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Security: misabegovic/tended

SECURITY.md

Security

Report vulnerabilities privately via GitHub's private vulnerability reporting (Security tab → "Report a vulnerability" on this repository) — please do not open public issues for security reports. For anything non-sensitive, a regular GitHub issue is fine. You should receive a response within a few days.

Scope notes for reporters:

  • The serving surfaces (BRAIN_SERVING=1: MCP over HTTP, Datasette, static UI) are designed to run read-only behind an identity-aware proxy and carry no auth of their own — reports about missing auth on deliberately-proxied surfaces are working as designed, but bypasses of the read-only guarantees are very much in scope.
  • The app page (rendered knowledge + health strip) executes no shell and carries no websocket; it is structurally excluded from serving deployments (BRAIN_SERVING=1). Since 0.15.0 the kernel ships no PTY bridge and spawns no harness subprocesses.
  • Both local HTTP surfaces (brain.py serve and brain-mcp.py --http) apply the same loopback Host-header allow-list to block DNS-rebinding, and the MCP surface additionally checks Origin. Neither is a substitute for the identity-aware proxy a serving deployment puts in front.
  • The ai-suggestions/ draft shelf is excluded from every read surface in serving mode (BRAIN_SERVING=1) — the MCP tools, the brain.py serve JSON API (/pages/, /pages.json, /views/*), the brain.py search CLI, and a serving-mode static UI build. A draft leaking through any serving surface is in scope.
  • Connector credentials are expected to be read-only-scoped.

There aren't any published security advisories