertions. Initial full run had an unrelated vault-auth child with null exit status; focused and full reruns passed without changes, and that initial exit remains unexplained. Focused access-review and full native smoke passed serially, retaining loading/source/destination-policy/oversized-source and native cancellation witnesses. Scoped lint: 70 warnings / 0 errors. Formatting and whitespace checks passed. Normal push hooks: 31/31 typecheck tasks, 29 cached.
Independent Standards review found no findings. The Spec worker failed to start; parent source review completed instead, not an independent security audit. Native smoke emitted the documented Mojo Widget, fixture ERR_EMPTY_RESPONSE and ObserverList reentrancy diagnostics despite completing.
Closing scoped implementation acceptance based on synthetic fixtures and documented limits. This supersedes the earlier OPEN checkpoint, not its evidence limitations. Packaged/native accessibility, physical-input, platform and verified-localization checks remain tracked under #19; #34 security assurance remains open. Source publication/plugin build is not installed-build inclusion, a release or deployment. No installed app/server/bridge was restarted.
Activity
trmosala commentedon Sep 16, 2026
Read-only preparation identifies a minimal interface: one Agent access section in existing Browser settings for global/tab consent, actual allowed hosts, history policy and transfer defaults/exact-origin exceptions. Effective tab eligibility should come from main using the actual WebContents URL, not a renderer fallback. OpenCode tool approvals remain independent and cannot be labelled approved from seeded defaults. Uploads support Choose files each time/Block, not Allow; transfer guarding can remain after tab revocation, and active downloads need explicit cancellation.
Two source-level gaps to reproduce and fix with this work: (1) registry global disable increments revisions but does not clear driver snapshots, so off -> on -> fresh consent may allow an old ref against an unchanged page; invalidate snapshots or bind access epochs. (2) tools.ts askWrite obtains host A then awaits approval, but press_key lacks approved URL/revision binding; navigation to allowlisted host B while approval is pending can dispatch a key under consent requested for A. Bind approved page/access context and revalidate in main.
These are source findings, not yet runtime reproductions. Use router and plugin deferred-approval tests plus isolated native checks; do not weaken host/tab enforcement or claim unsupported permission modes. #34 strict storage work is currently the sole-editor slice; #11 follows.
trmosala commentedon Sep 16, 2026
Published on browser-tabs at e55b0a1, based on 80d7a6b. Commit: e55b0a1. git ls-remote origin refs/heads/browser-tabs equals HEAD.
Scope: exactly 22 owned files (21 tracked changes plus the new mounted settings test). Unified existing Agent access controls for global/current-task tab grants, actual hosts, history and transfer defaults/exceptions. Main-owned live-URL eligibility, snapshot invalidation, prepare-before-approval source/access bindings, loading guards and abortable native consent remain enforced. The final cancellation guard rechecks current destination policy synchronously before loadURL; the shared constructor bounds complete UTF-8 Response JSON to 65,536 bytes without truncating URL identity. Main and plugin must ship together; missing/incompatible bindings fail closed. OpenCode approval remains independent; no unsupported upload Allow or implicit grant.
Independent final complete source review ses_f5905c6a3ffeYlhAvgmZBvPSmg found NO actionable findings across the entire scope, including the final destination-policy race and response-budget fixes. Source review is not external security assurance. README and password-security.md contain the final review record and precise limits.
Applicable checks, not rerun unnecessarily during documentation-only publication:
Final pre-fix driver/router reproduction was 24 PASS / 3 FAIL (one forbidden destination load; 65,656/65,697-byte responses); protocol boundary reproduction was 4 PASS / 1 FAIL. Passing native witnesses: loads=0, requested=false, sourceUnchanged=true; real Chromium history.replaceState produced a 65,568-byte source URL with page/list failures of 84 bytes each and successful fresh plugin-approved short recovery.
Evidence limits: the cancellation race holds a deterministic loading/cancellation seam with real temporary policy, Electron load observation and loopback requests, not naturally timed Chromium cancellation. Windows uses the real unparented native consent dialog and Electron-injected fixture-renderer Cancel, not physical input, packaged settings, keyboard/screen-reader or macOS/Linux validation. Other native/authentication choices remain controlled fixtures. Oversized inventories fail as a whole; recovery requires a known tab ID or manual navigation. The budget excludes internal memory/storage, renderer state, outer IPC framing and plugin formatting; dispatched actions cannot be recalled.
#11 remains OPEN for outstanding real native/accessibility, packaged/platform and verified-localization evidence; #34 assurance gates remain open. Publication produced one commit and one normal push. The commit call reported index.lock; status/log/process/remote reconciliation confirmed the completed commit, so no duplicate commit or lock deletion was attempted. All 22 owned files are clean; the two excluded files remain untouched/uninspected. No #12 code, installed app/server/bridge restart, release or deployment.
fix(browser): require read approval before navigation
trmosala commentedon Sep 19, 2026
Implemented and published on browser-tabs: 97ab8bd, following the existing unified settings implementation e55b0a1. Local and remote revisions match; worktree clean.
Acceptance:
Verification: the new deny/abort/allow regression failed 3/3 before the one-line fix; cm-browser typecheck, 91 tests / 3653 assertions and bundle build passed afterward. Mounted settings passed 95 assertions. Desktop typecheck and full rerun passed 533 / skipped 1 / failed 0, 3691 assertions. Initial full run had an unrelated vault-auth child with null exit status; focused and full reruns passed without changes, and that initial exit remains unexplained. Focused access-review and full native smoke passed serially, retaining loading/source/destination-policy/oversized-source and native cancellation witnesses. Scoped lint: 70 warnings / 0 errors. Formatting and whitespace checks passed. Normal push hooks: 31/31 typecheck tasks, 29 cached.
Independent Standards review found no findings. The Spec worker failed to start; parent source review completed instead, not an independent security audit. Native smoke emitted the documented Mojo Widget, fixture ERR_EMPTY_RESPONSE and ObserverList reentrancy diagnostics despite completing.
Closing scoped implementation acceptance based on synthetic fixtures and documented limits. This supersedes the earlier OPEN checkpoint, not its evidence limitations. Packaged/native accessibility, physical-input, platform and verified-localization checks remain tracked under #19; #34 security assurance remains open. Source publication/plugin build is not installed-build inclusion, a release or deployment. No installed app/server/bridge was restarted.