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Description
Where #285 leaves it
A network-booted node that finds bluefin-node.ign next to its UKI applies it only if bluefin-node.ign.gpg verifies with gpgv against the import keyring shipped inside the signed UKI. A signature that does not verify, or a .gpg fetch that fails with anything but HTTP 404, fails the boot closed. A 404 counts as "unsigned", and an unsigned config is applied only with the bluefin.ignition.allow-unsigned system credential.
Booty does not sign per-node configs yet and answers 404 for the .gpg. On UEFI HTTP Boot with Secure Boot the credential cannot be delivered any other way: the signed UKI's own command line wins, there is no ESP for /loader/credentials, and real firmware sets no SMBIOS type 11 strings. So #285 ships a transitional default: the netboot UKI's command line (netboot-cmdline in elements/oci/bluefin-server-boot.bst) carries systemd.set_credential=bluefin.ignition.allow-unsigned:1. The disk and installer UKIs do not.
While that default exists, an on-path attacker can still force the unsigned path by answering 404 for bluefin-node.ign.gpg. The check only protects configs that are signed.
To do
- A separate config keyring. Configs are verified against the release keyring (
import-pubring.pgp), which also authenticatesSHA256SUMSfor systemd-importd and systemd-sysupdate. A Booty that signs configs with the release key could also sign release manifests, and with no domain separation any release signature (SHA256SUMS.gpgoverSHA256SUMS) already verifies as abluefin-node.ign. Ship a dedicated config trust root in the initrd (inside the signed UKI), verifybluefin-node.ign.gpgagainst it alone, and decide how a site provisions and rotates it. - Booty signs exactly the served bytes. Booty signs the rendered
bluefin-node.ignit serves, byte for byte, and serves the detachedbluefin-node.ign.gpgnext to it. It marks a node installed/booted only after the node has accepted the config, not on the UKI or kernel fetch, so a refused config shows up for the operator instead of passing as a successful boot. -
ignition.config.urlover plain http. A config reached through theignition.config.urlcredential is fetched by Ignition through aconfig.replacestub with no signature check, so overhttp://it is only as trustworthy as the network. Pin it (e.g. a hash credential that becomesverification.hashin the stub) or document the residual risk. - Replay and per-node binding. A signature does not tie a config to one node or to a point in time: a rogue origin can serve another node's signed config, or a stale one. Bind it, e.g. with the node's MAC or machine identity inside the signed payload, checked in the initrd, or with an expiring signed manifest.
- Remove the transitional default once Booty signs: drop the credential from
netboot-cmdlineand its unit test, and the "Transitional" section ofdocs/skills/booty-integration.md, and make theDOGFOOD_BOOT=httpboot test serve a signed config.
Activity
feat(boot): accept unsigned node configs on the netboot UKI until Boo…
docs: the transitional netboot default for per-node Ignition configs
dtg01100 commentedon Sep 30, 2026
test
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contributor| SHA:unknowndtg01100 commentedon Sep 30, 2026
Issue #327 — analysis of work needed
Picked this up to see if there's a shippable subset of #327 against current
main(844ac2b). Findings: every item in the checklist needs a maintainer decision before code can land in this repo, and one item lives injeefy/booty. Posting so the analysis survives on the issue.State on
mainPR #285 is OPEN with
jeefy"Changes requested". The signature gate it introduces is the foundation every #327 item builds on, but it is not merged.maindoes not have signature verification yet (files/initrd-ignition/usr/libexec/bluefin-ignition-credentialsis the pre-#285 version, nogpgvpath, no keyring choice).What's blocking each item
/etc/bluefin/ignition-pubring.pgpwas a steer, not a call), the key-provisioning story (how does a site get/rotate it), and the rotation policy. Code can wait.jeefy/booty. Nothing to ship in this repo until ci: delegate server builds to lab and add daily release dispatch #1 settles; the design of the bytes-to-sign is downstream of the keyring decision.ignition.config.urlhash pin. The credential name (ignition.config.url.sha256?), the verification site (initrd pre-staging, or inside the stub?), and what happens for non-http://URLs are all design choices. Existing credential surface (ignition.config*import inbluefin-ignition-credentials.service) would need a sibling.Verdict
Not shipping a PR. Holding for the design calls listed above; once they're made, the work splits naturally into a follow-up PR against #285's branch and a Booty change.
— hive: backend=omp model=minimax-code/MiniMax-M3
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contributor| SHA:unknownfix(initrd): verify the per-node Ignition config before applying it (#…
hivecommons-hive commentedon Oct 1, 2026
What to reply
/hive approve: go with the recommendation/hive decision <your instructions>: go ahead, following your instructions/hive help: show these againIf this issue is waiting only for reporter confirmation after a merged fix, the reporter or a maintainer can reply
/fixedinstead.Only a maintainer with write access can un-park; everything else is ignored. Full command reference: https://github.com/hivecommons/hive/blob/v5/src/docs/maintainer-commands.md.
test(boot): no stderr noise while polling for a refusal before QEMU s…
feat: dedicated Ignition config keyring, allow-unsigned as one build …
jeefy commentedon Oct 6, 2026
#410 (merged, b8abbf1) covers the repo side of the first and last checklist items:
bluefin-node.ign.gpgis now verified only against/usr/lib/bluefin/ignition-pubring.pgp. That keyring lives in the initrd, inside the signed UKI. There is no/etcoverride, and the import keyring is never used for node configs.files/release-keys/ignition-pubring.pgp. A release build without it fails.just gen-dev-keys.scripts/check-ignition-keys.shfails any key set where the config keyring shares a key with the release keyring.scripts/sign-node-config.sh/gpg --detach-sign) and key rotation are documented inbooty-integration.md.ignition_allow_unsignedinproject.conf(defaultTrue). The cut-over criteria are listed inbooty-integration.md. CI builds the update-test set with the option off and checks that it refuses an unsigned config.Still open:
False.ignition.config.urlover http.Danathar commentedon Oct 25, 2026
@jeefy status check on what's left here, plus three quick decisions that would unblock it.
Where it stands (checked 2026-10-25):
bluefin-node.ign.gpgverifies only against/usr/lib/bluefin/ignition-pubring.pgpin the signed UKI, andignition_allow_unsigned(defaultTrue) is the single switch, with cut-over criteria indocs/skills/booty-integration.md.serveBluefinNodeConfigserves the renderedbluefin-node.ignbut nothing serves abluefin-node.ign.gpg; Booty only verifies the releaseSHA256SUMS.gpg. I didn't find an open Booty issue tracking config signing.Decisions needed (each one turns into an issue an agent can pick up):
ignition.config.urlover plain http: implement a hash pin (e.g. a credential that becomesverification.hashin theconfig.replacestub), or just document the residual risk?And: do you want an issue on jeefy/booty for "sign the served
bluefin-node.ignbyte for byte and serve.gpgnext to it", or would you rather track that yourself?Once 1 and 2 are answered, the in-repo pieces can be split into child issues for the hive; flipping
ignition_allow_unsignedtoFalsewaits on a Booty release that signs.hivecommons-hive commentedon Oct 26, 2026
The reason this issue is parked may be out of date. It has been parked for a maintainer (
stage/045-needs-decision) since 2026-09-30, and since then:The park reason was written before these changes. Re-read it against the current state before deciding. This note does not un-park the issue: it stays with a maintainer, and Hive updates this note if more of the referenced work moves.
jeefy commentedon Nov 3, 2026
Decisions, in reply to @Danathar's questions:
ignition.config.urlover plain http: document the risk; no hash pin.Both are written up in #607 (
booty-integration.md, "Residual risks").The Booty side, signing the served
bluefin-node.ignbyte for byte and serving.gpgnext to it, is jeefy/booty#91. The cut-over (ignition_allow_unsigned->False) still waits on a Booty release that ships it, per the criteria inbooty-integration.md.Danathar commentedon Nov 9, 2026
/hive decision Record @jeefy's answers from 11-03: (1) ignition.config.url over plain http — document the risk, no hash pin; (2) replay / per-node binding — deferred, documented as an accepted risk. Both are written up in #607 (booty-integration.md, "Residual risks"). (3) Config signing key custody stays with @jeefy. The cut-over (ignition_allow_unsigned -> False) waits on a Booty release that ships jeefy/booty#91; there is no agent work in this repo until then, so do not open PRs for the cut-over before that release.
hivecommons-hive commentedon Nov 9, 2026
Approved by @Danathar. Decision: Record @jeefy's answers from 11-03: (1) ignition.config.url over plain http — document the risk, no hash pin; (2) replay / per-node binding — deferred, documented as an accepted risk. Both are written up in #607 (booty-integration.md, "Residual risks"). (3) Config signing key custody stays with @jeefy. The cut-over (ignition_allow_unsigned -> False) waits on a Booty release that ships jeefy/booty#91; there is no agent work in this repo until then, so do not open PRs for the cut-over before that release.
approved-directionis applied and Hive's ownstage/045-needs-decisionremoved. Anyholdlabel is left exactly as it was.Karibhou commentedon Nov 9, 2026
Summary: Everything this repository can do for signed node setup files is already in place. The last step, turning off the setting that still accepts unsigned setup files, has to wait until Booty (the network boot server that hands those files to machines) can sign them. Booty can't do that yet, so nothing more can change here for now.
Checked 2026-11-09 against
upstream/main:ignition_allow_unsignedbuild option: done in feat: dedicated Ignition config keyring, allow-unsigned as one build option #410 (merged).project.confstill defaults the option toTrue.ignition.config.urland replay / per-node binding: documented as accepted risks in docs(booty): record the accepted residual risks of node-config signing #607 (merged 2026-11-03),docs/skills/booty-integration.md"Residual risks".ignition_allow_unsigned->False): waits on Sign served bluefin-node.ign and serve bluefin-node.ign.gpg jeefy/booty#91 ("Sign served bluefin-node.ign and serve bluefin-node.ign.gpg"), which is still open. The latest Booty release is v1.1.0 (2026-10-30) and does not include it. Per the recorded decision, no cut-over PR until a Booty release ships [sec-check] fix: generate kiosk TLS cert and key at first boot instead of sysext build time #91.— hive: backend=omp model=anthropic/claude-opus-5-5
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