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Hotfix: image search inserts a verified, saved image #46
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| import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest' | ||
| import { Readable } from 'node:stream' | ||
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| vi.mock('../_imageSearch.js', () => ({ | ||
| ImageSearchError: class ImageSearchError extends Error {}, | ||
| imageSearchErrorBody: vi.fn(() => ({ error: 'Search failed' })), | ||
| searchImages: vi.fn(), | ||
| embedImage: vi.fn(), | ||
| resolveKeys: vi.fn(() => ({})), | ||
| })) | ||
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| import handler from '../image-search.js' | ||
| import { searchImages, embedImage } from '../_imageSearch.js' | ||
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| const images = [ | ||
| { id: 'one', url: 'https://images.example/one.jpg', thumbnailUrl: 'https://images.example/one-thumb.jpg', provider: 'openverse' }, | ||
| { id: 'two', url: 'https://images.example/two.jpg', thumbnailUrl: 'https://images.example/two-thumb.jpg', provider: 'openverse' }, | ||
| ] | ||
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| async function post(body) { | ||
| const req = Readable.from([JSON.stringify(body)]) | ||
| req.method = 'POST' | ||
| const res = { | ||
| statusCode: 200, | ||
| setHeader: vi.fn(), | ||
| end: vi.fn(), | ||
| } | ||
| await handler(req, res) | ||
| return { status: res.statusCode, body: JSON.parse(res.end.mock.calls[0][0]) } | ||
| } | ||
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| describe('manual image selection', () => { | ||
| beforeEach(() => { | ||
| vi.resetAllMocks() | ||
| searchImages.mockResolvedValue(images) | ||
| embedImage.mockResolvedValue('') | ||
| }) | ||
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| it('embeds the image actually clicked, not the first search result', async () => { | ||
| const response = await post({ query: 'apple', provider: 'openverse', limit: 20, embedSelectedUrl: images[1].url }) | ||
| expect(response.status).toBe(200) | ||
| expect(response.body).toMatchObject({ embedded: true, candidate: images[1] }) | ||
| expect(embedImage).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(images[1].url) | ||
| expect(searchImages).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ query: 'apple', provider: 'openverse' })) | ||
| }) | ||
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| it('rejects an unverified URL without downloading it (SSRF guard)', async () => { | ||
| const response = await post({ query: 'apple', provider: 'openverse', embedSelectedUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1/private' }) | ||
| expect(response.status).toBe(409) | ||
| expect(response.body.code).toBe('image_selection_expired') | ||
| expect(embedImage).not.toHaveBeenCalled() | ||
| }) | ||
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| it('can embed the provider thumbnail if the original is blocked', async () => { | ||
| embedImage.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('403')).mockResolvedValueOnce('') | ||
| const response = await post({ query: 'apple', provider: 'openverse', embedSelectedUrl: images[0].url }) | ||
| expect(response.status).toBe(200) | ||
| expect(response.body).toMatchObject({ embedded: true, thumbnailFallback: true }) | ||
| expect(embedImage).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(2, images[0].thumbnailUrl) | ||
| }) | ||
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| it('reports download failures instead of pretending insertion succeeded', async () => { | ||
| embedImage.mockRejectedValue(new Error('403')) | ||
| const response = await post({ query: 'apple', provider: 'openverse', embedSelectedUrl: images[0].url }) | ||
| expect(response.status).toBe(422) | ||
| expect(response.body.code).toBe('image_download_failed') | ||
| expect(response.body).not.toHaveProperty('dataUrl') | ||
| }) | ||
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| it('preserves ordinary image search requests', async () => { | ||
| const response = await post({ query: 'apple', provider: 'openverse' }) | ||
| expect(response.status).toBe(200) | ||
| expect(response.body.results).toEqual(images) | ||
| expect(embedImage).not.toHaveBeenCalled() | ||
| }) | ||
| }) |
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A fresh provider result is still an untrusted external URL, so it does not establish an SSRF boundary: an indexed attacker-controlled image URL can redirect to a loopback, private-network, or cloud-metadata address.
embedImageexplicitly usesredirect: 'follow'and performs no hostname or resolved-IP validation, allowing this new selected-image route (and its thumbnail fallback) to make the server follow that redirect. Reject private/reserved destinations after DNS resolution and validate every redirect hop before downloading.Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.