Distribute bounded delivery resources and verify native message replicas - #71
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# Conflicts: # tests/test_network_packaging.py
…nto feat/native-mailbox-read
…nto feat/native-mailbox-receipts
…nto feat/native-mailbox-authorization
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New sends previously filled one approved resource while another still had capacity. This change freezes new ciphertext against separately approved item/byte grants in Python and native TypeScript, rotates receive polling, bounds Python HTTP admission without increasing its eight execution slots, and removes unnecessary SQLite writer locks from reads.
Native recipients also recover an explicitly selected message replica through complete historical COPY and current READ verification. Original source loss, immutable ciphertext, independent receipt confirmation, saved local Memory reuse, replacement epoch refusal and retained revocation are covered. Existing frozen sends are never retargeted and all consent/work limits remain enforced.
Validation so far: 63 targeted cases, protocol/source gate and packaging checks, exact-source eight-asset build, and extracted-client offline checks. Final-source full CI passed 1270 tests across 147 modules with zero failures, errors or skips; all 330 source hashes matched
36562e894da83855708ec4c99a68a7b726dd6737. All three supported Python 3.10 suites and three-platform protocol conformance passed. The extracted client passed save/recall, exact retries, hooks and backup/restore. All 228 packaged runtime/launcher files match the source and archive privacy checks passed. The isolated latest alpha39 comparison offers 48 distinct selected Memories at 2/s: 39 to 48 complete chains, 18.75% to 0% errors; both independently approved nodes complete 24. p95 is 345.7 to 365.5 ms. This measures authorized capacity use, not a CPU/SQLite maximum.Experimental alpha limits are explicit in docs/CAPACITY_HANDOFF.md and public synthetic evidence: cold message-replica reception takes about 17.9s, with 13.55s server-thread CPU in complete COPY/READ preparation. The existing durable 64-work account remains finite; further old demand requires independent funding. No independent-host/WAN or automatic universal repair claim. This prepares alpha.0.40 and preserves the alpha38 draft release and original Mac checkouts.