Fix the two pre-existing test failures on develop (stack 6/6)

.claude/hooks/block-dangerous-git.sh

@@ -24,7 +24,17 @@ fi
 # Drop heredoc bodies, so documentation or test data that names a command is
 # not mistaken for an invocation of it. A heredoc body spans lines, so this
 # keeps the line that opens it and discards everything after.
-SCRUBBED=$(printf '%s' "$COMMAND" | awk '/<</ { print; exit } { print }')
+#
+# Exception: if the heredoc feeds an interpreter, the body IS executed, and
+# dropping it would be a bypass (`bash <<EOF` / `git reset --hard` / `EOF`).
+# In that case scan the whole thing.
+HEREDOC_LINE=$(printf '%s' "$COMMAND" | grep -m1 '<<')
+if [ -n "$HEREDOC_LINE" ] && printf '%s' "$HEREDOC_LINE" |
+  grep -qE '(^|[;&|[:space:]])(bash|sh|zsh|dash|ksh|python3?|perl|ruby|eval|xargs|source)([[:space:]]|$)'; then
+  SCRUBBED="$COMMAND"
+else
+  SCRUBBED=$(printf '%s' "$COMMAND" | awk '/<</ { print; exit } { print }')
+fi
 
 # Only inspect commands that actually invoke git.
 printf '%s' "$SCRUBBED" | grep -qE '(^|[;&|[:space:]])git([[:space:]]|$)' || exit 0
@@ -35,7 +45,11 @@ deny() {
 }
 
 # --force rewrites remote history unconditionally; --force-with-lease is guarded.
-if printf '%s' "$SCRUBBED" | grep -qE 'push([[:space:]]|$).*(--force([[:space:]]|$)|[[:space:]]-f([[:space:]]|$))'; then
+# Checked as two independent conditions rather than one ordered regex: the flag
+# may precede or follow the remote, and `push -f` leaves no space for a pattern
+# that expects one before the flag.
+if printf '%s' "$SCRUBBED" | grep -qE '(^|[;&|[:space:]])push([[:space:]]|$)' &&
+  printf '%s' "$SCRUBBED" | grep -qE '(^|[[:space:]])(--force|-f)([[:space:]]|$)'; then
   printf '%s' "$SCRUBBED" | grep -q -- '--force-with-lease' || deny "an unguarded force-push"
 fi
 

src/config/hierarchy.rs

@@ -169,9 +169,11 @@ mod tests {
     use crate::config::repository::{
         RepositoryMetadata, RepositoryType, VersioningConfig, VersioningRules, VersioningStrategy,
     };
+    use serial_test::serial;
     use tempfile::TempDir;
 
     #[test]
+    #[serial]
     fn test_merged_config_without_repository() {
         let temp_dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
         let merged = MergedConfig::load(temp_dir.path()).unwrap();
@@ -181,6 +183,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
+    #[serial]
     fn test_regex_fallback_to_user_config() {
         let temp_dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
         let merged = MergedConfig::load(temp_dir.path()).unwrap();
@@ -192,6 +195,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
+    #[serial]
     fn test_repository_config_overrides_user() {
         let temp_dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
 

tests/guardrail_hook_tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+//! Behaviour matrix for the local agent guardrail.
+//!
+//! `.claude/hooks/block-dangerous-git.sh` is a PreToolUse hook: it reads the
+//! tool input as JSON on stdin and exits 2 to refuse the command. Nothing
+//! executed it before, so its deny rules were unverified — which matters more
+//! than for ordinary code, because a guardrail that silently stops refusing
+//! looks exactly like one that works.
+//!
+//! Exit codes: 0 = allowed, 2 = blocked.
+
+#![cfg(unix)]
+
+use std::io::Write;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
+
+fn hook_path() -> PathBuf {
+    PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join(".claude/hooks/block-dangerous-git.sh")
+}
+
+/// Feed a command to the hook exactly as the harness would, and report whether
+/// it was refused.
+fn is_blocked(command: &str) -> bool {
+    let payload = serde_json::json!({ "tool_input": { "command": command } }).to_string();
+
+    let mut child = Command::new("bash")
+        .arg(hook_path())
+        .stdin(Stdio::piped())
+        .stdout(Stdio::null())
+        .stderr(Stdio::null())
+        .spawn()
+        .expect("failed to run the guardrail hook");
+
+    child
+        .stdin
+        .take()
+        .expect("hook stdin")
+        .write_all(payload.as_bytes())
+        .expect("failed to write hook input");
+
+    let status = child.wait().expect("hook did not exit");
+    match status.code() {
+        Some(0) => false,
+        Some(2) => true,
+        other => panic!("hook returned unexpected exit code {other:?} for: {command}"),
+    }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Deny side — the reason the hook exists
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[test]
+fn refuses_unguarded_force_push() {
+    for command in [
+        "git push --force origin main",
+        "git push -f origin main",
+        "git push origin main --force",
+    ] {
+        assert!(is_blocked(command), "must refuse: {command}");
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn refuses_hard_reset() {
+    assert!(is_blocked("git reset --hard HEAD~1"));
+    assert!(is_blocked("git reset --hard origin/main"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn refuses_forced_clean() {
+    for command in ["git clean -f", "git clean -fd", "git clean -xfd"] {
+        assert!(is_blocked(command), "must refuse: {command}");
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn refuses_forced_branch_delete() {
+    assert!(is_blocked("git branch -D some-branch"));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn refuses_bulk_working_tree_discard() {
+    for command in ["git checkout .", "git restore .", "git checkout -- ."] {
+        assert!(is_blocked(command), "must refuse: {command}");
+    }
+}
+
+/// The old hook matched raw substrings, so these evaded it entirely.
+#[test]
+fn refuses_destructive_commands_that_evaded_substring_matching() {
+    for command in [
+        "git  reset --hard HEAD~1",          // two spaces
+        "env FOO=1 git reset --hard HEAD~1", // leading assignment
+        "git -C . push --force origin main", // -C before the subcommand
+        "cd /tmp && git clean -fd",          // not at the start of the command
+    ] {
+        assert!(is_blocked(command), "must refuse: {command}");
+    }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Allow side — over-blocking is what deadlocked this repo's own workflow
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[test]
+fn allows_ordinary_pushes() {
+    for command in [
+        "git push",
+        "git push -u origin my-branch",
+        "git push origin --delete stale-branch",
+        "git push --force-with-lease origin my-branch",
+    ] {
+        assert!(!is_blocked(command), "must allow: {command}");
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn allows_non_destructive_git() {
+    for command in [
+        "git status --short",
+        "git commit -m 'feat: something'",
+        "git checkout -b new-branch",
+        "git restore --staged src/main.rs",
+        "git branch -d merged-branch",
+        "git reset HEAD~1",
+    ] {
+        assert!(!is_blocked(command), "must allow: {command}");
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn allows_commands_that_are_not_git() {
+    for command in ["ls -la", "cargo test", "rm -rf target"] {
+        assert!(!is_blocked(command), "must allow: {command}");
+    }
+}
+
+/// The failure that motivated the rewrite: the old hook matched the *text* of
+/// a command, so writing documentation that merely named one was refused —
+/// including, circularly, the heredoc that would have replaced the hook.
+#[test]
+fn allows_a_heredoc_that_writes_prose_naming_a_dangerous_command() {
+    let command = "cat > notes.md <<'EOF'\n\
+                   Run git push --force to overwrite.\n\
+                   git reset --hard undoes work.\n\
+                   EOF";
+    assert!(
+        !is_blocked(command),
+        "a heredoc written to a file is data, not an invocation"
+    );
+}
+
+/// A heredoc fed to an interpreter *is* executed, so its body must still be
+/// scanned. Dropping every heredoc body would make this a trivial bypass.
+#[test]
+fn still_refuses_a_destructive_command_inside_an_interpreter_heredoc() {
+    for command in [
+        "bash <<'EOF'\ngit reset --hard HEAD~1\nEOF",
+        "sh <<EOF\ngit clean -fd\nEOF",
+    ] {
+        assert!(
+            is_blocked(command),
+            "a heredoc feeding a shell is executed, not documentation: {command}"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+/// Deliberate over-block, recorded so it is a decision rather than a surprise.
+///
+/// Prose inside a quoted string is still refused. Stripping quoted segments
+/// would fix it, but would also let `bash -c "git reset --hard"` through, and
+/// for a guardrail a false refusal costs far less than a false pass.
+#[test]
+fn still_refuses_quoted_prose_naming_a_dangerous_command() {
+    assert!(
+        is_blocked("echo 'see git clean -fd' > /tmp/note.txt"),
+        "quoted text is not distinguishable from `bash -c \"...\"`, so it stays blocked"
+    );
+}

tests/tag_tests.rs

@@ -266,6 +266,11 @@ fn test_tag_respects_repo_git_overrides_and_cli_can_override_them() {
         dir.path(),
         &[
             "tag.gpgsign=true".to_string(),
+            // Pin the signing format. `gpg.program` is only consulted for
+            // openpgp; a machine with `gpg.format=ssh` in its global config
+            // routes signing to `gpg.ssh.program` instead, the stub below
+            // never runs, and this test silently asserts nothing.
+            "gpg.format=openpgp".to_string(),
             format!("gpg.program={}", failing_gpg.display()),
         ],
     );