Docs: clarify scope fingerprint spoofing vs IP-reputation/velocity blocks (proxy support?)

[andremmfaria]

Summary

Fortress does what it claims at the fingerprint level, but in testing against a site that gates on IP reputation/velocity (eBay), a clean fingerprint alone did not sustain access. It would help to state this scope boundary in the README, and possibly to document or add proxy / IP-rotation support.

Observation

Testing three eBay UK listing URLs that block plain curl/headless fetches:

• The first request of the session, from a cold egress IP, returned a full 200 with real rendered HTML. So the fingerprint spoofing genuinely worked.
• Every subsequent attempt from the same host IP, including from freshly started containers, returned eBay's WAF block page (403). Restarting the browser process did not restore access.

This pattern is consistent with an IP-velocity/reputation gate rather than pure fingerprint detection, which fingerprint correction cannot address on its own. (Single-session, single-IP observation, not a controlled study.)

Suggestions

1. README: add a short "what Fortress does and does not solve" note. It corrects the browser fingerprint, but does not rotate IPs or defeat IP-reputation throttling.
2. Consider documenting a recommended way to route traffic through a proxy pool, or a first-class proxy option, so users can pair fingerprint stealth with IP diversity.