Use GitHub's private vulnerability report to report a suspected security issue in MagicDesk. You can also open the repository's Security tab and choose Report a vulnerability.

Do not publish exploit details in public issues, pull requests, Reddit or Telegram. The Telegram support bot is for ordinary troubleshooting, not confidential security reports: its workflow can produce public test patches. When unsure whether a problem is security-sensitive, use the private report.

Include what you have available:

• The exact MagicDesk version or commit and installation source.
• Android version, device and firmware, and the affected feature.
• Reproduction steps or a minimal proof of concept, expected behavior and observed behavior.
• The potential impact and any access or permissions needed to reproduce it.
• Relevant logs or a Diagnostics excerpt with private information removed.

For privilege or automation issues, include the selected startup backend, actual service UID and Limits > Maximum access setting, relevant MCP listener permissions, and whether access is local or over a network. Never include live bearer tokens, passwords, signing keys or unrelated personal files. Test only on devices and accounts you own or have permission to use.

Follow-up discussion should stay in the private report. Please coordinate public disclosure with the maintainer so users can receive a fix or mitigation. Response and fix times depend on maintainer availability and the issue; there is no guaranteed response deadline.

Security fixes target the latest stable release and current development code. Older release lines do not receive separate security backports. Reports about development builds are welcome; include their complete version or commit. An older build should not prevent you from reporting a suspected vulnerability.

MagicDesk can perform privileged operations through Shizuku or optional direct root. The Maximum access ceiling limits the working service; it does not revoke the application's root-manager authorization. Authorized MCP shell and input access deliberately allow broad device control; network MCP requires a trusted network or protected tunnel. These permissions are not a sandbox. See the README security section and privilege boundaries for the intended behavior. Suspected bypasses of authentication, permissions or those boundaries belong in a private security report.

The optional external command API delegates command execution to Android apps granted MagicDesk's RUN_COMMAND permission while the local opt-in is enabled. It is independent of MCP authorization and disabled by default. Grant it only to trusted apps: the chosen executor can have shell or root authority. Launcher exports authorize a retained entry, not arbitrary commands supplied by its caller.

Shroot runs trusted Linux programs with the selected shell/root executor's authority. Its guest users, virtual root, OCI layers and browser-filter support do not make it a container security boundary. A guest program can reach Android resources allowed to that executor. See Shroot boundaries. Only opt trusted programs into the additional MagicDesk command channel.

For ordinary crashes, display compatibility and feature requests, use GitHub issues or community support.