Add deep analysis of Linux certificate handling with alternate solutions

[Copilot]

Comprehensive technical analysis of the Linux certificate handling implementation identifying security gaps, limitations, and proposing solutions.

Key Findings

• CRL checking disabled on Linux (CrlCheckingFlag = 0) due to unresolved distribution point resolution
• 20+ LINUXTODO items across CryptoUtility.Linux.cpp, SecurityConfig.h, and related files
• Private keys stored as PEM without encryption at rest
• No HSM/PKCS#11 support

Document Structure (docs/Linux_Certificate_Handling_Analysis.md)

• Architecture - Component mapping, storage model (PEM in /var/lib/sfcerts), certificate flow
• Limitations - Cataloged by severity with code references
• Security gaps - Analysis with interim mitigations
• 6 Alternate Solutions:
  1. OCSP support (real-time revocation)
  2. CRL caching with background refresh
  3. System trust store integration
  4. HSM support via PKCS#11
  5. Azure Key Vault integration
  6. Certificate Transparency log checking
• Priority matrix - P1: CRL/OCSP, P2: HSM/trust store, P3: Key Vault/CT

Critical Code Areas Identified

src/prod/src/Common/SecurityConfig.h:291-292       # CRL disabled
src/prod/src/Common/CryptoUtility.Linux.cpp:1184   # Hardcoded hash alg
src/prod/src/Common/CryptoUtility.cpp:3044         # CreateCertFromKey not implemented

Original prompt

Deep analysis of the certificate handling code for Linux and propable alternate solutions

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