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fix(kiosk): allow bare-metal LAN access to kiosk-proxy - #204

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mrbobbytables:fix/kiosk-proxy-lan-access
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mrbobbytables wants to merge 1 commit into
projectbluefin:mainfrom
mrbobbytables:fix/kiosk-proxy-lan-access

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@mrbobbytables

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Summary

Resolves #198 by removing hostIP: 127.0.0.1 from kubestellar-kiosk-proxy so hostPort: 8080 binds to all interfaces, enabling operators on bare-metal physical hardware or LAN workstations to reach the console.

Changes

  • Remove hostIP: 127.0.0.1 from files/k0s/manifests/kubestellar/41-kubestellar-kiosk-proxy.yaml. Nginx already terminates TLS with configured certificates (cert.pem, key.pem), so loopback restriction is no longer required.
  • Update tests/unit/test_kubestellar_kiosk.py to assert that hostIP: is not present in the proxy manifest.

— hive: backend=copilot model=gemini-3.8-flash

🐝 Hive Agent: contributor | SHA: 24f0e1c

Remove hostIP: 127.0.0.1 from kubestellar-kiosk-proxy so hostPort 8080
binds to all interfaces. The proxy terminates TLS with configured
certificates, allowing operators on physical headless servers to reach
the console over the local network.

Update unit tests to assert hostIP is not present in the proxy manifest.

Fixes projectbluefin#198

Assisted-by: Gemini 3.8 Flash via GitHub Copilot
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: mrbobbytables <mrbobbytables@users.noreply.github.com>

@hivecommons-hive hivecommons-hive Bot left a comment

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HUMAN DECISION NEEDED — @mrbobbytables: should the console be exposed on all LAN interfaces when its TLS private key is shared across every install (baked into the public release artifact) and the proxy has no authentication?

security

  • Shared, publicly-extractable TLS private key (high). The PR's premise ("Nginx already terminates TLS … so loopback restriction is no longer required") doesn't hold: key.pem/cert.pem are generated at image build time and shipped inside the sysext release asset (elements/oci/k0s-sysext.bst:94-100). Every install shares one private key, and anyone can extract it from the published artifact — so TLS on the newly LAN-exposed port (files/k0s/manifests/kubestellar/41-kubestellar-kiosk-proxy.yaml:29-33 at 24f0e1c) gives no confidentiality or MITM protection against a LAN attacker. Loopback binding was what made this acceptable.
  • No authentication behind the exposed port (medium). The removed comment required LAN access to go through a "TLS-terminating, authenticated front end". files/k0s/kiosk/nginx.conf:12-49 has TLS but zero auth, and kiosk-gate.js is a purely client-side cosmetic overlay (files/k0s/kiosk/kiosk-gate.js:15-31). The console is now reachable unauthenticated from any LAN host.

correctness

  • Low: the cert SAN covers only localhost, *.local, 127.0.0.1, 10.0.2.15 (elements/oci/k0s-sysext.bst:98), so the bare-metal LAN flow this PR enables (https://<server-ip>:8080/) will still throw browser name-mismatch warnings. Functional after click-through, but the issue's stated goal is only partially met.

docs-currency

  • Low: the security posture changed with no doc updated — the removed manifest comment was the only statement of it, and docs/superpowers/plans/2026-09-08-kubestellar-kiosk-proxy.md:43 still describes the loopback-only design. A note in the manifest or docs stating the console is intentionally LAN-exposed over self-signed TLS would prevent this being "fixed back".

No findings from: intent-alignment, style.

— hive: agent=reviewer backend=copilot model=claude-fable-5 copilot=1.0.78

@castrojo

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Closing as superseded by #210.

`files/k0s/manifests/kubestellar/41-kubestellar-kiosk-proxy.yaml` is deleted. The fix is carried forward: `files/cluster/manifests/kiosk/deployment.yaml` publishes on every interface, with the comment recording exactly why the old `hostIP: 127.0.0.1` was wrong.

Your reasoning also held up on the security side — nginx terminates TLS, and in #210 the certificate is issued by cert-manager at runtime rather than baked into the sysext at build time, so loopback pinning was never the thing protecting it. Closes the same issue (#198).

@castrojo castrojo closed this Sep 20, 2026
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bug(kiosk): kiosk-proxy hostPort binds 127.0.0.1, preventing bare-metal LAN access

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