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Security: mosamlife/wpmgr

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately. Do not open a public issue.

We aim to acknowledge within 72 hours and provide a remediation timeline after triage. Coordinated disclosure is appreciated.

Threat model (summary)

  • Multi-tenancy: the control plane is multi-tenant; one tenant must never read another's data. Enforced via Postgres Row-Level Security plus application-layer tenant_id scoping.
  • Untrusted agents: the agent runs on potentially-compromised WordPress sites. All site-supplied data is treated as untrusted and schema-validated.
  • Backup storage: backups are not encrypted client-side in shipped builds, so a backup is protected by whatever protects the destination it was sent to. The default destination is a control-plane-managed bucket, so unless a site is pointed elsewhere the control plane holds its chunks; that storage is the operator's own on a self-hosted control plane and WPMgr's on the hosted service. A customer-owned S3-compatible bucket or a local folder on the WordPress host keeps them on storage the operator controls. Uploads to a managed or S3-compatible bucket go over HTTPS; a local destination writes to disk on the site's own server and does no network transfer. Encryption at rest is whatever the chosen destination provides: a bucket can be configured for it, while a local folder gets only whatever the host's own disk does, which WPMgr does not configure and cannot guarantee. Client-side encryption is the intended model and the age implementation and per-site key management ship with the agent, but the encrypt step is not enabled. The constraint that the control plane must never hold a backup decryption key stands.

Cryptography

Locked algorithms (changes require an ADR): Ed25519 (agent request signing), AES-256-GCM (at-rest secret encryption), BLAKE2b-256 (content addressing / integrity; the code identifier and the wire field name both read blake3), age (backup encryption; implemented, not enabled in shipped builds).

The full threat model lives in docs/security.md.

There aren't any published security advisories