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Security: projectbluefin/lab

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Posture (Homelab)

This is a single-tenant homelab. The trade-offs below are intentional and accepted for this environment. They are documented here so future agents can distinguish deliberate decisions from oversights.

Accepted trade-offs

Trade-off Risk accepted Production fix
Workflow pods run as runAsUser: 0 Required for disk image manipulation (losetup, mount, chown) Rootless podman with user namespaces; separate privileged step with minimal scope
No NetworkPolicy in argo namespace Workflow pods can reach all cluster services Restrict egress to argo-server + ghost node IPs; deny inter-pod lateral movement
Mutable image tags (:latest, :latest-dev) Silent upstream breakage if image changes incompatibly Pin to digest; add a nightly digest-update workflow
argo-server ClusterRole Broad cluster-wide read access for workflow submission Namespace-scoped RBAC scoped to argo
selinux=0 in BLS boot entries SELinux disabled on test VMs — reduces isolation Accept for test VMs; production VMs should have SELinux enforcing
NodePort 32746 on LAN Argo API reachable on the lab subnet without TLS TLS termination + token rotation; restrict to specific agent IPs
StrictHostKeyChecking=no in SSH opts MITM possible if a VM IP is reused for a different host Acceptable on isolated homelab VLAN; use known_hosts in production

What is NOT a concern in this environment

  • Multi-tenancy: single user, internal lab
  • Data sensitivity: test VMs contain no production data or secrets
  • Compliance scope: no PCI, HIPAA, or SOC2 requirements
  • Internet exposure: NodePort 32746 is LAN-only, not internet-facing

What WOULD change before production use

  1. Replace runAsUser: 0 with a purpose-built privileged init container (min scope)
  2. Add NetworkPolicy: deny all → allow only required paths
  3. Pin all image tags to digests and automate rotation
  4. TLS on argo-server with cert-manager
  5. Namespace-scoped RBAC replacing ClusterRole
  6. Remove selinux=0 from BLS entries; enforce SELinux on all VMs

There aren't any published security advisories