Repository navigation
fix(progress): tell agents how to load the answer tool and which fields it takes; bump to 1.14.5 - #135
Merged
Conversation
…ds it takes; bump to 1.14.5 In Claude Code an agent that hadn't loaded progress_question_answer, or lost it to compaction, guessed its fields and failed once before retrying. The skill now loads all Progress tools in one search and again after compaction, and the question_ask tool's reply names the answer tool's fields.
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Why
In Claude Code, recording a question's answer often failed on the first call. Claude Code hides a tool's inputs until the agent loads it. Agents loaded the setup tools at the start and left out
progress_question_answer, or lost it when a long chat was compacted. They then guessed the field names (ref,answer,option) and got a validation error. The retry about 3 seconds later worked, so no answers were lost. Four recent sessions show this pattern.What changed
ToolSearchquery that loads all 11 Progress tools. It tells agents to run it again after each compaction. It also mapsquestion answer Q7 Ato the tool'sidandchoice.progress_question_asksucceeds, its reply namesprogress_question_answerand its fields.Scope
Verification
npm testinprogress: 232 pass.npm run typecheck,oxlintandoxfmt --checkare clean.npm run check:installinstalls with npm 12.2.2.Security review
No release blockers found.
Full report
Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-progress@1.14.5
I found no release blockers in 1.14.5. I reasoned everything below from the source at 409ef96. I had no shell in this session, so I ran no tests and nothing was executed.
What changed, and what it can reach
server/tool.ts:61-72,withNoteandANSWER_NOTE. This wrapsprogress_question_askand adds a fixed sentence to the end of a successful reply. Failed replies come back unchanged. The added text is a constant the plugin writes; nothing from the repo or the agent goes into it. The wrapper keeps the tool's name, input check and description, and calls the samerun()→runCli()path with the same fixed"question ask"command. It adds no file, program, HTML or network access. The chat row (client/chat-row.ts:81-93) shows the reply as plain text, so the note appears as the plugin's own wording.skills/paseo-progress/SKILL.md:10-18. These are new instructions telling the agent to load the 11 Progress tools with oneToolSearchcall. That only loads the plugin's own tools. It doesn't tell the agent to run commands, open files or install anything. The skill is shown in the panel (server/skill.ts:131-133) from the plugin's own folder, never from the repo.package.jsonandpackage-lock.json. Version 1.14.5, and zod 4.6.7 as a dev dependency, pinned by an integrity hash. The repo being reviewed has no say in it.server/tool.test.ts. Left out of the package by the!**/*.test.tsrule infiles.Every place that touches files, programs, HTML or the network
server/system.ts:24-31,runProgramandrunCommandLine: programs start in Node's own folder, never the worktree, so a program committed to the repo can't be picked up instead. Safe.server/system.ts:37-113, the file-writing helpers: each write names a trusted folder plus a relative name, rejects absolute paths and.., and refuses to write through any link along the way. Safe.server/store.ts:20-28,git: runsgit -C <root>from Node's folder, so agit.exein the repo can't run. Safe.server/store.ts:37-51, the working folder: always under~/.local/state/paseo-progress/<name>-<hash>, never inside the repo. Safe.server/store.ts:77-98, the history folder: read from the repo's local git config, which the attacker doesn't control. It must be inside the worktree and not under.git(checked in any letter case). Safe.server/store.ts:134-151,saveRunCopy: folders are made one step at a time, and it stops if any step is a link or a file. The write goes to a temporary file that is renamed into place, so a link sitting at the target gets replaced, not written through. Safe.server/store.ts:101-113,setHistoryFolder: runs only when the user clicks in the panel. It writes to the local git config throughgit config --local, not by editing files directly. Safe.server/store.ts:155-164,listFolders: read-only. It checks the folder and leaves out.git. Safe.server/progress-file.ts:59-87andserver/lock.ts: append to the progress file, write the panel-opened marker, and create and remove the lock. All of it happens in the plugin's own state folder through thesystem.tshelpers, and every event is checked against a schema before it's written. Safe.server/cli.ts:510-523,rootRelativeandguessKind: they only check whether paths exist (stat); nothing is opened or sent. Paths outside the worktree are stored as absolute paths, and the open and preview code below refuses them. Safe.server/cli.ts:574-575,install-launcherfrom the command line: it writes wherever it's told. Agents can't reach it, becauseserver/tool.ts:207-213refuses it as the first argument. The other tools always pass fixed command words, andrunClionly matchesargv[0]. Safe.server/launcher.ts:128-173, launcher install: runs only from the panel's Install button. It writes a fixed script to~/.local/binand won't overwrite a file the plugin didn't write. Safe.server/skill.ts:24-143, skill links: they point into the plugin's own folder under the home folder. They're re-pointed automatically only if the plugin made them; new links wait for the user's click. Paseo's command comes from the user's environment or PATH and runs from Node's folder. Safe.server/open.ts:67-81,resolveAttachment: looks up an attachment by its reference in the dashboard, then resolves real paths and refuses anything outside the real worktree. Safe.server/open.ts:85-91,openDeliverable: runs on the user's click. It checks the real file is a regular file with an extension that only displays, never runs. HTML, SVG and scripts are refused, then it's opened throughexplorer,xdg-openoropenstarted from Node's folder. Safe.server/open.ts:117-178, preview and read-in-pieces: read-only, inside the worktree, with size limits. A preview never serves HTML. Images are sent as data URIs. Safe.server/open.ts:38-47,defaultBrowser: reads the user's own Launch Services file withplutil. Safe.server/whats-new.tsandserver/question-mode.ts: read the plugin's own README and package.json, and write fixed files in the state folder throughwriteFileIn. Safe.client/attachments.tsx:66-75: http(s) links go to Paseo's browser oropenExternalUrlon the user's click. The command only acceptshttp(s)links. Safe.client/attachments.tsx:96-110,PageLink: an HTML deliverable opens in Paseo's sandboxed preview, which blocks network access. The page is never handed to the host's default app (opensOnHostandcanPreviewboth refuse HTML). Safe.client/chat-row.ts: shows tool replies as plain text, with no HTML. Safe.No release blockers found.