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ci: boot-test tamper refusal, HTTP boot, Ignition and A/B rollback; skip image builds for docs-only changes - #270

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jeefy:ci/boot-coverage-and-speed
Sep 29, 2026
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jeefy merged 18 commits into
projectbluefin:mainfrom
jeefy:ci/boot-coverage-and-speed

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@jeefy jeefy commented Sep 29, 2026 •

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Summary

Part A: boot coverage (boot-test)

The QEMU harness already did more than CI ran. boot-test now also runs:

Step What it asserts
Refuse a tampered image (DOGFOOD_TAMPER=raw) The serial console shows systemd-importd's own verdict, DOWNLOAD INVALID: Checksum of <image> file did not check out, after the DDI, SHA256SUMS and SHA256SUMS.gpg were served (so it is not a transport error). Nothing boots, and the kernel ran with Secure Boot enabled. systemd.unit-dropin credentials for systemd-import@.service and systemd-importd.service (SYSTEMD_LOG_TARGET=console, journal+console) put importd's messages on the console.
Refuse a re-hashed manifest (DOGFOOD_TAMPER=sums) Changed semantics. The old sums mode overwrote every hash, so it failed on the checksum and never exercised the signature check. It now serves the corrupted DDI with SHA256SUMS re-hashed to match, which is what an attacker without the key can do. The pull reports SHA256 checksum ... is valid, then gpg: BAD signature, then DOWNLOAD INVALID: Signature verification failed, and the test asserts that last line.
Ignition config from a credential tests/fixtures/ignition/apply-marker.ign writes /etc/dogfood-ignition-marker and enables a oneshot unit. The probe must print PROBE ignition marker=applied unit=active enabled=enabled ran=yes (new DOGFOOD_EXPECT).
UEFI HTTP boot with bluefin-node.ign DOGFOOD_BOOT=http plus the same fixture served next to the UKI. This covers HTTP boot and the StubDeviceURL → bluefin-node.ign Ignition path.
Install, A/B update and boot-counted rollback (off main) dogfood-install.sh dist/diskless dist/diskless-next dist/diskless-broken

Every --check now also fails unless Secure Boot was enforced (PROBE secureboot=enabled). See "Findings" below: until now CI never booted with Secure Boot on.

  • A/B + rollback sets. The build job exports 1.<run>.1 and 1.<run>.2 right after the main set (just set-version + just export-image, warm cache, only 13 version-stamped elements rebuild). Locally each extra set took 129 s and 131 s including checkout. On CI the version-dependent elements were ~3–10× slower than locally in run 36499270842, so I estimate ~5–8 min per set, ~15 min in total. The installer raw is excluded from the extra upload.
    • Why 1.<run>.N and not 0.<run>.N: see Findings.
    • main does not run this. Its extra sets would be release-signed versions that nobody publishes, and every change reaches main through a PR that ran it. main keeps install + disk boot.
  • Harness fixes:
    • dogfood-install.sh hardcoded 10.0.2.2:8765 and ignored DOGFOOD_PORT; fixed.
    • HTTP-boot key enrollment used a fixed sleep 2. It now does a bounded wait for the firmware reset that follows enrollment, and keeps dogfood-enroll.log.
    • The EXIT trap now also kills QEMU. An aborted run had left an orphaned guest holding the port and the callers' qemu.lock. The trap only kills PIDs that are set, because kill 0 signals the whole process group.
    • Failed boot tests upload their serial logs.

Findings the new coverage surfaced

  1. CI's "Secure Boot" boot-test never ran with Secure Boot. Ubuntu 26.04's ovmf 2025.11 rejects systemd-boot's PK enrollment (secure_boot_enroll_at: Failed to write PK secure boot variable: Security violation), and the guest boots on in setup mode. Run 36499270842's probes all say secureboot=disabled (setup). boot-test now uses Fedora's edk2-ovmf-20260508-6.fc44 (Koji URL + SHA-256 pin, extracted with bsdtar). That is byte-identical to the local build where enrollment works, and the harness now fails when Secure Boot is off. Verified locally: with Ubuntu's OVMF the new check fails with FAIL: booted without Secure Boot (PROBE secureboot=disabled (setup)).
  2. A/B to a 0.<run>.1 update keeps booting the old version. systemd-sysinstall writes the installed image as a Type ci: delegate server builds to lab and add daily release dispatch #1 entry bluefin-server-commit_1.<ver>.conf with version 1.<ver>. systemd-boot sorts 1.0.900 above the sysupdate UKI 0.900.1, so the node kept booting 0.900 (boot-entry=bluefin-server-commit_1.0.900.conf, UKI bluefin-server-0.900.1+3-0.efi untried). Release versions (26.09.x, above 1.26.09.x) are unaffected, so CI uses 1.<run>.N.

Part B: CI speed

Diagnosis. Run 36499270842 (PR, cold runner): Build and export the image set took 23:41 → 01:41. BuildStream pulled 239 artifacts and built 85, about 3.9 h of build time over 4 cores.

  • Critical path: FSDK components/linux.bst. Its source fetch took 6 min (it is in no source cache) and the build took 1 h 43 min (23:50 → 01:33). Then kernel-modules (3.5 min), boot (2 min) and image (1 min).
  • Why the kernel is never cached. The components/linux-module-cert.bst junction override (our module cert) and patches/freedesktop-sdk/0006-linux-* change its cache key, so FSDK's caches never hold it.
  • Next biggest cost. About 40 FSDK elements changed by our FSDK patches or depending on them: harfbuzz 13 min, libglycin 12, go 9+8, vala 8, glib 6, binutils-stage1 5, and so on. All of it builds in parallel with the kernel.

What changed:

  • Docs-only PRs skip the build. The main — review policy ruleset (id 22705159) has no required status checks, and there is no classic branch protection. I still used a changes job rather than paths-ignore: skipped jobs report as passing, so build/boot-test can become required later without leaving PRs pending. The job lists the PR's files through the API (renames under both names) and feeds them to .github/scripts/image-build-needed.py. Pushes and dispatches always build.
    • tests/unit/test_image_build_needed.py guards the invariant: every tracked file under a build-input root, plus project.conf, Justfile, build.yml and check-*.py, must build.
  • Opt-in cache push on main. It uses the same mTLS identity projectbluefin/dakota uses: repository variable CASD_CLIENT_CERT and secret CASD_CLIENT_KEY, against https://cache.projectbluefin.io:11002. When both exist, the job writes a global BuildStream artifacts remote (push: true, override-project-caches: false) and runs bst artifact push --deps all oci/bluefin-server-image.bst after the upload. That step is continue-on-error. Without the credentials it does nothing, and PRs never push. Neither exists in this repo yet; a maintainer has to add them. Once they do, main builds pull the kernel as long as its inputs and the release module cert are unchanged.
  • Not done, with reasons:
    • PR kernels still rebuild. gen-dev-keys creates a new module cert on every run, so the PR kernel key never matches a cached one. Fixing that needs a stable, non-release PR module key pair (fork PRs get no secrets) plus a job that pushes that kernel. That is a key-handling decision for maintainers.
    • No actions/cache. Only the kernel source fetch (6 min) sits on the critical path, and only when the kernel rebuilds anyway. The runner cache would be several times the 2.1 GB image set, which churns the 10 GB quota, and BuildStream 2 cannot import a single artifact from a tarball. Local ~/.cache/buildstream/sources is 894 MB.

The release job is untouched; another PR is changing it.

Verification

  • python3 -m pytest tests/unit -q: 389 passed (throwaway detached worktree, no boot-keys). bats tests/unit: 74 ok. docs-checks.py passed. flock bst.lock just validate passed.
  • actionlint shows only the existing ubuntu-26.04 unknown-label warning.
  • Local QEMU runs (flock qemu.lock) of exactly the CI scenarios, with the final scripts on the pinned Fedora OVMF. Image sets were 0.900, 1.900.1 and 1.900.2, built in this worktree:
diskless     22s  PROBE secureboot=enabled (user)
                  PASS: netboot boot with no failed units
tamper-raw   19s  REFUSED [    8.542374] systemd-importd[183]: (transfer1) DOWNLOAD INVALID: Checksum of bluefin-server_0.900.raw file did not check out, file has been tampered with.
                  PASS: tamper=raw: bluefin-server_0.900.raw refused after fetching the signed manifest
tamper-sums  19s  REFUSED [    9.530083] systemd-importd[180]: (transfer1) DOWNLOAD INVALID: Signature verification failed.
                  PASS: tamper=sums: bluefin-server_0.900.raw refused after fetching the signed manifest
ign-cred     23s  PROBE ignition marker=applied unit=active enabled=enabled ran=yes
                  PASS: netboot boot with no failed units
http-ign     94s  PROBE secureboot=enabled (user)
                  PROBE ignition marker=applied unit=active enabled=enabled ran=yes
                  PASS: http boot with no failed units
install-ab  422s  PASS: installed, updated A->B, and rolled back from a broken 1.900.2 to 1.900.1
  • Local timing of the extra sets (warm cache, just set-version + just export-image): 129–135 s each.

Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5.5 via GitHub Copilot

jeefy and others added 9 commits September 28, 2026 22:08
apply-marker.ign writes /etc/dogfood-ignition-marker and enables a oneshot unit through Ignition's preset; apply-marker.probe reports both from inside the booted guest, so a dogfood boot can assert that Ignition applied the config rather than only that the node booted.

Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5.5 via GitHub Copilot
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
image-build-needed.py reads a PR's changed paths and answers false only for docs, Markdown outside the build inputs, unit/e2e tests and workflows that do not build the image. The unit test fails if any tracked file under a build input root (elements/, files/, include/, patches/, plugins/, scripts/, tests/fixtures/, project.conf, Justfile, build.yml) would skip the build.

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The update probe rewrote the sysupdate transfers to a hardcoded 10.0.2.2:8765, so any DOGFOOD_PORT other than the default served the image on one port while the guest updated from another. Export the port once and substitute it into the probe.

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With DOGFOOD_TAMPER, --check now passes only if the initrd's pull fails after the image, SHA256SUMS and SHA256SUMS.gpg were served and nothing booted; a systemd.unit-dropin credential copies the pull's own messages to the serial console so the log says why. DOGFOOD_EXPECT=<ERE> makes --check also require a probe line (e.g. Ignition's marker).

Robustness: key enrollment for HTTP boot waits (bounded) for the firmware to reset after systemd-boot enrolls instead of a fixed sleep, and keeps its log; the EXIT trap kills QEMU too, so an aborted run no longer leaves an orphaned guest holding the port and the caller's locks. The trap only kills PIDs that are set, since kill 0 signals the whole process group.

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…back; skip docs-only builds

boot-test now also runs DOGFOOD_TAMPER=raw and =sums (must be refused), Ignition from the ignition.config credential and UEFI HTTP boot with bluefin-node.ign (both must show the fixture's file and enabled unit), and off main the full install -> sysupdate A->B -> boot-counted rollback. The build job exports the two higher-versioned sets it needs (<ver>.1, <ver>.2) from the warm cache; main skips them so no unpublished release-signed versions exist. Failed boot tests upload their serial logs.

A changes job skips build and boot-test for pull requests image-build-needed.py classifies as docs/tests-only; skipped jobs report as passing. On main, an opt-in step pushes all artifacts to cache.projectbluefin.io:11002 when the CASD_CLIENT_CERT variable and CASD_CLIENT_KEY secret exist (the dakota identity), so main builds stop rebuilding the kernel; it is best effort and a no-op without them. The release job is unchanged.

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ci-tooling.md is canonical for what boot-test covers, the measured build-time breakdown (kernel on the critical path), the docs-only skip, the CASD_CLIENT_CERT / CASD_CLIENT_KEY cache push, and why PR kernels and actions/cache are out of scope. ddi-installer-build.md documents DOGFOOD_EXPECT/PORT/MEM/TIMEOUT, the tamper pass criterion, how to make next/broken sets, and points at ci-tooling.md for CI coverage.

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… reason

The sums tamper overwrote every hash in SHA256SUMS, so the pull failed on the checksum and the signature check was never exercised. It now serves the corrupted image with SHA256SUMS re-hashed to match it, which only SHA256SUMS.gpg can expose. --check requires the pull's own verdict on the serial console: 'DOWNLOAD INVALID: Checksum of <image> file did not check out' for raw, 'DOWNLOAD INVALID: Signature verification failed' for sums. Drop-ins for systemd-import@.service and systemd-importd.service (SYSTEMD_LOG_TARGET=console, journal+console) put those messages there.

The EXIT cleanup moves into a function (shellcheck SC2154 on the inline trap).

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systemd-sysinstall writes the installed image's boot entry as a Type projectbluefin#1 entry with 'version 1.<ver>' (bluefin-server-commit_1.<ver>.conf). systemd-boot sorts it above a 0.<run>.1 update, so the updated node kept booting 0.<run> and the A/B step failed (reproduced locally with 0.900 -> 0.900.1). 1.<run>.N sorts above both and below every release; with it the full install, A/B update and rollback pass locally.

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Document which refusal each DOGFOOD_TAMPER mode asserts, and that next/broken sets must sort above the installed entry's 'version 1.<ver>'.

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@castrojo castrojo left a comment

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Reviewed at 0f718b3. One blocking issue and one smaller note. The rest checks out.

Blocking: the opt-in cache push would upload the signing keys

.github/workflows/build.yml:196 runs just bst artifact push --deps all oci/bluefin-server-image.bst. --deps all includes build dependencies. elements/oci/bluefin-server-image.bst:52 (plus kernel-modules.bst, efi-keys.bst, os-sd-boot-signed.bst, bluefin-server-boot.bst and openzfs-signed.bst) build-depends on bluefin-server/keys/boot-keys.bst, which is kind: import of the whole files/boot-keys directory. On main this same job fills that directory from BOOT_KEYS_TARBALL and writes SYSUPDATE_SIGNING_KEY to files/boot-keys/sysupdate-signing.asc (build.yml:93-107). The element's own description says "Never add this element to a runtime stack: its artifact holds private keys."

So once CASD_CLIENT_CERT/CASD_CLIENT_KEY are configured, the first main build pushes an artifact containing the Secure Boot db key, the module-signing key and the sysupdate GPG key to cache.projectbluefin.io:11002. project.conf lists that host as a pull remote for every build. The artifact's cache key isn't secret either: it appears in the dependency metadata of every artifact that build-depends on it. Please exclude the key element from the push, for example by pushing only the elements that don't depend on the keys, or with --deps scoped to runtime plus an explicit list. Or keep push off until the cache has a private-artifact story.

Note: the classifier comes from the PR head

The changes job sparse-checks out .github/scripts from the PR head and runs image-build-needed.py from there, so a PR can edit the classifier to answer false and skip build/boot-test. A PR can already do the same by editing build.yml, so this doesn't open a new bypass. It is less visible in a diff, though, and nothing in the main ruleset requires build. If you want the gate to hold, run the classifier from the base revision and treat a change to the classifier itself as needing a build (the unit test that asserts this runs from the PR too).

What I verified

  • The classifier (image-build-needed.py): BUILD_PREFIXES is checked before the .md exemption, so files/**/*.md or elements/** changes still build. Anything unlisted builds, and an empty or 3000-file-truncated list builds. Renames are listed under both names. I found no false-negative path for elements/, files/, include/, patches/, plugins/, scripts/ or tests/fixtures/.
  • The earlier "no build check" state was only the new changes job gating build. At this head, changes passes and build is running (run 36521847750).
  • pytest tests/unit: 389 passed. bats tests/unit: pass. actionlint on the workflows: clean apart from the unknown ubuntu-26.04 label in my local actionlint. shellcheck -S warning scripts/dogfood-install.sh: clean. The SC2054 warnings in scripts/dogfood-diskless.sh exist on main too.

jeefy and others added 3 commits September 28, 2026 23:45
Firmware that refuses systemd-boot's key enrollment boots on in setup mode, where nothing is verified, and --check still passed. CI's boot-test did exactly that on Ubuntu's OVMF: every probe reported 'secureboot=disabled (setup)' (e.g. run 36499270842). --check now requires 'PROBE secureboot=enabled', and a tamper run requires the kernel's 'Secure boot enabled' line.

Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5.5 via GitHub Copilot
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Ubuntu 26.04's OVMF 2025.11 rejects systemd-boot's PK enrollment ('Failed to write PK secure boot variable: Security violation'), so boot-test never ran with Secure Boot on, and the new HTTP boot step, which enrolls explicitly, fails outright. Fetch Fedora's edk2-ovmf 20260508-6.fc44 from Koji, check its SHA-256, extract OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd / OVMF_VARS.fd with bsdtar and point the harness at them. It is the build dogfooding uses locally, where enrollment works.

Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5.5 via GitHub Copilot
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5.5 via GitHub Copilot
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
jeefy and others added 4 commits September 29, 2026 01:43
bst artifact push --deps all oci/bluefin-server-image.bst would upload
bluefin-server/keys/boot-keys.bst, an import of files/boot-keys that on
main holds the Secure Boot db, module-signing and sysupdate private keys,
to a cache every build pulls from. Remove the push steps and the
CASD_CLIENT_CERT/CASD_CLIENT_KEY configuration; ci-tooling.md records
that pushing needs an element allow-list proven not to depend on
boot-keys.bst.

Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5.5 via GitHub Copilot
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The changes job checked out .github/scripts from the PR head, so a PR
could edit image-build-needed.py to answer false and skip build and
boot-test. Check out the base SHA instead, feed it the PR's changed
files, and build when the base has no classifier yet. The classifier
now lists itself and build.yml as gate files that always build; the
unit test asserts that and that the changes job checks out the base.

Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5.5 via GitHub Copilot
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 5.5 via GitHub Copilot
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Resolve scripts/dogfood-diskless.sh: keep both the tamper-run import
console drop-ins and upstream's DOGFOOD_CREDS system credentials.

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@jeefy

jeefy commented Sep 29, 2026

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Thanks for the review, @castrojo. Addressed at 75824d2:

Blocking: the cache push would upload the signing keys. Fixed in 1e37fa0 (ci(build): drop the BuildStream cache push). I removed the push rather than scoping it. The image, UKIs, kernel-modules.bst, efi-keys.bst, os-sd-boot-signed.bst and openzfs-signed.bst all build-depend on boot-keys.bst, so a safe allow-list isn't small enough to prove in this PR. The configure, push and cleanup steps and the CASD_CLIENT_CERT/CASD_CLIENT_KEY references are gone. ci-tooling.md now has a "No cache push" note: pushing needs an explicit element allow-list, plus a unit test showing that no listed element is, or build-depends on, boot-keys.bst. FSDK's kernel only stages the public linux-module-cert.bst, so it's the element worth listing when someone picks this up.

Note: the classifier comes from the PR head. Fixed in b93e88a (ci(build): run the build classifier from the PR's base revision), with docs in 1dd8d09.

  • The changes job now sparse-checks out .github/scripts at github.event.pull_request.base.sha in the base repository (persist-credentials: false) and passes it the PR's changed-file list from the API.
  • If the base doesn't have the classifier yet (which is the case for this PR), the job answers image=true.
  • image-build-needed.py has a GATE_FILES set (itself and build.yml) that it checks first, so a change to either always builds.
  • test_image_build_needed.py asserts that gate files build even when mixed with docs and still exist at those paths. It also parses build.yml to check that the changes job's only checkout uses base.sha with no repository override, and that the bootstrap fallback is present.

Merge. Main had moved (#272, #275) and the PR was CONFLICTING. 75824d2 merges upstream/main. The only conflict was in scripts/dogfood-diskless.sh, and I kept both sides: the tamper-run import console drop-ins and the new DOGFOOD_CREDS loop. The PR is MERGEABLE again.

Checks run on the merge head:

  • pytest tests/unit: 424 passed. It also passes in a detached worktree without files/boot-keys, and at 1e37fa0 (389 passed).
  • bats tests/unit: 0 failures.
  • docs-checks.py: passed.
  • just validate: passed.
  • actionlint on all workflows: clean apart from the unknown ubuntu-26.04 label.
  • shellcheck -S warning scripts/dogfood-install.sh: clean.

jeefy added a commit to jeefy/server that referenced this pull request Sep 29, 2026
Both checked out pull_request.head.ref, the branch, so a push landing
mid-run could pair release-dry-run's scripts with artifacts built from
another commit. Check out head.sha on pull requests and github.sha
otherwise, the commit release passes to gh release --target.
boot-test keeps head.ref: projectbluefin#270 rewrites that job.

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jeefy and others added 2 commits September 29, 2026 06:13
Combines projectbluefin#271's rollback scenarios (DOGFOOD_BROKEN, boot deadline) with
this branch's DOGFOOD_PORT handling, the 1.<ver> version-order note and
the tamper/RAM harness docs.

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…refusal

Since projectbluefin#273 the initrd writes its failure summary to the console while
systemd-importd logs the refusal, so DCS/OSC sequences can land inside the
refusal line and refused() missed it (boot-test run 36560436141). Match
against the same cleaned log the harness saves.

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@jeefy
jeefy merged commit 1c830e4 into projectbluefin:main Sep 29, 2026
6 checks passed
jeefy added a commit to jeefy/server that referenced this pull request Sep 29, 2026
Takes projectbluefin#270's changes/build/boot-test rows in the ci-tooling.md job table
and keeps this branch's release and release-dry-run rows. build.yml merged
cleanly; the update sets go to the separate image-update artifact, so the
release set that publish-release.sh verifies is unchanged.

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jeefy added a commit to jeefy/server that referenced this pull request Sep 29, 2026
Runs the offline installer test after projectbluefin#270's update and rollback step, and
lists it in ci-tooling.md's boot-test scenarios instead of the old table
row. projectbluefin#268, which this was stacked on, is now in main.

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