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chore: raise zod to 4.6.7 in six plugins' dev dependencies - #133

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chore-zod-4.6.7
Nov 7, 2026
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stevecastaneda merged 1 commit into
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chore-zod-4.6.7

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@stevecastaneda stevecastaneda commented Nov 7, 2026 •

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Why

npm audit warned about zod below 4.6.6 (GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5, memory exhaustion while validating oversized constrained collections) when Progress 1.14.4 was published. This clears the warning for local installs and tests.

Nothing users install changes:

  • zod is a dev dependency in every plugin. Paseo 0.14.0 hands plugins its own zod (SERVER_HOST_MODULES in compiler-esbuild.ts), and the installed Paseo ships zod 4.6.7.
  • npm audit --omit=dev already found 0 vulnerabilities.

What changes

History, Playwright Pulse, Progress, Setup Monitor, Time Since and Workspace Links now ask for zod ^4.6.7 and lock 4.6.7. Shell Yeah already locked 4.6.7. There are no version bumps: CONTRIBUTING says dev dependency and lockfile changes need none, so there's nothing to publish.

Verification

  • npm audit lists no zod advisory in any of the six.
  • Each plugin's typecheck and tests pass: History 50, Playwright Pulse 45, Progress 230, Setup Monitor 31, Time Since 20, Workspace Links 28.
  • oxlint and oxfmt are clean.

Security review

No release blockers found in any of the six.

History (1.2.1): no release blockers found

Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-history@1.2.1

  • Reviewer: claude --model opus
  • Commit: 4f614dc
  • Tree: ebd6043245fafc0f23dca279aad196bff3115a8f
  • Diff: 495358c..4f614dc -- history/
  • Date: 2026-11-07T17:16:34.089Z
  • Minutes: 1.1
  • Key: 0f5d835ae3d0938e94b8983c314e3d0fc53c02cf09e0a4ad90073b5979162a66

I found no release blockers in @stevecastaneda/paseo-history 1.2.1. I reasoned everything from the source; I didn't run anything.

What changed

Almost all of the diff is reformatting by the new formatter. The parts that change behaviour:

  • New server/system.ts. Both ways the server starts a program or opens a file now go through it. runProgram calls execFile with no shell and always uses utf8; its default start folder is the Node install folder. openToRead opens a file with "r" only.
  • server/opencode.ts:12. It now calls runProgram instead of its own execFile. It still passes the home folder as the start folder, so the new default isn't used here. Errors now carry cause:, but the messages are fixed text and only those reach the client.
  • server/files.ts:43. It now opens files through openToRead(path) instead of open(path, "r"). The behaviour is the same.
  • client/load-history.ts:15. do { … } while (true) became for (;;) { … }. Every break and return works the same way.
  • package.json. Fields were reordered, and zod (a dev dependency) went from 4.4.3 to 4.6.7. There is still no runtime dependency and no install script.

Every place that touches files, programs, HTML or the network

  • server/opencode.ts:12, starts opencode export <id> --pure. Safe. There is no shell. The session ID must match ^ses_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$, so it can't be read as an option. The ID comes from Paseo's own record of the session, not from anything an agent writes. The program runs in the home folder, not the worktree, so on Windows it can't pick up a program the repo committed. PATH and the rest of the environment come from the daemon and the user's provider settings. The run has a 30-second timeout and a 64 MiB output limit.
  • server/system.ts:18, runProgram. Safe. It uses execFile with arguments as a list and forces utf8. The default start folder is dirname(process.execPath), which the attacker doesn't control.
  • server/system.ts:22, openToRead. Safe. It opens files read-only. There is no file write, delete or rename anywhere in the shipped code.
  • server/files.ts:19, readdir in findLog. Safe. It only walks folders that come from the user's environment and settings: CODEX_HOME/sessions, CODEX_HOME/archived_sessions and CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/projects, or the defaults under the home folder. It goes at most 8 levels deep and visits at most 100,000 entries. With withFileTypes, a symlink counts as neither a folder nor a file, so links are never followed. The session ID is checked against ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$ and must match a file name exactly, so .. paths are impossible. If two logs match, it refuses to choose one.
  • server/files.ts:42–79, readPage. Safe. It refuses anything that isn't a regular file. The source hash ties paging to one file (its path, device, inode and creation time). The offset is a safe integer of 0 or more (checked by zod in shared/history.ts:8) and no larger than the file. A single entry is capped at 4 MiB. The text goes only to the user's own Paseo client.
  • server/history.ts:17–28. Safe. It decides which folder to read from Paseo's agent record and the user's provider settings and environment. The client can only supply agentId, offset and source; none of them changes which file is read.
  • shared/history.ts, the RPC definition. Safe. Inputs are checked with zod and the output has a fixed shape.
  • client/viewer.tsx and client/task-notification.tsx, showing log text. Safe. Log content is shown with Paseo's Markdown component or as plain Text. The plugin builds no HTML and no web view and runs no scripts. Links and images inside Markdown are handled by Paseo's own component. "Copy" uses Paseo's copyText.
  • shared/entries.ts, which labels each entry as the user's or the assistant's. Safe as far as I could check.
    • Claude tool results, isMeta text (such as injected skill bodies) and compaction summaries are kept out of messages labelled "You".
    • Task notifications are labelled "Agent/Task finished", never "You".
    • Notification-shaped text written by the assistant stays an assistant message.
    • Codex AGENTS.md and environment context are kept out of "You" too.
  • client/directory.ts and client/pills.tsx, Paseo agent list and composer pill. Safe. They use only Paseo's own client API and make no other network calls.
  • client/web.ts, the event boundary on the web. Safe. It only stops click and key events from bubbling up to the composer pill; it doesn't change what the dialog does.

One thing I couldn't check from this repo: whether Codex writes the text of a skill you invoke from the repo as a plain user message (for example starting with <skill>). If it does, entries.ts:93 would show that text labelled "You". This code didn't change in this release, and there's no Codex sample in the repo to test against. Comparing one real Codex log to that rule would settle it. I haven't counted it as a blocker.

No release blockers found.

Playwright Pulse (1.5.1): no release blockers found

Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-playwright-pulse@1.5.1

  • Reviewer: claude --model opus
  • Commit: 4f614dc
  • Tree: dea136e3440ae2ca7bf6d66ea0be8be99d57c364
  • Diff: 495358c..4f614dc -- playwright-pulse/
  • Date: 2026-11-07T17:16:14.335Z
  • Minutes: 0.8
  • Key: 99801a6e2bab160dc0f54c79b8d922e3ba08c480b9cfbe55a9ecfda513a6234c

I read the changed server code, system.ts, and the code it reaches: attachments.ts, run-file.ts, reporter-install.ts, stop.ts, pulse.ts, pulse-reporter.mjs, rpc.ts and index.server.ts. I also searched the client for links, HTML, web views and clipboard writes. I didn't run anything; all of this is reasoned from the source.

What changed: almost all of the client and test changes are formatting from the new formatter. The real change is on the server: programs.ts was folded into the new system.ts, and every place that starts a program or changes a file now goes through its helpers. I compared each call site with the old code:

  • runProgram keeps the old behaviour: the program is named by absolute path, it runs from LAUNCH_FOLDER unless told otherwise, and output is read as text. findPluginDirectory, processStartTime and commandOf used to pass cwd: LAUNCH_FOLDER themselves; they now get it as the default, so nothing changes.
  • startDetached is the old systemOpener code, moved unchanged.
  • placeFileIn does what writeReporter did before: write a temporary file, then link it into place (or rename over the plugin's own copy), then remove the temporary file. It adds a check against .. and absolute names, and against links in any folder along the way.
  • removeIn and removeFolderIn replace the plain rm and rmdir calls in pruneRuns and removeReporter. The names they get come from readdir (no slashes), from the RUNS_FOLDER constant, or from basename(path). So they behave as before, plus the .. check.

Every place that touches files, programs, HTML or the network:

  • system.ts:29 findProgram: walks PATH, which is the user's own setting. It skips relative entries, and for xdg-open it also skips entries inside the worktree, by their own path or where they lead. Safe.
  • system.ts:55 findPs and reporter-install.ts:62 findPluginDirectory: find programs only through findProgram plus the user's PASEO_BIN or a fixed path. The repo can't plant either one. Safe.
  • system.ts:58 runProgram: starts a program by absolute path from Node's own folder, never from the worktree. Its arguments are fixed or a number (the process id). Safe.
  • system.ts:63 startDetached: only used for explorer.exe, by absolute path, from Node's folder. Safe.
  • system.ts:89 placeFileIn: only called for the fixed path ~/.local/share/playwright-pulse/reporter.mjs. It only renames over a file that starts with the plugin's marker line, and linking fails rather than overwrite anything else. Nothing here comes from the repo. Safe.
  • system.ts:100 and :105, removeIn and removeFolderIn: only called on the reporter copy or on folders under ~/.local/state/playwright-pulse. The names can't climb out, and an rmdir only removes an empty folder. Safe.
  • run-file.ts:145 pruneRuns: only acts on a run folder that readdir reports as a real folder (not a link), that is named for its run's own worktree, and only once that worktree is gone. It deletes only file names the reporter writes. Only the reporter writes these folders, inside the user's own Playwright run, never repo files. Safe.
  • run-file.ts:64 and :83, reading the run files: read-only. The run id is checked against RUN_ID, so it can't name another path. Safe.
  • attachments.ts:49 resolveAttachment: only reaches a file named in the latest run. That file must be inside the worktree (by its given path or its real path), every step of the path is checked with lstat and none may be a link, and the end must be a regular file. Safe.
  • attachments.ts:71 previewImage: reads only those files, only with an image extension, and capped at 10 MB. The image goes as a data: URI to the plugin's own panel, which shows it with React Native's Image and runs no scripts. Nothing goes over the network. Safe.
  • attachments.ts:122 openFile: a video or screenshot opens in its default app only if its extension is a video or image type. A trace is only shown in its folder (open -R, explorer /select,, or xdg-open on the folder), so nothing it contains runs. The repo can't pick the opener. Safe.
  • attachments.ts:114 viewTraceCommand: only copied to the clipboard, never run. It refuses paths with shell-active characters, and --prefix keeps npx from picking up the repo's own Playwright. Safe.
  • stop.ts:28 stopRun: sends a signal only when the run is the newest, its process is still alive, it started no later than the run, and its command line names Playwright. Safe.
  • pulse-reporter.mjs: runs inside the user's own Playwright process and writes only in its own folder under ~/.local/state/playwright-pulse. Not a way in for the attacker. Safe.
  • Client (panel.tsx, tests.tsx, screenshot.tsx and the rest): text from the repo is only shown as React Native Text, with no HTML, web view or links. copyText only runs on the user's click and copies what the button says. The clipboard prompt for the slowest tests includes test titles, but it is labelled as a prompt about those tests. Unchanged and safe.

No release blockers found.

Progress (1.14.4): no release blockers found

Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-progress@1.14.4

  • Reviewer: claude --model opus
  • Commit: 4f614dc
  • Tree: 53db17a145a8cba4a9bb368ef882c3cf123ef19e
  • Diff: f54bcdd..4f614dc -- progress/
  • Date: 2026-11-07T17:16:38.671Z
  • Minutes: 1.2
  • Key: 7cc739b5e97d364a90bc83d2f3bc62b50e207ba020e08eab1394e285f16332e4

No release blockers. The only change is a patch-level bump of zod (4.6.5 → 4.6.7), a dev dependency. I had no shell, so I didn't run anything; everything below is reasoned from the source.

Where the change shows up in what ships

  • zod is only in devDependencies, so people who install the package don't get it as a separate package.
  • It does ship inside dist/server/cli.js. prepack bundles server/cli.ts with esbuild, and that bundle pulls in zod through shared/events.ts, server/question-mode.ts and server/tool.ts. When the plugin loads the code directly, zod comes from Paseo's runtime instead.
  • The safety checks don't rely on fine details of zod's behaviour that a patch release might change:
    • events.ts:28: links must start with http:// or https://. That check is the plugin's own regex added on top of z.url(), so a looser z.url() can't let a file: or javascript: link through.
    • events.ts:22: option letters must match /^[A-Z]$/.
    • question-mode.ts:14 and whats-new.ts:17: these read the plugin's own files with a fixed list of allowed values or a regex.
    • The RPC input schemas in shared/rpc.ts only check types. The real checks on paths and references happen later in the server code, not in zod.
  • node_modules/zod/package.json reports 4.6.7, which matches the lock file. The lock file's integrity hash points at the official npm registry.

Every place that touches files, programs, HTML or the network

  • server/system.ts:24-31 (runProgram / runCommandLine): programs start in Node's own folder by default, never in the worktree, so a program committed to the repo can't be picked up on Windows. No caller sets the starting folder to the worktree.
  • server/system.ts:37-113 (writing helpers): names containing .. or absolute paths are refused, linked folders along the way are refused, and the atomic write renames over a link at the target instead of writing through it.
  • server/store.ts:20-28 (git): runs git -C <root> from Node's folder, with arguments passed as a list.
  • server/store.ts:134-151 (saveRunCopy): the folder comes from the user's local git config and is checked by checkFolder (no .., nothing inside .git). It's created one step at a time and refused if any step is a link or a file. The file name is built from a cleaned-up slug, and the write is atomic.
  • server/store.ts:101-113 (setHistoryFolder): only the user's click in the panel calls it. It writes to --local git config through a list of arguments, after checkFolder.
  • server/store.ts:155-164 (listFolders): read only. It goes through checkFolder and skips .git folders.
  • server/progress-file.ts:59-88 and server/lock.ts: write only in ~/.local/state/paseo-progress/<name>-<hash>, which is outside the repo. Each event passes eventSchema before it's appended.
  • server/open.ts:67-81 (resolveAttachment): the panel can only name a recorded reference, never a raw path. The real path is checked to be inside the real worktree, so links and .. can't escape.
  • server/open.ts:85-91,26-62 (open on the host): checks the real file, not the recorded name. Only images, video, audio, PDFs and text open; HTML, SVG and scripts are refused. It runs explorer, xdg-open or open with the path as an argument, starting in Node's folder.
  • server/open.ts:117-178 (preview and reading pieces): read only, inside the real worktree, with size limits. .git contents are only reachable if an agent records them as a path, and even then they're shown only in the panel's own preview, never sent off the machine.
  • server/open.ts:38-47 (defaultBrowser): runs plutil on a fixed plist in the user's home folder.
  • server/launcher.ts:128-173: writes only to ~/.local/bin/paseo-progress, and only when the user clicks Install. It never replaces a file it didn't write. The agent tool refuses install-launcher (tool.ts:190). The CLI's own install-launcher [path] needs a shell the agent already controls, so it gives the agent nothing new.
  • server/skill.ts:36-143: links in ~/.agents|.claude|.codex/skills, pointing at the folder Paseo reports for the plugin. It replaces only links this plugin made, and asks Paseo through runProgram from Node's folder.
  • server/question-mode.ts and server/whats-new.ts: atomic writes and removal of fixed names in the plugin's state folder. The README they read is the plugin's own file.
  • server/cli.ts:98-108,510-516: stored links must be http(s). Local paths are stored as recorded, and every later use goes through resolveAttachment.
  • client/attachments.tsx:66-75 (opening links): url has already passed the http(s) check in eventSchema. Clicking opens it in Paseo's browser or the system browser, and the address is shown as the row's short name.
  • client/attachments.tsx:96-110 and shared/attachments.ts:207 (HTML pages): open in Paseo's sandboxed preview, which blocks network access, so a page's scripts can't send anything off the machine. The host never opens HTML or SVG.
  • shared/markdown.ts:326-344 (Markdown preview): rewrites only relative links, and only when they stay inside the worktree root. Absolute links and links with a scheme are left alone.
  • client/chat-row.ts: only checks tool output with zod and shows it as text.

No release blockers found.

Setup Monitor (1.1.1): no release blockers found

Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-setup-monitor@1.1.1

  • Reviewer: claude --model opus
  • Commit: 4f614dc
  • Tree: 75723a4908b55caf291fecff2d0c630f28a8f884
  • Diff: aa56a35..4f614dc -- setup-monitor/
  • Date: 2026-11-07T17:16:20.258Z
  • Minutes: 0.9
  • Key: 82ae12b479fc04959d525da9fce2a23db5c7de731f1692fd0a544e3ff7f62b7f

I found no release blockers. Almost the whole diff is formatting: line wrapping, quote style, key order in package.json, a test helper moved out of a test, and an unused import removed. The only changes to what ships are zod 4.5.4 → 4.6.7 (a dev dependency only) and a new security-review npm script. That script runs only in the maintainer's checkout: npm runs only install-time scripts like postinstall for people who install the package, and this isn't one. I reasoned everything from the source and ran nothing.

Every place the shipped plugin touches files, programs, HTML or the network

  • server/daemon.ts:18-34 (defaultPort), the daemon channel: it only talks to the parent Paseo daemon through process.send and process.on("message"). It opens no sockets, makes no HTTP requests and sends nothing anywhere else. Safe.

  • server/daemon.ts:41-65 (parsePaseoFrame): it reads the daemon's frames with JSON.parse inside a try/catch and checks the shape before using anything. Safe.

  • server/daemon.ts:88-124 (requestFromDaemon): it sends a fixed message type plus a workspaceId and a random requestId. JSON.stringify builds the frame, so an attacker-supplied ID can't add fields or change the request type. Replies are matched by requestId and time out after 8 seconds. Safe.

  • server/daemon.ts:71-79 and shared/setup.ts:29-35 (parseSnapshot and setupSnapshotSchema): zod checks every snapshot, and logs are cut to their last 8,000 characters (shared/snapshot.ts:23-26). Nothing from a snapshot is ever run, written to disk, or used as a path. Safe.

  • server/daemon.ts:147-162 (createSetupRunner) and index.server.ts:7, which sends workspace.setup.run.request: this is the only thing in the plugin that leads to code running. It is safe for three reasons:

    • It runs only when the user presses Run setup (client/buttons.tsx:64-68). The plugin registers no agent commands, so an agent can't trigger it.
    • It forwards the same daemon request any Paseo client can already send, so it adds no new power.
    • Just above the button, the popover shows Paseo's own warning naming the source repository and saying the setup "could run code you have not reviewed" (shared/snapshot.ts:141-144, client/popover.tsx:134-166). The label isn't hiding anything.

    The popover doesn't list the commands before you press Run setup. That's a hardening idea, not a blocker.

  • server/daemon.ts:203-264 (createSetupWatcher), the subscribe and release messages to the daemon: these only read setup status. Safe.

  • client/buttons.tsx:169-219, the client's calls to the plugin server and to client.paseo.workspaces.list: these only read status and workspace lists, and only for workspaces of kind worktree. Safe.

  • client/popover.tsx:101-227, how attacker-influenced text is shown: this covers branch name, command text, cwd, logs, error text and the source repository name. All of it goes into React Native <Text> as plain text: no HTML, no dangerouslySetInnerHTML, no links, no Linking.openURL, no web views. The text sits inside the setup popover and is clearly labeled as a log, so it can't pass as the user's own work. Safe.

  • Files and programs: the shipped code never uses fs, child_process, a shell, or the system's default app, and never writes settings or history. Safe.

  • package.json, the package's own scripts: there's no install, postinstall or prepare script, so installing the package runs nothing. The scripts it does have (dev, check:install, security-review) only run from the maintainer's checkout, and their files under scripts/ aren't part of the package. zod is only a dev dependency. Safe.

No release blockers found.

Time Since (1.1.1): no release blockers found

Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-time-since@1.1.1

  • Reviewer: claude --model opus
  • Commit: 4f614dc
  • Tree: 899fdcbde51139ac9cf3bfde9eb108e7ea49bb68
  • Diff: aa56a35..4f614dc -- time-since/
  • Date: 2026-11-07T17:15:54.226Z
  • Minutes: 0.5
  • Key: 370a771a89de5cd51b96e08115e7e8479e2d582b833ef4aec02de82a06c0328a

I found no release blockers. All findings below come from reading the source. I didn't run anything.

What changed: most of the diff is formatting (the new oxfmt style), package.json fields moved around, and a dev-only bump of zod from 4.5.4 to 4.6.7. Zod is not shipped as a runtime dependency. The one change in behaviour is the new time-since/server/system.ts. Both storage modules now write their files through writeFileAtomicIn instead of calling fs directly. It writes the same files to the same folder in the same way: write a temporary file next to the target, rename it over the target, and delete the temporary file if anything fails. It adds two checks: it rejects names that are absolute or contain .., and it refuses to write through a folder that is a link.

Places that touch files, programs, HTML or the network:

  • server/system.ts:23-34 (writeFileAtomicIn: mkdir, writeFile, rename, rm): safe. The folder and file name are hard-coded constants built from PASEO_HOME or ~/.paseo, which the user controls. Nothing from the repo or an agent reaches the path. The temporary file name comes from the process id and a random UUID.
  • server/settings.storage.ts:19 (readFile) and :40 (write): safe. They only read and write <paseo home>/plugin-data/time-since/settings.json. The content is checked against settingsSchema (two booleans). The RPC input updateSettings only accepts two optional booleans.
  • server/last-reply.storage.ts:17 (readFile) and :32 (write): safe. They only read and write <paseo home>/plugin-data/time-since/last-reply.json. The keys are agent IDs that the daemon assigns, and the values are server-made new Date().toISOString() timestamps (server/last-reply.ts:15). Neither is ever used as a path. They are stored as JSON and only parsed back with Date.parse on the client.
  • server/write-lock.ts: no I/O. It only orders operations in memory, keyed by the fixed file paths.
  • server/last-reply.ts:14-19 (daemon events agent.turn_ended / agent.archived): safe. The only thing an agent influences is when a turn ends. Agent text is never used.
  • client/ticker.tsx:120 (agent timeline subscription), :176-198 (RPCs), :229 (agent directory list): safe. These use Paseo's own client API, not the general network. Only the event type and timestamp are read from the timeline. Message content is never shown.
  • client/ticker.tsx:133-155 and :82-84 (pill label and popover): safe. They show elapsed time worked out from a timestamp, or Date.toLocaleString(). Both render as React Native Text, so there's no HTML and no agent-written text.
  • client/settings-panel.tsx (options panel): safe. It only shows fixed labels and two booleans, and each click shows the new state of a single toggle.
  • client/directory.ts: Paseo directory subscription only. No files, programs, HTML or network of its own.
  • Programs: the plugin starts no programs (no child_process, open or shell calls anywhere in the shipped files).
  • Network: no fetch, WebView, links or remote content.

No release blockers found.

Workspace Links (1.1.2): no release blockers found

Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-workspace-links@1.1.2

  • Reviewer: claude --model opus
  • Commit: 4f614dc
  • Tree: 616d643576a96c791429e40047c45dd5969df9e0
  • Diff: a08928e..4f614dc -- workspace-links/
  • Date: 2026-11-07T17:16:10.200Z
  • Minutes: 0.7
  • Key: df3aaccacb41eddbd4b5cb0e15e1c424417a32d492fa5df396d3301ef8c11163

I found no release blockers in Workspace Links 1.1.2. I worked from the source only and ran nothing.

What changed, in short: almost all of the diff is reformatting by the new formatter (layout, quote style, line wrapping), with no change in behaviour. Three changes do matter:

  • File writes now go through a new helper in server/system.ts.
  • server/shortcut.storage.ts calls that helper instead of doing its own write-then-rename.
  • zod is raised to 4.6.7. It's a dev dependency only, and the files list is unchanged.

The package.json change to prepublishOnly only affects the maintainer's checkout, so I left it out as instructed.

Every place that touches files, programs, HTML or the network

  • server/links.ts:9-22, readLinks – reads only <workspaceDirectory>/workspace-links.json. It checks the file first without following links (lstat), refuses links and anything that isn't a regular file, and refuses files over 64 KB. The contents must match linksSchema: at most 100 entries, each with a label and an http(s) URL. Read-only, and it returns only labels and URLs. The workspace folder is sent by the client, so a caller could point it at another folder. Even then it can only read a file with that exact name, and only if the file parses as a link list, so no private files can leak. Safe.
  • server/links.ts:34-40, canonical – rewrites each URL the way the browser will read it, and rejects URLs with a name or password before an @. The popover therefore shows the site the click really opens. Safe.
  • server/status.ts:12-27, probe – sends a HEAD request to each URL in the workspace's own file, never to URLs the client supplies (:30-35). It skips certificate checks and ignores everything in the response except that one arrived. The repo can make the host send HEAD requests to URLs it chooses. That was already true before this change, and the requests carry no private files. Safe under items 1 to 4.
  • server/shortcut.storage.ts:30-50, reading settings – reads $PASEO_HOME/plugin-data/workspace-links/settings.json, or ~/.paseo/... if that variable isn't set. The path comes from the user's environment, which the attacker doesn't control, and the contents are checked against shortcutSchema. Safe.
  • server/shortcut.storage.ts:52-58 → server/system.ts:23-34, writeFileAtomicIn (new) – the folder is dirname(settingsFilePath) and the name is the fixed string settings.json. Because the name has no subfolders, the check for linked folders in placeIn has nothing to check. The folder itself comes from the user's environment, so this is fine. The helper creates the folder, writes a temp file named settings.json.<pid>.<uuid>.tmp, then renames it over the target. Renaming replaces a link instead of writing through it. The only values written are an enum and a boolean, both checked by shortcutSchema.parse. Nothing the repo or an agent controls reaches the path. Safe.
  • server/system.ts:11-19, placeIn – rejects absolute names and .. parts. There is a small gap: it splits on both slash types when checking for .., but only on the system separator when walking subfolders. No caller passes a name the attacker controls, so nothing can reach it. Not a blocker.
  • shared/shortcut.ts:32-39, the settings update call – input is limited to placement ∈ {composer, header} and a headerShowsLabel boolean. An agent could switch where the button appears, which is harmless and isn't the "attacker content in a trusted place" case in item 4. Safe.
  • client/popover.tsx:82-85, client/panel.tsx:176-179, openExternalUrl – opens only http(s) URLs that passed the server's checks, in the browser. No programs, files or custom URL schemes. The row shows the URL before you click (the full address in the panel, without the scheme in the popover). Safe.
  • client/popover.tsx:199, copyText(link.url) – copies a checked http(s) URL to the clipboard when the user clicks. Safe.
  • Rendering in client/panel.tsx and client/popover.tsx – labels, URLs and error messages appear only as React Native <Text>. There's no HTML, no dangerouslySetInnerHTML, no WebView and no eval. Safe.
  • client/links-query.ts, client/pills.tsx, client/directory.ts – these only call Paseo and the plugin's own server through the plugin client, and only reformatting changed here. No direct file, program or network access. Safe.
  • index.server.ts, index.client.tsx, paseo-plugin.json, tsconfig.json – registration and config only, with formatting changes. Safe.
  • Programs – no spawn, exec or similar anywhere in the shipped files (I searched for them). Safe.

No release blockers found.

npm audit flagged zod below 4.6.6 (GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5, memory exhaustion
validating oversized constrained collections). zod is a dev dependency in
every plugin: Paseo 0.14.0 hands plugins its own zod, which is 4.6.7, and
npm audit --omit=dev already found nothing. This clears the warning for
local installs and tests. Shell Yeah already locked 4.6.7. No version bumps,
since nothing users install changes.
@stevecastaneda
stevecastaneda merged commit c384439 into main Nov 7, 2026
1 check passed
@stevecastaneda
stevecastaneda deleted the chore-zod-4.6.7 branch November 7, 2026 17:17
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