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fix(creds): apply firstboot.* credentials without systemd-firstboot - #254
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bluefin-firstboot-credentials.service ran `ExecStart=systemd-firstboot --force --welcome=no`, but the OS payload is Flatcar's /usr (flatcar-usr.bst) and Flatcar builds systemd without systemd-firstboot: flatcar-container.tar.gz for 4593.2.5 contains neither /usr/bin/systemd-firstboot nor systemd-firstboot.service. On the installed image the unit fails with bluefin-firstboot-credentials.service: Failed at step EXEC spawning systemd-firstboot: No such file or directory so every firstboot.locale / locale-messages / keymap / timezone / hostname credential is a silent no-op, including the ones systemd-sysinstall itself propagates from the installer environment. Replace the binary with /usr/libexec/bluefin-firstboot-credentials, a bash + coreutils helper (Flatcar ships both) that reads the five credentials from $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, validates them with the same shape systemd accepts (hostname labels per hostname_is_valid: no leading or trailing hyphen, 64 chars total; timezone must exist under /usr/share/zoneinfo; no path or shell metacharacters; ASCII-only under `export LC_ALL=C`, since PID 1 exports the LANG this helper itself writes and [[:alnum:]] would otherwise widen with it), and writes the same files systemd-firstboot would (/etc/locale.conf, /etc/vconsole.conf, the /etc/localtime symlink) plus /etc/hostname and the live kernel hostname so the first DHCP request carries it -- systemd <= v259 (Flatcar's 257.9) has no firstboot.hostname; systemd v260 added it as a static hostname honoured only when none is set, whereas this helper applies it unconditionally. The validators are at least as strict as systemd's (ASCII-only; keymap and locale capped below 128 bytes like keymap_is_valid()/locale_is_valid()); a NUL byte in a credential is rejected rather than silently dropped by $(<file), and a nonexistent CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY is an error rather than a silent no-op that would still get the stamp. Any invalid value fails the run before anything is written, with control characters in the rejected value %q-quoted in the log. The helper syncs before exiting so the ExecStartPost stamp cannot outlive the files on power loss. The unit's ordering, conditions and ImportCredential= lines are unchanged; the ExecStartPost hostname shell one-liner folds into the helper. The shebang is /usr/bin/bash so EXEC does not depend on the tmpfiles-created /bin symlink. Pulling FSDK's systemd-firstboot into the Flatcar /usr was rejected: it links libsystemd-shared of a different systemd build and would reintroduce the FSDK/Flatcar split the Flatcar cutover removed. test_credentials_provisioning.py pins the unit and element wiring; test_firstboot_credentials_behavior.py executes the helper against a scratch --root: all five credentials, a subset, --force overwrite, twelve invalid inputs that must write nothing (including trailing-hyphen and empty labels, a non-ASCII hostname, and a CR), a non-ASCII keymap/locale under C.UTF-8 (this one exercises a [[:alnum:]] regex and fails when the helper's `export LC_ALL=C` is removed -- verified by mutation), the 127/128 keymap length boundary, locale-only and messages-only locale.conf, an invalid locale-messages value, a NUL byte, an empty credential, a missing and a nonexistent CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, and shellcheck (skipped, not silently passed, when it is not installed). Assisted-by: Claude Fable 5.1 via GitHub Copilot Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Describe what bluefin-firstboot-credentials.service actually runs on the Flatcar-based payload and which files it writes: the same files systemd-firstboot would, plus /etc/hostname and the kernel hostname from the firstboot.hostname credential, which systemd <= v259 (Flatcar's) does not read (v260 added it as a static hostname applied only when none is set; Bluefin applies it unconditionally). Drop systemd-firstboot as a consumer of passwd.hashed-password.root since the binary is not shipped. Assisted-by: Claude Fable 5.1 via GitHub Copilot Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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…st.creds_sha256) for PXE installs (#253) **Stacked on #252** (wait-online) ← #251 (`/dev/shm` staging) ← #250 (sed rewrite) — only the last four commits (`feat`, `docs`, `test`, `docs`) are new here; the credentials pull shares the same staging directory and network wait, so the diff shrinks to those four as the fixes merge. ## Motivation #229 made PXE installs self-contained by letting the installer pull the DDI over the LAN (`inst.ddi_url` / `inst.ddi_sha256`). Its feature request (#14 §4) left per-host configuration out of scope, naming the natural follow-up: installer-fetched systemd credentials. A PXE fleet still needs a hostname, an operator SSH key and usually a first-boot callback per machine, and the only delivery path today is an operator hand-mounting the ESP after the install. This PR closes that gap with the same shape as the DDI pull: two opt-in kernel parameters, mandatory verification, no new installer logic — the files are handed to the stock systemd credential consumers already documented in `docs/skills/tpm2-credential-sealing.md` (`firstboot.*`, `tmpfiles.extra`, `network.*`, `passwd.*`). Found while integrating with the [jeefy/booty](https://github.com/jeefy/booty) PXE server, which serves `GET /creds/<mac>.tar` per host. ## Behaviour | Parameter | Meaning | |---|---| | `inst.creds_url=<url>` | Download a **flat, uncompressed tar archive** of `systemd-creds encrypt`ed `*.cred` files (any `curl` scheme; the example uses plain `http://`) and place them in the installed system's ESP at `/loader/credentials/`. | | `inst.creds_sha256=<hex>` | **Mandatory** when `inst.creds_url` is set. Verified before anything is unpacked or written. | iPXE example (`${mac}` expanded by iPXE): ```text systemd.unit=system-install.target console=tty0 console=ttyS0,115200 rw unattended inst.ddi_url=${base}/bluefin-server-ddi-<ver>.raw.zst inst.ddi_sha256=<sha256> inst.creds_url=${base}/creds/${mac}.tar inst.creds_sha256=<sha256> ``` Archive contract: an **uncompressed** ustar/pax/gnu tar (the wrapper checks the `ustar` magic at offset 257 and feeds tar on stdin, where GNU tar refuses compressed input instead of transparently decompressing a `.tar.zst` into an unbounded listing) of at most **64** top-level regular files named `<name>.cred`, `<name>` matching `[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._@~-]*` (`~` is systemd's own `systemd.unit-dropin.<unit>~<name>` credential namespace), each name at most **250 bytes**, each file at most **1 MiB**, the archive at most **16 MiB**, and no name repeated even ignoring case (the ESP is vfat, where `a.cred` and `A.cred` are the same file). Any other member (directory, `./` prefix, symlink, hardlink, device, FIFO, path, space/control character/leading dash or dot in the name, non-`.cred` name, over-long or duplicate name) rejects the whole archive with a wrapper-level message before anything is extracted. Build with `tar -cf <mac>.tar -C <dir> a.cred b.cred`. Trust model: `inst.creds_sha256` arrives on the same unauthenticated PXE command line as the URL, so the checksum protects against a compromised or misconfigured *file server*, not against whoever controls DHCP/TFTP — they control both. The archive hardening is defence against operator error and a bad mirror, not a security boundary against a hostile netboot server; secrets belong in TPM2/host-key-sealed credentials. ## Guarantees - **Absent → behaviourally unchanged.** Without `inst.creds_url` the wrapper behaves as before; the one shared change is that the ESP is now located by GPT partition type instead of "first vfat on the target" (design note 1). The commit message and in-script comment now say the same (round 1 said "byte-for-byte", which was wrong). - **Fail closed on missing checksum**, same wording as the DDI check. - **Nothing touches the disk before both downloads verify, and nothing unverified is used.** The archive is fetched right after the DDI (one shared `systemd-networkd-wait-online`), capped at 16 MiB (`curl --max-filesize` — curl ≥ 8.4 aborts a transfer of unknown length once it crosses the cap; re-checked with `stat` after the checksum so the bound does not depend on the curl version), `sha256sum --check`ed, checked for the `ustar` magic, and only then listed — via stdin, so tar cannot auto-decompress. The `tar -tv` listing is validated column by column *before extraction* — type must be a regular file (no directories, symlinks, hardlinks, devices, FIFOs), size numeric and ≤ 1 MiB, date/time columns where GNU tar puts them (`LC_ALL=C`), name matching the strict pattern (which also rejects the backslash sequences `--quoting-style=escape` emits for a smuggled newline or other control character) and ≤ 250 bytes, no duplicate or case-colliding names, ≤ 64 members — and cross-checked against the plain `tar -t` listing so a column shift (e.g. an owner name with a space) is caught. Only the validated names are extracted (`--no-same-owner --no-same-permissions`), pinned to `0644`, and re-checked as regular non-symlink files. Everything lands in `/dev/shm/installer/credentials/` (tmpfs) *before* `systemd-sysinstall` runs. A bad download aborts with the target untouched. - **Placement happens after `systemd-sysinstall`** in the existing post-install ESP pass (`stage_fallback_bootloader` → `finalize_target_esp`): one `mount -t vfat` of the ESP identified by type GUID `c12a7328-f81f-11d2-ba4b-00a0c93ec93b` on the target disk, `mkdir -p loader/credentials`, `cp -- "$CREDS_DIR/$name"` for each validated name (never a glob over the extraction directory), `sync` — **first**, then the best-effort fallback-loader copy on the same mount, so a loader hiccup cannot abort the function with the mandatory step undone — then `umount`. - **Fail closed after install too.** If `inst.creds_url` was given and the ESP cannot be found or mounted, the wrapper exits 1 (→ `FailureAction=poweroff`) instead of letting an unconfigured, unreachable host reboot. - **Credentials must be `systemd-creds` encrypted.** `systemd-stub` stages ESP credentials under `/run/credentials/@encrypted`, so plaintext `*.cred` files are rejected by the consuming services (`status=243/CREDENTIALS`); null-key encrypted files (`systemd-creds --with-key=null encrypt --name=<name> - <name>.cred`) apply. The docs say so and show the commands. - **One new tool**: GNU `tar` (`components/tar.bst`, present at the pinned `freedesktop-sdk-26.08.0`; runtime deps glibc, symlinks, utf-locale) in `installer-stack.bst`, also added to the build-time tool check together with `dd`, `rm`, `chmod`, `sync` (all confirmed in the released initrd). `curl`, `sha256sum`, `stat`, `mount`, `lsblk`, `udevadm` were already there (confirmed against the released 26.08.0 initrd's file list: uutils coreutils 0.11.0, GNU grep, curl, zstd, util-linux; no `sed`/`awk`/`tar`). ## Verification - `tests/unit/test_installer_contract.py::test_installer_network_credentials_pull_contract` — parameter parsing, mandatory-checksum wording, fetch → verify → size cap → `ustar` magic → listing → unpack → `systemd-sysinstall` ordering, tar only ever reading the archive from stdin, the 16 MiB / 64 / 250-byte / 1 MiB caps, mode and name patterns, case-insensitive duplicate check, listing cross-check, 0644 pin and regular-file re-check, ESP lookup by type GUID on a single vfat mount with per-name copies (no glob) written before the loader, fail-closed message, `tar.bst` in the stack and `tar` in the build-time tool check. - `tests/unit/test_installer_creds_pull_behavior.py` (new, 29 tests) — runs the wrapper (shared `installer_wrapper` fixture) under bash: `bash -n`, `shellcheck -S warning` when installed, and the fetch/verify/validate/unpack block against real tar archives with a stand-in `curl`. Accepted: a flat archive lands in tmpfs at `0644` regardless of archive modes/owners and the download is removed; 64 members incl. a 1 MiB member (boundary); a `systemd.unit-dropin.multi-user.target~booty.cred` member; a 250-byte name. Rejected without creating the credentials directory: checksum mismatch, non-`.cred` names, directories, `./` prefixes, symlinks, hardlinks, char/block devices, FIFOs, names with spaces / newlines / colons / leading dash / leading dot, an owner field with a space (column shift), a 1 MiB + 1 B member, 65 members, a 251-byte name, a repeated name, two names differing only by case, a 17 MiB archive, a zstd-compressed tar (rejected at the magic check; GNU tar on stdin is also shown to refuse it), empty and non-tar payloads. **Not executed here**: the curl-side `--max-filesize` (the stand-in curl ignores it; the `stat` re-check is executed) and `finalize_target_esp` (string assertions only) — stated in the module docstring. Tests skip unless GNU tar is present. - `python3 -m pytest tests/unit -q` — 383 passed, 1 xfailed (pre-existing). - `bash -n` + `shellcheck -S warning` on the extracted wrapper — clean. - `python3 .github/scripts/docs-checks.py` + the `check-*` scripts — pass. - **End to end in QEMU** (OVMF, q35/KVM, 8 GiB, 20 GiB virtio disk, single NIC) with the *combined* wrapper of this stack and GNU tar dropped into the released `installer-v26.08.0` initrd, booted via iPXE from a Booty instance serving all four `inst.*` parameters: archive fetched and verified before any disk change, a 7-file `*.cred` archive accepted, `systemd-sysinstall` runs, `finalize_target_esp` stages the fallback loader and writes `/loader/credentials/*.cred` on `/dev/vda1`; on first boot the target logs `Received untrusted credentials: firstboot.hostname, firstboot.locale, firstboot.timezone, tmpfiles.extra, …`, `tmpfiles.extra` is applied and SSH as the provisioned operator works. - **Not booted**: the archive-hardening pass (size caps, column-by-column listing validation, cross-check, `--no-same-permissions`/`0644` pin, per-name copy) and the `--any` on wait-online were added *after* that QEMU run from review; the happy path is behaviourally identical for a well-formed archive (the executed unit tests exercise the exact block that ships), but the current wrapper has not been re-booted. The archive-rejection paths, the ESP-not-found/unmountable failure and the wait-online timeout are unit-tested only. - Not run: `just validate` / `just build-installer` (no local BuildStream); the tested initrd was hand-assembled from the released one. Two target-side observations from that run, both outside this PR: (a) null-key credentials are honoured by `ImportCredential=` consumers (tmpfiles, sysusers, …) but refused by PID 1 and generators (`system.hostname`, `systemd.extra-unit.*`: `Operation not supported`), so anything beyond those consumers needs host/TPM2-key encryption; (b) `bluefin-firstboot-credentials.service` fails on the released image with `Failed at step EXEC spawning systemd-firstboot`, so `firstboot.*` are no-ops there — fixed separately in `fix/firstboot-credentials-binary` (#254). ## Design notes / questions 1. **ESP lookup by partition type.** The fallback-loader pass previously took the first `vfat` partition on the target disk. I switched it to the ESP type GUID so the credentials cannot land on an unrelated vfat data partition on an install-alongside layout. Same partition in every layout the installer produces today; flagging it because it touches the non-PXE path. 2. **Mount reuse vs. separate pass.** I reused the single existing post-install mount rather than mounting twice, so the fallback loader and the credentials share one function. Happy to split it if you prefer the bootloader staging to stay strictly best-effort and isolated. 3. **`sha256sum` vs. `importctl`.** I mirrored the DDI path (`curl` + `sha256sum --check`). If you would rather move both network pulls to `importctl pull-raw --verify=checksum` with a `SHA256SUMS`, I can do that in a follow-up covering both. 4. **Encrypted-only enforcement.** The wrapper checks archive shape, not contents. Should it additionally check for the `systemd-creds` header and refuse plaintext up front? 6. **Caps.** 64 members / 1 MiB each / 16 MiB total are generous for encrypted credentials (a few KiB each) but arbitrary; happy to tune. 5. **`tar` as the only new dep.** GNU tar was the smallest thing that reads the archive; a `cpio` or a DDI-wrapped credentials volume felt heavier for a handful of small files.
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Branch:
fix/firstboot-credentials-binary(OS payload, independent of the installer fixes).Problem
On the installed image
bluefin-firstboot-credentials.servicefails on every boot that carries afirstboot.*credential:so
firstboot.locale,firstboot.locale-messages,firstboot.keymap,firstboot.timezoneandfirstboot.hostnameare silent no-ops — including the onessystemd-sysinstallitself propagates from the installer environment (locale/keymap/timezone, see the "Propagates installer environment settings" bullet inddi-installer.md). Observed in QEMU on the installedinstaller-v26.08.0image with credentials staged on the ESP (Received untrusted credentials: firstboot.hostname, firstboot.locale, firstboot.timezone, …followed by the EXEC failure). Found while integrating with the jeefy/booty PXE server, which deliversfirstboot.hostnameper host.Root cause
The unit runs
ExecStart=systemd-firstboot --force --welcome=no, written when the OS payload was FSDK's systemd. #132 cut the payload over to Flatcar's/usr(flatcar-usr.bst), and Flatcar builds systemd withoutsystemd-firstboot:flatcar-container.tar.gzfor 4593.2.5 contains neither/usr/bin/systemd-firstbootnorsystemd-firstboot.service(verified by listing the archive; theln -sf /dev/null …/systemd-firstboot.servicemask inbluefin-server-ddi.bstis therefore a no-op too, harmless).installer-stack.bststill has FSDK's systemd withsystemd-firstboot, which is why the installer side works and the target side does not.Fix
Replace the binary with
/usr/libexec/bluefin-firstboot-credentials, a bash + coreutils helper (both shipped by Flatcar), staged byos-creds-prov.bst. It reads the five credentials from$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY, validates them at least as strictly as systemd's validators (hostname_is_valid-style: labels[A-Za-z0-9]([A-Za-z0-9-]*[A-Za-z0-9])?, no leading/trailing hyphen, ≤ 64 chars total; timezone must match[A-Za-z0-9_+-]+(/…)*and exist under/usr/share/zoneinfo; locale/keymap restricted to safe characters and < 128 bytes likelocale_is_valid()/keymap_is_valid(); everything ASCII-only underexport LC_ALL=C, since PID 1 exports theLANGthis helper itself writes and[[:alnum:]]would otherwise widen with it; a NUL byte in a credential is rejected rather than silently dropped by$(<file)), and writes the same filessystemd-firstbootwould, in the same format — plus/etc/hostname. Onfirstboot.hostname: systemd ≤ v259 (Flatcar 4593.2.5 ships 257.9) has no such credential; systemd v260 added it as a static hostname honoured only when none is set yet, whereas this helper applies it unconditionally and additionally sets the live kernel hostname (systemd's own transient hostname credential remainssystem.hostname, consumed by PID 1):firstboot.locale/firstboot.locale-messages/etc/locale.conf(LANG=/LC_MESSAGES=)firstboot.keymap/etc/vconsole.conf(KEYMAP=)firstboot.timezone/etc/localtime -> ../usr/share/zoneinfo/<tz>firstboot.hostname/etc/hostname+ live kernel hostname (/proc/sys/kernel/hostname) so the first DHCP request carries it — new relative tomain(the oldExecStartPostset the kernel hostname but never persisted/etc/hostname); semantics differ from systemd v260's (always applied, not only when no static hostname exists)Any invalid value fails the run before anything is written (unit fails visibly, stamp file not created; control characters in the rejected value are
%q-quoted in the log). The helpersyncs before exiting so theExecStartPoststamp cannot outlive the files on power loss. The unit's ordering, conditions,ImportCredential=lines and the/etc/.bluefin-firstboot-credentialsstamp are unchanged; the oldExecStartPosthostname one-liner folds into the helper. Shebang is/usr/bin/bashso EXEC does not depend on the tmpfiles-created/binsymlink.--root=DIRexists for tests only.Known, deliberate differences from
systemd-firstboot(stated in the helper's header): trailing newlines in a credential are stripped rather than rejected;LC_MESSAGES=is written even when it equalsLANG=; locales/keymaps are shape-checked, not checked against what is installed (Flatcar ships the full zoneinfo, so the timezone existence check is real).Why not ship the binary
Pulling FSDK's
systemd-firstbootinto the Flatcar/usrwas the other option and was rejected: it linkslibsystemd-shared-<ver>.sofrom a different systemd build, so it would drag a second libsystemd-shared into the image and reintroduce exactly the FSDK/Flatcar userspace split #132 removed. The helper is ~100 lines with no dependencies beyond what the payload already has, and follows the precedent of #246'sfiles/os/libexec/bluefin-root-cred-sync.Verification
tests/unit/test_credentials_provisioning.py— unit no longer namessystemd-firstboot,ExecStartpoints at the helper and precedes the stamp; element stagesfiles/os/libexecand installs the helper 0755.tests/unit/test_firstboot_credentials_behavior.py(new, 26 tests) — executes the helper against a scratch--root: all five credentials produce the exact files above; a subset writes only its files;--force-style overwrite of existing/etc/hostnameand/etc/localtime; interior hyphens/digits in labels accepted; twelve invalid inputs (bad host,-leading,trailing-,foo-.bar,foo..bar,hôte,host\r, 65-char hostname,../../etc/passwdand unknown timezone, shell metacharacters in locale,..in keymap) exit 1 with a named error and write nothing; a non-ASCII keymap/locale ([[:alnum:]]regexes) is rejected withLC_ALL=C.UTF-8/LANG=C.UTF-8in the environment — this test fails whenexport LC_ALL=Cis removed from the helper (verified by mutation; the round-1 hostname variant did not, because[A-Za-z0-9]does not widen underC.UTF-8); 127-byte keymap accepted / 128 rejected; locale-only and messages-onlylocale.conf; invalidlocale-messages; a NUL byte; the CR case logs$'host\r'; empty credential treated as absent; missing and nonexistentCREDENTIALS_DIRECTORYare errors;bash -n;shellcheck -S warning(skipped visibly, not silently passed, when shellcheck is absent — CI'sunit-tests.ymldoes not install it).python3 -m pytest tests/unit -q— 371 passed, 1 xfailed (pre-existing).test_files_payload_reachabilityconfirms the newfiles/os/libexec/path is staged.python3 .github/scripts/docs-checks.py+ thecheck-*scripts — pass.just validate/just build-ddi(no local BuildStream) and a rebuilt-image boot. The helper has only been exercised by the executed unit tests against a scratch--root; a first boot withfirstboot.*credentials on a rebuilt DDI is the remaining proof and I am happy to run it against a CI artefact.Docs:
ddi-installer.mddescribes what the unit actually runs and writes (same files assystemd-firstbootplus the hostname handling, with the ≤ v259 / v260 distinction);tpm2-credential-sealing.mddropssystemd-firstbootas a consumer ofpasswd.hashed-password.root.No relation to the installer PR stack (#250, #251, #252, #253); no textual or compose overlap with #246 (
bluefin-root-cred-syncis installed from a separate element).Review round 2
Applied from the line-by-line review:
firstboot.hostnameis Bluefin-specific;systemd-firstbootnever reads it" was false upstream — systemd v260 reads it (static hostname, only if none set). Helper header,os-creds-prov.bstdescription,ddi-installer.md, both commit messages and this body now say "systemd ≤ v259 (Flatcar's) does not; v260 added it; Bluefin applies it unconditionally". "Like systemd's own validators" → "at least as strict as".LC_ALLtest was ineffective (literal[A-Za-z0-9]hostname regex does not widen underC.UTF-8) → the test now feedshôteas keymap/locale ([[:alnum:]]regexes) and fails on the mutant withoutexport LC_ALL=C.< 128likekeymap_is_valid(); NUL bytes in a credential rejected ($(<file)would silently drop them); nonexistentCREDENTIALS_DIRECTORYis an error instead of a silent no-op that still gets the stamp; tests for locale-only / messages-onlylocale.confand an invalidlocale-messages.%q-quoted value indie_value(journald's LineMax already bounds it; a multi-MB credential is not a realistic input); thesystemd-firstboot.servicemask comment inbluefin-server-ddi.bst(outside this PR's diff; follow-up).build(run 36259022366) passed; the new build is running.