RepoRadar is designed with security as a first-class concern:
- Local-first by default — Core scanning and storage stay on your machine
- Read-only by default — No destructive Git operations
- No network exposure — Server binds to
127.0.0.1only - No telemetry — Zero data collection or phoning home
- Minimal dependencies — Only Kujo runtime and Git are required
The HTTP server explicitly binds to 127.0.0.1 using http_listen("127.0.0.1", port). This means:
- Only accessible from the local machine
- Not exposed to the local network or internet
- No TLS needed (localhost-only)
All Git operations use safe, read-only subcommands:
- No
git commit,git push,git pull,git reset,git rebase,git stash,git checkout,git merge - Commands are executed with validated paths
- Every inspection uses
GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS=0and-c core.fsmonitor=falseso read-only scans neither acquire optional index locks nor execute repository-configured filesystem-monitor helpers - Output is parsed defensively; malformed output is handled gracefully
If write actions are implemented in the future:
- They are disabled by default via settings toggle
- Each action requires explicit user confirmation
- The exact command is displayed before execution
- Failed commands show output without bricking the UI
- All write actions are logged to an audit trail
Dependabot alert counts are disabled by default. When enable_dependabot_alerts is set to true, scans may call:
gh api /repos/<owner>/<repo>/dependabot/alertsThis only applies to GitHub remotes that can be parsed as owner/repo, and it returns -1 when gh is missing, unauthenticated, unauthorized, or unavailable. RepoRadar does not store GitHub credentials; authentication remains owned by the GitHub CLI.
Leave this setting disabled for fully offline/local-only operation or environments where repository names should not be sent to GitHub.
- Repo paths are validated to exist and be directories
- Git repo validation via
git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree - SQL values are escaped via the shared
escape_sql(...)helper - JSON import validates structure before processing
- Static asset requests reject
..segments and backslashes before touching the filesystem - Browser mutation requests must match the exact
http://<Host>origin; origin-less local clients remain available for terminal and agent integrations - JSON mutation endpoints require
Content-Type: application/json - Request bodies are capped at 1 MiB, bulk collections at 1,000 entries, settings updates at 50 keys, and discovery at 25,000 visited entries/1,000 results
- SQLite database at
~/.reporadar.db(configurable viaREPORADAR_DB) - URI userinfo (including HTTPS tokens/passwords) is removed from remote URLs before persistence and reporting; SCP-style SSH usernames remain. Arbitrary repository content, URL paths/query strings and user-entered notes are not a general-purpose secret-redaction surface.
- Commit messages and repo paths are the most sensitive data stored
- Connections enable foreign-key enforcement, a 5-second busy timeout, WAL journaling, and normal synchronous durability
- Indexed latest-snapshot and date-first activity queries avoid repeated full-history scans
- Scan snapshots and file-change rows are trimmed to the newest 250 snapshots per repository to keep long-lived registries bounded
- Settings downloads a database backup; binary restoration is offline, as described below.
- Static HTML/CSS/JS with no external CDN dependencies
- Content is escaped (
escHtml) before rendering to prevent XSS - Dashboard action buttons resolve repositories by numeric ID instead of embedding repository JSON in inline handlers
- CORS headers only reflect same-machine browser origins (
127.0.0.1,localhost, and[::1]) - Responses include defensive browser headers:
X-Content-Type-Options,Referrer-Policy,X-Frame-Options,Permissions-Policy, and a local-only Content Security Policy
RepoRadar has no user authentication because it is a single-user localhost application. Other processes running as the same operating-system user can generally access the same repositories and database directly. Do not bind or proxy RepoRadar to a LAN or the public internet. A networked or multi-user deployment requires a separate threat model plus authentication, authorization, and TLS.
If you discover a security issue, please report it responsibly. Do not disclose publicly until resolved.
Every registered route validates Host against 127.0.0.1, localhost, or [::1], optionally followed by a valid numeric port. Browser mutations also require matching Origin; originless local CLI clients remain supported. This closes the arbitrary-Host boundary without asserting a demonstrated browser DNS-rebinding exploit.
JSON mutations reject malformed JSON and wrong container/field types with structured 400 responses. Collection limits return 413 before registry writes. Imports validate the entire structure before starting a transaction; unexpected persistence failures roll back repositories and settings together. Existing duplicate and missing-path skip behavior remains. Scan snapshots, file changes, timestamps, and retention pruning likewise commit atomically.
GET /api/export/db uses SQLite VACUUM INTO to create a consistent snapshot including committed WAL data. The snapshot lives in a private temporary directory, is returned as binary SQLite data, and is removed after reading. A failed backup is logged and returns a structured error. Backups contain local paths and metadata; store them accordingly.
The JSON importer accepts registry/settings exports, not SQLite files. To restore a binary backup, stop RepoRadar and any other users of its database, preserve the existing database together with its -wal and -shm sidecars, then place the downloaded file at the configured REPORADAR_DB path without old sidecars. Restart RepoRadar and run doctor --json. Do not replace a live database. The regression harness verifies backup integrity and recovery of a committed WAL marker using disposable files.
Schema v4 redacts URL userinfo in existing snapshot rows in a transaction, with secure-delete enabled on application connections, then requests WAL truncation. A busy external database reader can delay checkpoint cleanup. Existing backups, JSON exports, logs and copied reports remain outside the migration: replace or securely retire affected artifacts, and rotate any credential that was shared. RepoRadar never rewrites a repository's Git remote. No real credential exposure is inferred from the synthetic regression fixture.
Scans explicitly include all untracked files and submodule changes regardless of repository/global status preferences. Commit fields are NUL-framed, and invalid date fallback text is HTML-escaped in detail/activity views.