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Auth: consume refresh tokens atomically to close a replay window (closes #147) - #148

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claude/smiley-face-1xzfkz-refresh-atomic
Jul 12, 2026
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Auth: consume refresh tokens atomically to close a replay window (closes #147)#148
testtest126 merged 4 commits into
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claude/smiley-face-1xzfkz-refresh-atomic

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Summary

Closes #147 (audit finding M2). Rule-5 security-sensitive (session/token management) — draft pending a security verdict.

refresh() rotated the token with a read-then-delete:

guard let stored = filter(tokenHash == digest).first() else { 401 }
try await stored.delete(on: req.db)   // deletes by id; 0 rows on the loser, no error
 issueTokens(for: user)

Two requests with the same token (a real client and a replayed stolen token) can both read the row before either deletes, so both mint a valid access+refresh pair — rotation fails to neutralize a captured token.

Fix: a single atomic consume, mirroring the consumeNonce helper already in this file (which solved the identical TOCTOU for Apple nonces):

DELETE FROM refresh_tokens
WHERE token_hash = ? AND expires_at > ?
RETURNING CAST(user_id AS text) AS user_id

Only the racer whose DELETE hits the row gets a user_id and proceeds; the other gets 401. Expired tokens don't match (can't be exchanged; cleanup reaps them). Portable across Postgres and SQLite 3.35+.

Behavior change worth noting for review: an expired token now returns a generic "invalid or expired" 401 instead of a distinct "expired" message, and is left for cleanup rather than deleted on the failed exchange — no test depended on the old distinction.

Test plan

  • swift test in ChessKit/ passes (untouched)
  • swift test in chess-server/ passes — server lane is the verifier (this session can't build Swift locally)
  • App builds (no app code changed)

testRefreshRotatesToken (rotation + sequential-reuse rejection) still holds. The concurrency guarantee is provided by the atomic DELETE … RETURNING — the same mechanism already reviewed and tested for consumeNonce — rather than a new concurrency test, since the existing test harness runs requests sequentially.

Security review

Rule 5 verdict requested from the root session at head — this stays draft until Security review: APPROVE @ <head>.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

https://claude.ai/code/session_01E9dkcpbwWWHrdGzpvWZd1T


Generated by Claude Code

 #147)

refresh() read the token row, then deleted it, then issued new tokens.
Two requests with the same token — a real client and a replayed stolen
one — could both read the row before either delete (the second delete
hits 0 rows without erroring), so both minted a fresh access+refresh
pair. Rotation therefore failed to neutralize a captured token.

Replaced the SELECT-then-delete with a single atomic
DELETE ... WHERE token_hash = ? AND expires_at > ? RETURNING user_id, so
only the racer whose delete hits the row proceeds and the other gets
401 — mirroring the consumeNonce pattern already used in this file for
the same class of TOCTOU replay. Portable across Postgres and SQLite.

The existing testRefreshRotatesToken (rotation + sequential-reuse
rejection) still holds. Rule 5 (session management): opens as draft
pending a security verdict. Found by the 2026-07-11 full-repo audit (M2).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E9dkcpbwWWHrdGzpvWZd1T
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Security review (rule 5) — BLOCK @ 8807f7b7

Classification: security-sensitive — refresh-token rotation / session management.

Fix: correct. The atomic DELETE … RETURNING consume closes the concurrent replay window in #147: two requests presenting the same token can no longer both SELECT-then-issue, because only the transaction whose DELETE hits the row gets a RETURNING result — the loser matches zero rows and gets 401. Folding expires_at > now into the WHERE is right, and mirroring consumeNonce is the correct precedent. No correctness objections.

Blocker — missing regression for the bug class. AuthTests.testRefreshRotatesToken already asserts sequential single-use (replaying the old token after rotation → 401), but the old SELECT-then-delete code passes that test too — it never exercised the concurrent race that #147 is about. Per rule 5, the test must be able to catch the class of bug under review, and this one can't.

Required before APPROVE: a concurrency regression that fires ≥2 simultaneous POST /auth/refresh with the same token (task group / async let) and asserts exactly one 200 and the rest 401, with only one new token pair minted. That test fails against the pre-fix code and passes against this diff.

Staying draft; no Security review: APPROVE posted, no orchestrator-approval status. Head reviewed: 8807f7b7 — a new push voids this verdict.

— orchestrator/reviewer, 2026-07-12

Security review (rule 5) noted testRefreshRotatesToken only covers
sequential reuse — the old SELECT-then-delete code passes it too — so it
can't catch the concurrent replay that #147 fixes. Added a test that
fires 8 simultaneous POST /auth/refresh with the same token and asserts
exactly one 200 and the rest 401. Atomic DELETE … RETURNING makes that
deterministic here; the pre-fix code let multiple racers mint sessions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01E9dkcpbwWWHrdGzpvWZd1T

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Added the required concurrency regression at 75e7f91: testConcurrentRefreshRedeemsTheTokenExactlyOnce fires 8 simultaneous POST /auth/refresh with the same token via a task group and asserts exactly one 200 and seven 401. The atomic DELETE … RETURNING makes "exactly one winner" deterministic here; the pre-fix SELECT-then-delete let multiple racers through. (Application isn't Sendable, so it crosses into the task closures via a small @unchecked Sendable box — Vapor routes each test request independently, which is the concurrency under test.) Ready for re-review; CI is the build/run verifier for this session.


Generated by Claude Code

claude and others added 2 commits July 12, 2026 11:38
The concurrency regression from 75e7f91 didn't build: its afterResponse
closure was synchronous, so overload resolution picked Application.test's
sync variant, which is unavailable from an async context (the enclosing
task-group closure). Mark the closure `{ res async in }` — the same
disambiguation every other async test in this file uses — so the async
overload is selected.

Verified the regression now does its job: against the pre-fix
SELECT-then-delete code all 8 concurrent refreshes return 200 (0×401),
and it fails reliably (5/5 runs); against the atomic DELETE … RETURNING
fix exactly one returns 200 and seven return 401 (5/5). Full server
suite: 86 tests, 0 failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@testtest126

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Re-review requested @ 5f8b867 — the concurrency regression now builds and bites.

Flagging the head the verdict must land on, because the regression added at 75e7f91 did not compile under the server toolchain (Swift 6.3.3): its afterResponse closure was synchronous, so overload resolution selected Application.test's sync variant — unavailable from asynchronous contexts inside the task-group closure. CI would have gone red; the earlier "ready for re-review" was never build-verified locally (author noted CI was the verifier).

Fixed in 5f8b867 with the one-line disambiguation every other async test in this file already uses:

-                    }, afterResponse: { res in
+                    }, afterResponse: { res async in

Verified empirically that the regression catches the bug class (the rule-5 blocker):

  • Pre-fix SELECT-then-delete (reverted AuthController.swift to cf20ef7 locally): fails 5/5 — all 8 concurrent refreshes return 200, 0×401. Replay window fully open; every racer mints a pair.
  • Atomic DELETE … RETURNING fix: passes 5/5 — exactly 1×200, 7×401. A pair is minted only on the 200 path, so "exactly one 200" is "exactly one new token pair minted".
  • Full server suite at this head: swift test86 tests, 0 failures.

Scope note: production code is unchanged since your BLOCK @ 8807f7b7git diff 8807f7b 5f8b867 -- …/AuthController.swift is empty (byte-identical). Every commit since the fix is test-only (regression add + lint + this compile fix). The consume logic you already assessed as "correct" hasn't moved.

Staying draft; not self-approving (rule 5). Requesting the rule-5 verdict re-issued at 5f8b867Security review: APPROVE @ 5f8b867.

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Thanks for the compile catch and the empirical pre/post verification — the sync afterResponse overload selection was a real gap I couldn't see without building (this session has no Swift toolchain; proxy blocks the download). Author-side confirmation: I'm freezing this branch at 5f8b867 — no further pushes from me, so the head stays stable for the rule-5 verdict. Production code is unchanged since your BLOCK @ 8807f7b7 as you noted. Nothing further needed from my side.


Generated by Claude Code

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Security review: APPROVE @ 5f8b867

Root-agent review (CLAUDE.md rule 5). The atomic DELETE ... RETURNING correctly closes the SELECT-then-delete replay window; parameterized binds (no injection); mirrors the established consumeNonce helper. Verified empirically, not just against CI: built at this head, then reverted the fix while keeping the test and confirmed testConcurrentRefreshRedeemsTheTokenExactlyOnce fails on the old code (8 of 8 concurrent refreshes mint a session) and passes on the fix -- a genuine regression test, not a self-consistent tautology. All lanes green at this head.

@testtest126
testtest126 marked this pull request as ready for review July 12, 2026 17:39
@testtest126
testtest126 merged commit e1b441f into main Jul 12, 2026
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@testtest126
testtest126 deleted the claude/smiley-face-1xzfkz-refresh-atomic branch July 12, 2026 17:40
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Security: refresh-token rotation is non-atomic — a replayed token can mint a parallel session

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