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chore(deps): update dependency promptfoo to v0.121.3#512

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chore(deps): update dependency promptfoo to v0.121.3#512
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@renovate renovate bot commented Mar 27, 2026

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
promptfoo 0.121.20.121.3 age confidence

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Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.


Release Notes

promptfoo/promptfoo (promptfoo)

v0.121.3

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📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "before 10am on friday" in timezone Europe/London, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

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@renovate renovate bot added dependencies Renovatebot and dependabot updates frontend javascript Pull requests that update javascript code labels Mar 27, 2026
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github-actions bot commented Mar 27, 2026

Open in Overmind ↗


model|risks_v6
✨Encryption Key State Risk ✨KMS Key Creation

🔴 Change Signals

Routine 🔴 ▇▅▃▂▁ Multiple instance resources showing unusual, infrequent changes at 1 event/week for the last 2-3 months, which is rare compared to typical patterns.
Policies 🔴 ▃▂▁ Multiple policy violations detected, including missing tags and lack of server-side encryption on S3 buckets, and security risks from open SSH access.

View signals ↗


🔥 Risks

Tip

✔ All risks disproven

We investigated 1 potential risk across 5 resources and verified each was safe. See the investigation details below.


🧠 Reasoning · ✔ 0 · ✖ 1

Public SSH exposure on EC2 instances via permissive security groups

Observations 1

Hypothesis

An EC2 instance (i-0464c4413cb0c54aa) is associated with a security group (sg-0437857de45b640ce) that allows inbound SSH (port 22) from 0.0.0.0/0. This exposes SSH to the public internet, violating compute hardening best practice SEC06-BP03 and creating a high-severity risk of unauthorized access or brute-force attacks. The associated configuration update suggests recent or ongoing security group or instance configuration changes that may further affect exposure.

Investigation

Evidence Gathered

I first checked the relevant organizational guidance. aws-compute-configuration explicitly says security groups allowing SSH from 0.0.0.0/0 are a High risk under SEC06-BP03. aws-network-security says unrestricted ingress to port 22 is a High risk under SEC05-BP02. security-compliance-requirements is even stricter: EC2 instances must not be directly reachable from the internet, SSH must never be open to 0.0.0.0/0, and an instance that has both a public IP and an open security group is critical severity.

I then queried the current blast-radius state for the changed instance 540044833068.eu-west-2.ec2-instance.i-0464c4413cb0c54aa, its attached ENI, and security group 540044833068.eu-west-2.ec2-security-group.sg-0437857de45b640ce. The current state confirms all parts of the exposure: the instance is running in production, has public IPv4 18.175.147.19, has public DNS ec2-18-175-147-19.eu-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com, and is attached to security group internet-access. That security group currently permits inbound TCP 22 from 0.0.0.0/0 and inbound TCP 80 from 0.0.0.0/0. The instance also has no IAM instance profile attached, which means there is no evidence here that Session Manager is configured as the safer alternative.

I checked the planned changes for both instances in this change. The only diff for i-0464c4413cb0c54aa is that public_ip and public_dns become (known after apply), which is a normal computed-value refresh and not a concrete change removing the public IP. There are no planned changes to the security group, subnet, ENI, routeing, or instance networking that would mitigate the public SSH exposure. I also checked AWS documentation and guidance: AWS recommends using Session Manager instead of opening SSH/RDP, Security Hub control EC2.13 flags security groups that allow 0.0.0.0/0 to port 22, and AWS prescriptive guidance states unrestricted ingress to SSH increases risk and should be avoided. (docs.aws.amazon.com)

Impact Assessment

The directly affected production resource is 1 EC2 instance: api-server (540044833068.eu-west-2.ec2-instance.i-0464c4413cb0c54aa). It has 1 attached ENI (eni-069a58a392f35dce3), 1 public IPv4 address (18.175.147.19), and 1 attached security group (sg-0437857de45b640ce). The confirmed operational consequence is not speculative service degradation but direct internet reachability of the instance’s SSH service on port 22, assuming the OS is listening. Because the security group is attached to this instance and the instance already has a public IP, scanners and attackers on the public internet can reach the SSH port.

The scope of disruption is limited to this specific instance based on the evidence gathered here; I did not find evidence in the blast radius that sg-0437857de45b640ce is attached to additional instances. However, this is still a serious production exposure because it creates a direct management-plane entry point on an internet-addressable host. The current change does not widen that exposure, but it also does not remediate it. Since the hypothesis asks whether this change poses a real risk, the answer is no: the risky condition already exists, and the proposed change only refreshes computed public_ip/public_dns values without changing the security posture.

Conclusion

I conclude this hypothesis is not a real risk from this change. The public SSH exposure is real and severe in the current environment, but the planned change does not introduce, worsen, or modify that exposure; it only shows computed public address fields changing to (known after apply) with no accompanying security group or networking change.

✖ Hypothesis disproven


💥 Blast Radius

Items 5

Edges 20

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Overmind

⛔ Auto-Blocked


🔴 Decision

Auto-blocked: Routine score (-5) is below minimum (-1)


📊 Signals Summary

Routine 🔴 -5


🔥 Risks Summary

High 0 · Medium 0 · Low 0


💥 Blast Radius

Items 23 · Edges 75


View full analysis in Overmind ↗

@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/promptfoo-0.x-lockfile branch from 514a41c to 58cbaeb Compare March 27, 2026 13:24
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Overmind

⛔ Auto-Blocked


🔴 Decision

Auto-blocked: Policy signal (-3) is below threshold (-2); Routine score (-5) is below minimum (-1)


📊 Signals Summary

Routine 🔴 -5

Policies 🔴 -3


🔥 Risks Summary

High 0 · Medium 0 · Low 0


💥 Blast Radius

Items 5 · Edges 20


View full analysis in Overmind ↗

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