Minutes captures, transcribes, and stores private conversations. Meetings, calls, voice memos, and the things people said believing no one else would hear them. A vulnerability here is not a degraded service, it is potential disclosure of that material. Reports are taken seriously and are welcome.

Please do not open a public issue for a security problem.

Report privately through GitHub:

1. Go to the Security tab
2. Click Report a vulnerability

This opens a private advisory visible only to you and the maintainer.

If GitHub private reporting is not available to you, contact @silverstein through GitHub and ask for a private channel. Do not include vulnerability details in a public message.

• What the issue is and roughly how severe you believe it is
• Steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept
• Affected version, platform, and configuration
• Anything about your setup that seems relevant (transcription engine, diarization on or off, MCP client, desktop app versus CLI)

Minutes is maintained by one person, so these are honest targets rather than a commercial SLA:

You will get a real answer either way, including if the report is assessed as out of scope or as accepted risk. Credit is given in the advisory unless you prefer otherwise.

Please give a reasonable window to ship a fix before public disclosure.

Minutes ships frequently and support tracks the latest minor release. Fixes land on main and go out in the next release rather than being backported.

• The Rust engine and CLI (crates/core, crates/cli, crates/reader)
• crates/whisper-guard
• The MCP server and TypeScript SDK (crates/mcp, crates/sdk)
• The Tauri desktop application (tauri/)
• Published artifacts: the minutes-sdk and minutes-mcp npm packages, the minutes-core, minutes-cli, and whisper-guard crates, the Homebrew cask, the MCPB bundle, and the Cowork extension

Issues of particular interest, given what this software handles:

• Anything causing conversation content, audio, or transcripts to leave the machine without the user configuring it
• Bypasses of file permission handling on meeting output (written 0600)
• Bypasses of consent or sensitivity controls
• Paths that expose restricted conversation content to an agent, MCP client, or model provider that should not receive it
• Memory-safety or parsing issues reachable from untrusted audio, including files placed in a watched folder
• Privilege or sandbox escapes in the desktop app
• Supply-chain weaknesses in how releases are built, signed, or published

• Vulnerabilities in upstream dependencies with no Minutes-specific exploitation path. Report those upstream; tell us if Minutes amplifies them
• Anything requiring an attacker who already has local user-level access to the machine, since a local-first tool cannot defend against a compromised host
• Content that a user deliberately configured a cloud summarizer to receive. That path is opt-in and documented
• Model quality problems, including transcription errors and hallucinated text, unless they cross a trust boundary. Transcript fabrication is handled by whisper-guard; open a normal issue
• Missing hardening with no demonstrated impact, and automated scanner output without analysis

• Audio never leaves the device. Transcription, diarization, and speaker matching run locally, and there is no cloud backend to breach
• No account and no server-side profile of conversations
• Meeting output is written with 0600 owner-only permissions
• HTTP uses ureq rather than shelling out, so credentials never appear in process arguments
• PID file lifecycle uses flock for atomic check-and-write, closing a TOCTOU race on recording state
• Automated summarization is off by default and needs no API key

Architecture and privacy detail: https://useminutes.app/security.md

Please do not submit real meeting recordings, transcripts, or personal audio in issues, pull requests, or test fixtures. Use synthetic samples. If you need to share a reproducer containing sensitive audio, ask for a private channel first.