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chore: raise zod to 4.6.7 in six plugins' dev dependencies - #133
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npm audit flagged zod below 4.6.6 (GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5, memory exhaustion validating oversized constrained collections). zod is a dev dependency in every plugin: Paseo 0.14.0 hands plugins its own zod, which is 4.6.7, and npm audit --omit=dev already found nothing. This clears the warning for local installs and tests. Shell Yeah already locked 4.6.7. No version bumps, since nothing users install changes.
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Why
npm auditwarned about zod below 4.6.6 (GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5, memory exhaustion while validating oversized constrained collections) when Progress 1.14.4 was published. This clears the warning for local installs and tests.Nothing users install changes:
SERVER_HOST_MODULESincompiler-esbuild.ts), and the installed Paseo ships zod 4.6.7.npm audit --omit=devalready found 0 vulnerabilities.What changes
History, Playwright Pulse, Progress, Setup Monitor, Time Since and Workspace Links now ask for
zod ^4.6.7and lock 4.6.7. Shell Yeah already locked 4.6.7. There are no version bumps: CONTRIBUTING says dev dependency and lockfile changes need none, so there's nothing to publish.Verification
npm auditlists no zod advisory in any of the six.Security review
No release blockers found in any of the six.
History (1.2.1): no release blockers found
Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-history@1.2.1
I found no release blockers in
@stevecastaneda/paseo-history1.2.1. I reasoned everything from the source; I didn't run anything.What changed
Almost all of the diff is reformatting by the new formatter. The parts that change behaviour:
server/system.ts. Both ways the server starts a program or opens a file now go through it.runProgramcallsexecFilewith no shell and always usesutf8; its default start folder is the Node install folder.openToReadopens a file with"r"only.server/opencode.ts:12. It now callsrunPrograminstead of its ownexecFile. It still passes the home folder as the start folder, so the new default isn't used here. Errors now carrycause:, but the messages are fixed text and only those reach the client.server/files.ts:43. It now opens files throughopenToRead(path)instead ofopen(path, "r"). The behaviour is the same.client/load-history.ts:15.do { … } while (true)becamefor (;;) { … }. Everybreakandreturnworks the same way.package.json. Fields were reordered, and zod (a dev dependency) went from 4.4.3 to 4.6.7. There is still no runtime dependency and no install script.Every place that touches files, programs, HTML or the network
server/opencode.ts:12, startsopencode export <id> --pure. Safe. There is no shell. The session ID must match^ses_[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$, so it can't be read as an option. The ID comes from Paseo's own record of the session, not from anything an agent writes. The program runs in the home folder, not the worktree, so on Windows it can't pick up a program the repo committed.PATHand the rest of the environment come from the daemon and the user's provider settings. The run has a 30-second timeout and a 64 MiB output limit.server/system.ts:18,runProgram. Safe. It usesexecFilewith arguments as a list and forcesutf8. The default start folder isdirname(process.execPath), which the attacker doesn't control.server/system.ts:22,openToRead. Safe. It opens files read-only. There is no file write, delete or rename anywhere in the shipped code.server/files.ts:19,readdirinfindLog. Safe. It only walks folders that come from the user's environment and settings:CODEX_HOME/sessions,CODEX_HOME/archived_sessionsandCLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/projects, or the defaults under the home folder. It goes at most 8 levels deep and visits at most 100,000 entries. WithwithFileTypes, a symlink counts as neither a folder nor a file, so links are never followed. The session ID is checked against^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$and must match a file name exactly, so..paths are impossible. If two logs match, it refuses to choose one.server/files.ts:42–79,readPage. Safe. It refuses anything that isn't a regular file. Thesourcehash ties paging to one file (its path, device, inode and creation time). The offset is a safe integer of 0 or more (checked by zod inshared/history.ts:8) and no larger than the file. A single entry is capped at 4 MiB. The text goes only to the user's own Paseo client.server/history.ts:17–28. Safe. It decides which folder to read from Paseo's agent record and the user's provider settings and environment. The client can only supplyagentId,offsetandsource; none of them changes which file is read.shared/history.ts, the RPC definition. Safe. Inputs are checked with zod and the output has a fixed shape.client/viewer.tsxandclient/task-notification.tsx, showing log text. Safe. Log content is shown with Paseo'sMarkdowncomponent or as plainText. The plugin builds no HTML and no web view and runs no scripts. Links and images inside Markdown are handled by Paseo's own component. "Copy" uses Paseo'scopyText.shared/entries.ts, which labels each entry as the user's or the assistant's. Safe as far as I could check.isMetatext (such as injected skill bodies) and compaction summaries are kept out of messages labelled "You".client/directory.tsandclient/pills.tsx, Paseo agent list and composer pill. Safe. They use only Paseo's own client API and make no other network calls.client/web.ts, the event boundary on the web. Safe. It only stops click and key events from bubbling up to the composer pill; it doesn't change what the dialog does.One thing I couldn't check from this repo: whether Codex writes the text of a skill you invoke from the repo as a plain user message (for example starting with
<skill>). If it does,entries.ts:93would show that text labelled "You". This code didn't change in this release, and there's no Codex sample in the repo to test against. Comparing one real Codex log to that rule would settle it. I haven't counted it as a blocker.No release blockers found.
Playwright Pulse (1.5.1): no release blockers found
Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-playwright-pulse@1.5.1
I read the changed server code,
system.ts, and the code it reaches:attachments.ts,run-file.ts,reporter-install.ts,stop.ts,pulse.ts,pulse-reporter.mjs,rpc.tsandindex.server.ts. I also searched the client for links, HTML, web views and clipboard writes. I didn't run anything; all of this is reasoned from the source.What changed: almost all of the client and test changes are formatting from the new formatter. The real change is on the server:
programs.tswas folded into the newsystem.ts, and every place that starts a program or changes a file now goes through its helpers. I compared each call site with the old code:runProgramkeeps the old behaviour: the program is named by absolute path, it runs fromLAUNCH_FOLDERunless told otherwise, and output is read as text.findPluginDirectory,processStartTimeandcommandOfused to passcwd: LAUNCH_FOLDERthemselves; they now get it as the default, so nothing changes.startDetachedis the oldsystemOpenercode, moved unchanged.placeFileIndoes whatwriteReporterdid before: write a temporary file, then link it into place (or rename over the plugin's own copy), then remove the temporary file. It adds a check against..and absolute names, and against links in any folder along the way.removeInandremoveFolderInreplace the plainrmandrmdircalls inpruneRunsandremoveReporter. The names they get come fromreaddir(no slashes), from theRUNS_FOLDERconstant, or frombasename(path). So they behave as before, plus the..check.Every place that touches files, programs, HTML or the network:
system.ts:29findProgram: walks PATH, which is the user's own setting. It skips relative entries, and forxdg-openit also skips entries inside the worktree, by their own path or where they lead. Safe.system.ts:55findPsandreporter-install.ts:62findPluginDirectory: find programs only throughfindProgramplus the user'sPASEO_BINor a fixed path. The repo can't plant either one. Safe.system.ts:58runProgram: starts a program by absolute path from Node's own folder, never from the worktree. Its arguments are fixed or a number (the process id). Safe.system.ts:63startDetached: only used forexplorer.exe, by absolute path, from Node's folder. Safe.system.ts:89placeFileIn: only called for the fixed path~/.local/share/playwright-pulse/reporter.mjs. It only renames over a file that starts with the plugin's marker line, and linking fails rather than overwrite anything else. Nothing here comes from the repo. Safe.system.ts:100and:105,removeInandremoveFolderIn: only called on the reporter copy or on folders under~/.local/state/playwright-pulse. The names can't climb out, and anrmdironly removes an empty folder. Safe.run-file.ts:145pruneRuns: only acts on a run folder thatreaddirreports as a real folder (not a link), that is named for its run's own worktree, and only once that worktree is gone. It deletes only file names the reporter writes. Only the reporter writes these folders, inside the user's own Playwright run, never repo files. Safe.run-file.ts:64and:83, reading the run files: read-only. The run id is checked againstRUN_ID, so it can't name another path. Safe.attachments.ts:49resolveAttachment: only reaches a file named in the latest run. That file must be inside the worktree (by its given path or its real path), every step of the path is checked withlstatand none may be a link, and the end must be a regular file. Safe.attachments.ts:71previewImage: reads only those files, only with an image extension, and capped at 10 MB. The image goes as adata:URI to the plugin's own panel, which shows it with React Native'sImageand runs no scripts. Nothing goes over the network. Safe.attachments.ts:122openFile: a video or screenshot opens in its default app only if its extension is a video or image type. A trace is only shown in its folder (open -R,explorer /select,, orxdg-openon the folder), so nothing it contains runs. The repo can't pick the opener. Safe.attachments.ts:114viewTraceCommand: only copied to the clipboard, never run. It refuses paths with shell-active characters, and--prefixkeepsnpxfrom picking up the repo's own Playwright. Safe.stop.ts:28stopRun: sends a signal only when the run is the newest, its process is still alive, it started no later than the run, and its command line names Playwright. Safe.pulse-reporter.mjs: runs inside the user's own Playwright process and writes only in its own folder under~/.local/state/playwright-pulse. Not a way in for the attacker. Safe.panel.tsx,tests.tsx,screenshot.tsxand the rest): text from the repo is only shown as React NativeText, with no HTML, web view or links.copyTextonly runs on the user's click and copies what the button says. The clipboard prompt for the slowest tests includes test titles, but it is labelled as a prompt about those tests. Unchanged and safe.No release blockers found.
Progress (1.14.4): no release blockers found
Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-progress@1.14.4
No release blockers. The only change is a patch-level bump of zod (4.6.5 → 4.6.7), a dev dependency. I had no shell, so I didn't run anything; everything below is reasoned from the source.
Where the change shows up in what ships
devDependencies, so people who install the package don't get it as a separate package.dist/server/cli.js.prepackbundlesserver/cli.tswith esbuild, and that bundle pulls in zod throughshared/events.ts,server/question-mode.tsandserver/tool.ts. When the plugin loads the code directly, zod comes from Paseo's runtime instead.events.ts:28: links must start withhttp://orhttps://. That check is the plugin's own regex added on top ofz.url(), so a looserz.url()can't let afile:orjavascript:link through.events.ts:22: option letters must match/^[A-Z]$/.question-mode.ts:14andwhats-new.ts:17: these read the plugin's own files with a fixed list of allowed values or a regex.shared/rpc.tsonly check types. The real checks on paths and references happen later in the server code, not in zod.node_modules/zod/package.jsonreports 4.6.7, which matches the lock file. The lock file's integrity hash points at the official npm registry.Every place that touches files, programs, HTML or the network
server/system.ts:24-31(runProgram/runCommandLine): programs start in Node's own folder by default, never in the worktree, so a program committed to the repo can't be picked up on Windows. No caller sets the starting folder to the worktree.server/system.ts:37-113(writing helpers): names containing..or absolute paths are refused, linked folders along the way are refused, and the atomic write renames over a link at the target instead of writing through it.server/store.ts:20-28(git): runsgit -C <root>from Node's folder, with arguments passed as a list.server/store.ts:134-151(saveRunCopy): the folder comes from the user's local git config and is checked bycheckFolder(no.., nothing inside.git). It's created one step at a time and refused if any step is a link or a file. The file name is built from a cleaned-up slug, and the write is atomic.server/store.ts:101-113(setHistoryFolder): only the user's click in the panel calls it. It writes to--localgit config through a list of arguments, aftercheckFolder.server/store.ts:155-164(listFolders): read only. It goes throughcheckFolderand skips.gitfolders.server/progress-file.ts:59-88andserver/lock.ts: write only in~/.local/state/paseo-progress/<name>-<hash>, which is outside the repo. Each event passeseventSchemabefore it's appended.server/open.ts:67-81(resolveAttachment): the panel can only name a recorded reference, never a raw path. The real path is checked to be inside the real worktree, so links and..can't escape.server/open.ts:85-91,26-62(open on the host): checks the real file, not the recorded name. Only images, video, audio, PDFs and text open; HTML, SVG and scripts are refused. It runsexplorer,xdg-openoropenwith the path as an argument, starting in Node's folder.server/open.ts:117-178(preview and reading pieces): read only, inside the real worktree, with size limits..gitcontents are only reachable if an agent records them as a path, and even then they're shown only in the panel's own preview, never sent off the machine.server/open.ts:38-47(defaultBrowser): runsplutilon a fixed plist in the user's home folder.server/launcher.ts:128-173: writes only to~/.local/bin/paseo-progress, and only when the user clicks Install. It never replaces a file it didn't write. The agent tool refusesinstall-launcher(tool.ts:190). The CLI's owninstall-launcher [path]needs a shell the agent already controls, so it gives the agent nothing new.server/skill.ts:36-143: links in~/.agents|.claude|.codex/skills, pointing at the folder Paseo reports for the plugin. It replaces only links this plugin made, and asks Paseo throughrunProgramfrom Node's folder.server/question-mode.tsandserver/whats-new.ts: atomic writes and removal of fixed names in the plugin's state folder. The README they read is the plugin's own file.server/cli.ts:98-108,510-516: stored links must be http(s). Local paths are stored as recorded, and every later use goes throughresolveAttachment.client/attachments.tsx:66-75(opening links):urlhas already passed the http(s) check ineventSchema. Clicking opens it in Paseo's browser or the system browser, and the address is shown as the row's short name.client/attachments.tsx:96-110andshared/attachments.ts:207(HTML pages): open in Paseo's sandboxed preview, which blocks network access, so a page's scripts can't send anything off the machine. The host never opens HTML or SVG.shared/markdown.ts:326-344(Markdown preview): rewrites only relative links, and only when they stay inside the worktree root. Absolute links and links with a scheme are left alone.client/chat-row.ts: only checks tool output with zod and shows it as text.No release blockers found.
Setup Monitor (1.1.1): no release blockers found
Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-setup-monitor@1.1.1
I found no release blockers. Almost the whole diff is formatting: line wrapping, quote style, key order in
package.json, a test helper moved out of a test, and an unused import removed. The only changes to what ships are zod 4.5.4 → 4.6.7 (a dev dependency only) and a newsecurity-reviewnpm script. That script runs only in the maintainer's checkout: npm runs only install-time scripts likepostinstallfor people who install the package, and this isn't one. I reasoned everything from the source and ran nothing.Every place the shipped plugin touches files, programs, HTML or the network
server/daemon.ts:18-34(defaultPort), the daemon channel: it only talks to the parent Paseo daemon throughprocess.sendandprocess.on("message"). It opens no sockets, makes no HTTP requests and sends nothing anywhere else. Safe.server/daemon.ts:41-65(parsePaseoFrame): it reads the daemon's frames withJSON.parseinside a try/catch and checks the shape before using anything. Safe.server/daemon.ts:88-124(requestFromDaemon): it sends a fixed messagetypeplus aworkspaceIdand a randomrequestId.JSON.stringifybuilds the frame, so an attacker-supplied ID can't add fields or change the request type. Replies are matched byrequestIdand time out after 8 seconds. Safe.server/daemon.ts:71-79andshared/setup.ts:29-35(parseSnapshotandsetupSnapshotSchema): zod checks every snapshot, and logs are cut to their last 8,000 characters (shared/snapshot.ts:23-26). Nothing from a snapshot is ever run, written to disk, or used as a path. Safe.server/daemon.ts:147-162(createSetupRunner) andindex.server.ts:7, which sendsworkspace.setup.run.request: this is the only thing in the plugin that leads to code running. It is safe for three reasons:client/buttons.tsx:64-68). The plugin registers no agent commands, so an agent can't trigger it.shared/snapshot.ts:141-144,client/popover.tsx:134-166). The label isn't hiding anything.The popover doesn't list the commands before you press Run setup. That's a hardening idea, not a blocker.
server/daemon.ts:203-264(createSetupWatcher), the subscribe and release messages to the daemon: these only read setup status. Safe.client/buttons.tsx:169-219, the client's calls to the plugin server and toclient.paseo.workspaces.list: these only read status and workspace lists, and only for workspaces of kindworktree. Safe.client/popover.tsx:101-227, how attacker-influenced text is shown: this covers branch name, command text, cwd, logs, error text and the source repository name. All of it goes into React Native<Text>as plain text: no HTML, nodangerouslySetInnerHTML, no links, noLinking.openURL, no web views. The text sits inside the setup popover and is clearly labeled as a log, so it can't pass as the user's own work. Safe.Files and programs: the shipped code never uses
fs,child_process, a shell, or the system's default app, and never writes settings or history. Safe.package.json, the package's own scripts: there's noinstall,postinstallorpreparescript, so installing the package runs nothing. The scripts it does have (dev,check:install,security-review) only run from the maintainer's checkout, and their files underscripts/aren't part of the package. zod is only a dev dependency. Safe.No release blockers found.
Time Since (1.1.1): no release blockers found
Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-time-since@1.1.1
I found no release blockers. All findings below come from reading the source. I didn't run anything.
What changed: most of the diff is formatting (the new oxfmt style), package.json fields moved around, and a dev-only bump of zod from 4.5.4 to 4.6.7. Zod is not shipped as a runtime dependency. The one change in behaviour is the new
time-since/server/system.ts. Both storage modules now write their files throughwriteFileAtomicIninstead of callingfsdirectly. It writes the same files to the same folder in the same way: write a temporary file next to the target, rename it over the target, and delete the temporary file if anything fails. It adds two checks: it rejects names that are absolute or contain.., and it refuses to write through a folder that is a link.Places that touch files, programs, HTML or the network:
server/system.ts:23-34(writeFileAtomicIn: mkdir, writeFile, rename, rm): safe. The folder and file name are hard-coded constants built fromPASEO_HOMEor~/.paseo, which the user controls. Nothing from the repo or an agent reaches the path. The temporary file name comes from the process id and a random UUID.server/settings.storage.ts:19(readFile) and:40(write): safe. They only read and write<paseo home>/plugin-data/time-since/settings.json. The content is checked againstsettingsSchema(two booleans). The RPC inputupdateSettingsonly accepts two optional booleans.server/last-reply.storage.ts:17(readFile) and:32(write): safe. They only read and write<paseo home>/plugin-data/time-since/last-reply.json. The keys are agent IDs that the daemon assigns, and the values are server-madenew Date().toISOString()timestamps (server/last-reply.ts:15). Neither is ever used as a path. They are stored as JSON and only parsed back withDate.parseon the client.server/write-lock.ts: no I/O. It only orders operations in memory, keyed by the fixed file paths.server/last-reply.ts:14-19(daemon eventsagent.turn_ended/agent.archived): safe. The only thing an agent influences is when a turn ends. Agent text is never used.client/ticker.tsx:120(agent timeline subscription),:176-198(RPCs),:229(agent directory list): safe. These use Paseo's own client API, not the general network. Only the event type and timestamp are read from the timeline. Message content is never shown.client/ticker.tsx:133-155and:82-84(pill label and popover): safe. They show elapsed time worked out from a timestamp, orDate.toLocaleString(). Both render as React NativeText, so there's no HTML and no agent-written text.client/settings-panel.tsx(options panel): safe. It only shows fixed labels and two booleans, and each click shows the new state of a single toggle.client/directory.ts: Paseo directory subscription only. No files, programs, HTML or network of its own.child_process,openor shell calls anywhere in the shipped files).fetch, WebView, links or remote content.No release blockers found.
Workspace Links (1.1.2): no release blockers found
Security review: @stevecastaneda/paseo-workspace-links@1.1.2
I found no release blockers in Workspace Links 1.1.2. I worked from the source only and ran nothing.
What changed, in short: almost all of the diff is reformatting by the new formatter (layout, quote style, line wrapping), with no change in behaviour. Three changes do matter:
server/system.ts.server/shortcut.storage.tscalls that helper instead of doing its own write-then-rename.fileslist is unchanged.The
package.jsonchange toprepublishOnlyonly affects the maintainer's checkout, so I left it out as instructed.Every place that touches files, programs, HTML or the network
server/links.ts:9-22,readLinks– reads only<workspaceDirectory>/workspace-links.json. It checks the file first without following links (lstat), refuses links and anything that isn't a regular file, and refuses files over 64 KB. The contents must matchlinksSchema: at most 100 entries, each with a label and an http(s) URL. Read-only, and it returns only labels and URLs. The workspace folder is sent by the client, so a caller could point it at another folder. Even then it can only read a file with that exact name, and only if the file parses as a link list, so no private files can leak. Safe.server/links.ts:34-40,canonical– rewrites each URL the way the browser will read it, and rejects URLs with a name or password before an@. The popover therefore shows the site the click really opens. Safe.server/status.ts:12-27,probe– sends a HEAD request to each URL in the workspace's own file, never to URLs the client supplies (:30-35). It skips certificate checks and ignores everything in the response except that one arrived. The repo can make the host send HEAD requests to URLs it chooses. That was already true before this change, and the requests carry no private files. Safe under items 1 to 4.server/shortcut.storage.ts:30-50, reading settings – reads$PASEO_HOME/plugin-data/workspace-links/settings.json, or~/.paseo/...if that variable isn't set. The path comes from the user's environment, which the attacker doesn't control, and the contents are checked againstshortcutSchema. Safe.server/shortcut.storage.ts:52-58→server/system.ts:23-34,writeFileAtomicIn(new) – the folder isdirname(settingsFilePath)and the name is the fixed stringsettings.json. Because the name has no subfolders, the check for linked folders inplaceInhas nothing to check. The folder itself comes from the user's environment, so this is fine. The helper creates the folder, writes a temp file namedsettings.json.<pid>.<uuid>.tmp, then renames it over the target. Renaming replaces a link instead of writing through it. The only values written are an enum and a boolean, both checked byshortcutSchema.parse. Nothing the repo or an agent controls reaches the path. Safe.server/system.ts:11-19,placeIn– rejects absolute names and..parts. There is a small gap: it splits on both slash types when checking for.., but only on the system separator when walking subfolders. No caller passes a name the attacker controls, so nothing can reach it. Not a blocker.shared/shortcut.ts:32-39, the settings update call – input is limited toplacement ∈ {composer, header}and aheaderShowsLabelboolean. An agent could switch where the button appears, which is harmless and isn't the "attacker content in a trusted place" case in item 4. Safe.client/popover.tsx:82-85,client/panel.tsx:176-179,openExternalUrl– opens only http(s) URLs that passed the server's checks, in the browser. No programs, files or custom URL schemes. The row shows the URL before you click (the full address in the panel, without the scheme in the popover). Safe.client/popover.tsx:199,copyText(link.url)– copies a checked http(s) URL to the clipboard when the user clicks. Safe.client/panel.tsxandclient/popover.tsx– labels, URLs and error messages appear only as React Native<Text>. There's no HTML, nodangerouslySetInnerHTML, no WebView and no eval. Safe.client/links-query.ts,client/pills.tsx,client/directory.ts– these only call Paseo and the plugin's own server through the plugin client, and only reformatting changed here. No direct file, program or network access. Safe.index.server.ts,index.client.tsx,paseo-plugin.json,tsconfig.json– registration and config only, with formatting changes. Safe.spawn,execor similar anywhere in the shipped files (I searched for them). Safe.No release blockers found.