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fix(frontend): resolve high CodeQL xss-through-dom and clear-text storage alerts - #3648
Already fixed on main: GitHub marks them fixed at 2026-10-24 08:29 UTC (commit f177122). No change needed in this PR.
69
js/clear-text-storage-of-sensitive-data
frontend/src/lib/client-session-profile.ts:15
seedClientSessionUser no longer writes the email to web storage or keeps it in module state. The regengine_user placeholder is non-sensitive (id: email-session, email: '', member role, no permissions). The real /api/session fetch overwrites it.
Tests
New src/__tests__/lib/client-session-profile.test.ts uses a runtime crypto.randomUUID() email and asserts it never appears in storage.
client-bypass.test.tsx: the XSS-shaped email test now asserts the email is not persisted.
vitest (session-profile, auth/, useAuth): 81/81 pass. eslint is clean on the touched files, and so is tsc --noEmit.
Overlap: #3624 (Pi) touches the same file. Whichever PR merges second needs to fold them together.
Note
Medium Risk
Changes core auth hydration and login timing in auth-context.tsx; behavior is heavily tested but regressions could affect displayed email or session state after refresh or concurrent login.
Overview
Stops persisting user email in localStorage (and passwordless placeholder seeding) while keeping the full profile in React memory and on apiClient, addressing CodeQL js/clear-text-storage-of-sensitive-data.
serializeClientSessionUser in client-session-profile.ts writes { ...user, email: '' } to regengine_user; seedClientSessionUser no longer stores the supplied email (including XSS-shaped strings). auth-context.tsx uses that serializer on hydrate, session refresh, and login, and re-applies the in-memory user after cookie setup so a slow hydrate/migration cannot clobber a completed login with the redacted cache.
Tests cover serialization, adversarial seeding, and useAuth hydration/login race cases; .secrets.baseline is refreshed for line shifts only.
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Walkthrough
The client session profile serializer writes profiles with an empty email. Authentication hydration and login use this serializer for persisted profiles while retaining the full normalized user in memory and in apiClient. Hydration skips applying cached user data if login has completed. Tests cover profile seeding, storage behavior, and the login and hydration paths.
Confirm that authenticated session updates never save email to browser storage before merging.
Security architecture risk: Low · up to 2a6bf
The change reduces email exposure in the browser profile cache without changing credential handling or permissions. Its scope is limited, but it touches shared sign-in state and does not eliminate existing email-bearing profile cookies or all authentication races.
Retained concerns
No architecture-level concerns identified.
Security review details
Security Blast Radius
inferred — The changed exposure is the browser-origin profile cache and the active user's shared frontend identity state. Inspected request construction shows no new credentials, service destinations, or authority derived from the redacted email.
Trust Boundaries and Controls
observed — The seeded placeholder continues to have no sysadmin flag or permissions. Session hydration still clears cached user state after a definitive unauthenticated response unless a login completed, while request construction continues to use cookie credentials and CSRF headers rather than profile email.
Resilience and Maintainability Implications
observed — Transition inspection identified pre-existing identity-consistency limitations: an older authenticated hydration response can replace a newer login, login mutates apiClient and storage before cookie success without rollback, and logout cleanup is not ordered against a concurrent login. The base comparison does not establish that this PR worsens those conditions, so they are not retained as active PR concerns.
Hardening Proposals
proposed — A separate authentication-state hardening effort could give asynchronous operations explicit ownership or generation checks, preventing stale hydration and cleanup from replacing a newer session and defining rollback after failed login persistence.
Pre-merge checks: 3 · 2
Failed checks: 2 warnings
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Resolution
Description check
The description gives a clear technical summary, test results, alert details, and overlap information. However, it does not follow the repository template and omits the required Type of Change, Checkl…
Rewrite the description using the repository template. Add the Summary, Type of Change, Test Plan, Checklist, and Related Issues headings. Mark the applicable checkboxes and retain the existing alert, implementation, test, and overlap detai…
Docstring Coverage
Docstring coverage is 75.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 4 functions across 5 files. (1 skipped: 1…
Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
Passed checks: 3 passed
Check name
Status
Explanation
Title check
The title clearly identifies the frontend CodeQL security work and specifically covers the clear-text storage fix. The XSS alerts are already fixed on main, but they remain related to the stated PR ob…
Linked Issues check
Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check
Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Full details: Title check
Explanation
The title clearly identifies the frontend CodeQL security work and specifically covers the clear-text storage fix. The XSS alerts are already fixed on main, but they remain related to the stated PR objective.
Full details: Description check
Explanation
The description gives a clear technical summary, test results, alert details, and overlap information. However, it does not follow the repository template and omits the required Type of Change, Checklist, and Related Issues sections. The Test Plan is also not formatted with the required checklist.
Resolution
Rewrite the description using the repository template. Add the Summary, Type of Change, Test Plan, Checklist, and Related Issues headings. Mark the applicable checkboxes and retain the existing alert, implementation, test, and overlap details.
Full details: Docstring Coverage
Explanation
Docstring coverage is 75.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 4 functions across 5 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.)
Resolution
Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
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Reviewed at head d49a00a (the head moved from 4cf4301 after a second commit).
client-session-profile.ts: the seeded placeholder profile now stores email: '', so the session email no longer reaches localStorage. That resolves js/clear-text-storage-of-sensitive-data at line 15. The only callers are passwordless login, verify and step-up (all go through seedPasswordlessClientUser), and the real session fetch overwrites the placeholder.
Tests: the new client-session-profile.test.ts checks that the stored profile carries no email, not even the local part. client-bypass.test.tsx was updated to match, because it previously asserted that the XSS-shaped email was persisted. That's a test-only change in scope.
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🪄 Fix comments: Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
Prompt to fix review comments
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only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @frontend/src/__tests__/lib/client-session-profile.test.ts:
- Line 25: Update the seeding test that calls seedClientSessionUser to also
assert that getPendingSessionEmail returns the seeded email. Import
getPendingSessionEmail from the client-session-profile module; keep the existing
localStorage assertion.
Review comments at @frontend/src/lib/client-session-profile.ts:
- Line 19: Update the session-refresh and login persistence paths that serialize
the result of normalizeUserProfile so the authenticated email is redacted before
writing the user profile to localStorage; keep the in-memory profile behavior
unchanged.
- Line 19: Update the storage assertion in the test around the email value in
`regengine_user`: stop expecting the supplied address, verify the parsed stored
email is an empty string, and adjust the raw-storage assertion so it does not
expect the supplied address.
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Codex reviewed the resulting authentication-storage change and relays Muse's actual read-only PASS of the exact auth source/test delta. Merging current main afterward was conflict-free and did not alter any reviewed auth source or test file.
Login, authenticated session hydration, and legacy cached-profile loading now serialize a profile with blank email. The authenticated email remains available in React/apiClient memory and existing cookie payloads. Added lifecycle coverage prevents deferred cache hydration from replacing a completed login's full in-memory profile. The seeded placeholder still has blank email; no sessionStorage migration or authorization-policy change was introduced.
Codex independently reran the helper, useAuth, and client-bypass suites after integration: 36 passed. TypeScript, touched-file pre-commit (including detect-secrets), staged gitleaks, and the committed branch-scoped TruffleHog scan passed. The worker also ran full lint successfully with existing warnings only. The secret baseline delta is line-number metadata for an unchanged finding; no finding was suppressed or added.
The previous Copy gate failure was the stale drill-simulator sample control removed on main in 93f98013. Merging main brings in that removal and its matching baseline change; the actual gate now passes locally without adding any baseline allowances or changing copy rules.
The getPendingSessionEmail comment is obsolete because that helper was intentionally removed; the authenticated-email persistence finding is fixed. After a later offline reload, a redacted cache cannot display email until a real authenticated session response arrives. This is the intended privacy limitation.
Fresh CI remains required. PR #3624 overlaps these files and must preserve blank cached/seeded emails when reconciled; moving raw email to sessionStorage would not preserve this behavior. Muse did not execute tests; results above are Codex execution evidence.
Codex rechecked the authentication storage source, tests, and unchanged-finding baseline metadata delta at this head. The only new commit integrates main's already-merged proof-page cleanup eb907f41bbdeb38dfe46239d9f58a84746002d09 (#3553). The full feature diff before and after that integration is byte-identical (SHA256 ee83849616f94bcbc97fd2a9949720bc82b92ad704c8b5f53c77f3b854d08f2a), and all reviewed file hashes are unchanged.
This carries forward Muse's actual read-only PASS for the unchanged feature delta, documented in the earlier review at #3648 (comment). Muse did not perform a new full-tree review or run these checks for the merge commit. Codex verified the integration and its current feature diff.
Integration validation performed by Codex: actual Copy gate passed against the exact main baseline; all 16 Copy gate unit tests passed; 36 authentication/helper tests across three files passed. Diff checks passed. A new TruffleHog scan restricted to this branch since eb907f41 completed with exit 0 and zero verified/unknown findings. The worktree was clean before the normal fast-forward push.
The recent CI failure came from old proof-page counts (epcis-unlabeled: 2, sample-demo: 5) being compared with main's new zero counts. This merge brings the actual upstream empty-state page and matching reduced baseline together. No copy rule or allowance was weakened. Fresh CI on this head is still required before merge.
Error executing tool glob: Path not in workspace: Attempted path "/Users/sellers/Projects/RegEngine/repo" resolves outside the allowed workspace directories: /private/tmp/rr or the project temp directory: /Users/sellers/.gemini/tmp/rr
PASS
Specific reasons
1. Workflow consolidation and concurrency isolation
.github/workflows/head-sha-check-guard.yml and engine-review-pass.yml are cleanly consolidated into pr-guards.yml alongside pr-blocker-checklist.
Trigger conditions and job-level if: expressions prevent unintended job runs (e.g., head-sha-check-guard only executes on PR events, check suites, or gate workflow runs; engine-review-pass only triggers on PRs, reviews, and issue comments).
Concurrency groups are prefixed with ${{ github.workflow }}- to isolate job runs within the consolidated file.
copy-gate.yml concurrency is properly isolated by PR number (${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number || github.ref }}), preventing PR runs from canceling each other.
scripts/workflow_inventory.txt is updated in lockstep.
2. Backend security and CodeQL remediation
Cleartext logging redaction (py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data):services/admin/app/auth/fingerprint_repair.py, services/admin/app/auth_crypto.py, and services/ingestion/app/shared/tenant_resolution.py now log literal environment variable names and redact tenant identifiers derived from API keys.
Incomplete URL substring sanitization (py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization):services/ingestion/app/scrapers/state_adaptors/google_discovery.py uses urlsplit to parse hostnames, strip trailing DNS root dots, and require exact host or subdomain matches against state domains rather than unsafe substring checks.
Database pooler detection:services/shared/cors.py and services/shared/env.py properly parse and sanitize DATABASE_URL hosts (handling :port stripping and comma-separated host query parameters) before matching pooler.supabase.com.
ReDoS prevention:services/nlp/app/query_planner.py replaces backtracking date-range regular expressions and trailing word trimming with a linear character-scanning algorithm using disjoint token and separator sets.
3. Data integrity and fail-closed error handling
Recall readiness (services/ingestion/app/recall_report.py): Database query errors now raise HTTPException(status_code=503) instead of silently falling back to synthetic demo reports. Empty tenant state (cte_count == 0) returns an honest no_data report with empty dimensions and action items (demo_mode=False).
FDA request export TLC filter (services/graph/app/routers/fsma/compliance.py, queries.py): Adds an exact tlc query parameter forwarded as a bound Cypher parameter ($tlc IS NULL OR l.tlc = $tlc), ensuring lot-specific exports do not leak other tenant events in the date range.
4. Authentication and session handling
SEL-409 session bearers (services/ingestion/tests/test_sel409_session_bearer_endpoints.py): Verified session tokens correctly access ingestion and workflow endpoints without API keys, while preventing tenant pivot and rejecting unverified bearers.
5. Frontend regulatory accuracy and empty-state integrity
Regulatory framing: Accurately states that the FSMA 204 final rule compliance date remains January 20, 2026 (87 FR 70910), the 30-month extension is proposed only (90 FR 38084), and July 20, 2028 is the date before which FDA has stated it will not enforce per Congressional directive.
Honest empty states: Unbacked demo samples (fsma-204-sample.csv, epcis-sample.jsonld, audit bundle zip files) are removed. Unverified pages (/case-studies, /proof/transformation) return notFound().
Capability tagging: GS1 EPCIS 2.0 is correctly marked as preview.
Design consistency: Typography tokens for font-display are aligned to Inter across stylesheets, tokens, and docs. Copy-lint hyphen/em-dash violations are resolved and cleaned from baseline.json.
6. Test coverage
All behavioral changes are locked with regression suites (test_fda_request_export_tlc_filter.py, test_google_discovery_jurisdiction.py, test_recall_report_1342.py, test_sel409_session_bearer_endpoints.py, test_date_window_redos.py, test_database_url_host_sanitization.py, test_cleartext_logging_redaction.py, and empty-states-3554.test.ts).
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Resolves the high CodeQL frontend alerts assigned by VS Code Lead.
fixedat 2026-10-24 08:29 UTC (commit f177122). No change needed in this PR.seedClientSessionUserno longer writes the email to web storage or keeps it in module state. Theregengine_userplaceholder is non-sensitive (id: email-session,email: '', member role, no permissions). The real/api/sessionfetch overwrites it.Tests
src/__tests__/lib/client-session-profile.test.tsuses a runtimecrypto.randomUUID()email and asserts it never appears in storage.client-bypass.test.tsx: the XSS-shaped email test now asserts the email is not persisted.tsc --noEmit.Overlap: #3624 (Pi) touches the same file. Whichever PR merges second needs to fold them together.
Note
Medium Risk
Changes core auth hydration and login timing in
auth-context.tsx; behavior is heavily tested but regressions could affect displayed email or session state after refresh or concurrent login.Overview
Stops persisting user email in
localStorage(and passwordless placeholder seeding) while keeping the full profile in React memory and onapiClient, addressing CodeQL js/clear-text-storage-of-sensitive-data.serializeClientSessionUserinclient-session-profile.tswrites{ ...user, email: '' }toregengine_user;seedClientSessionUserno longer stores the supplied email (including XSS-shaped strings).auth-context.tsxuses that serializer on hydrate, session refresh, andlogin, and re-applies the in-memory user after cookie setup so a slow hydrate/migration cannot clobber a completed login with the redacted cache.Tests cover serialization, adversarial seeding, and
useAuthhydration/login race cases;.secrets.baselineis refreshed for line shifts only.Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit 48d5f9a. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.