Name ignoring donations as the vault strategy's first-depositor defense

WRITING-PLAN.md

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Each incident is researched from primary sources and placed inside the chapter n
 - SPL token-lending rounding (about $2.6B at risk): the rounding section of The Arithmetic of Money
 - Cashio ($48M kept after refunds, unvalidated account chain): the validation section of The Adversary
 - Wormhole ($326M, bypassed signature verification): the validation section of The Adversary
-- First-depositor inflation incidents (the ERC-4626 class): named incidents are the Hundred and Sonne stories below (their setup is the inflation attack); the empty-pool section of The Adversary teaches the class, and The Constant-Product AMM chapter teaches the locked-minimum defense without an incident box
+- First-depositor inflation incidents (the ERC-4626 class): named incidents are the Hundred and Sonne stories below (their setup is the inflation attack); the empty-pool section of The Adversary teaches the class, The Constant-Product AMM chapter teaches the locked-minimum defense without an incident box, and The Vault Strategy chapter teaches ignoring donations
 - Mango Markets ($116M): the price-manipulation section of The Adversary
 - The Hundred and Sonne precision drains: the precision-exploits section of The Adversary
 

building-financial-products-in-solana/perpetual-futures.md

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ The pool is the mint authority of the **LP share mint** (seeds `"lp_mint"`) and
 
 ## Liquidity Providers Fund the Pool and Get Shares Priced at Mark
 
-Carol is a liquidity provider. Her income is every losing trader's loss and every funding payment; her risk is every winning trader's profit. She calls `add_liquidity()` with her whole 1,000 USDC. She is the first depositor, so her shares are her deposit minus `MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY`: a withheld 1,000 minor units, a tenth of a cent, that no one will ever own. That is the same first-depositor defense the *Constant-Product AMM* chapter built, and the one the *Vault Strategy* chapter named as its own missing guard. It prevents the share-inflation attack. Later deposits mint shares pro rata against **assets under management marked to market**, rather than against the vault balance or `liquidity` alone: `liquidity` minus the traders' current unrealized profit (or plus their unrealized loss). If LP shares were priced while ignoring open positions, a depositor could buy in cheap the moment traders were winning and dilute Carol at her worst moment. Marking AUM makes entering and leaving the pool fair at any instant, and both `add_liquidity()` and `remove_liquidity()` take a minimum-out argument so a price move between signing and execution fails with `SlippageExceeded` instead of filling badly. Eleven more providers follow Carol in over the morning, and the pool opens for trading with 12,000 USDC of liquidity.
+Carol is a liquidity provider. Her income is every losing trader's loss and every funding payment; her risk is every winning trader's profit. She calls `add_liquidity()` with her whole 1,000 USDC. She is the first depositor, so her shares are her deposit minus `MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY`: a withheld 1,000 minor units, a tenth of a cent, that no one will ever own. That is the same first-depositor defense the *Constant-Product AMM* chapter built, and it prevents the share-inflation attack. The *Vault Strategy* chapter ignores donations instead. Later deposits mint shares pro rata against **assets under management marked to market**, rather than against the vault balance or `liquidity` alone: `liquidity` minus the traders' current unrealized profit (or plus their unrealized loss). If LP shares were priced while ignoring open positions, a depositor could buy in cheap the moment traders were winning and dilute Carol at her worst moment. Marking AUM makes entering and leaving the pool fair at any instant, and both `add_liquidity()` and `remove_liquidity()` take a minimum-out argument so a price move between signing and execution fails with `SlippageExceeded` instead of filling badly. Eleven more providers follow Carol in over the morning, and the pool opens for trading with 12,000 USDC of liquidity.
 
 Withdrawals have one extra gate: only **free** liquidity, `liquidity − reserved_liquidity`, may leave (`InsufficientLiquidity` otherwise, checked by `test_remove_liquidity_blocked_by_reserved`). Carol can never pull out money the pool has promised to a winner.