security: harden network surface, filesystem, and hub IPC#9
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Network surface reduction (Phase 0): - Bind 127.0.0.1 by default; add HOST env for opt-in network access - Cap request body at 50 MB (CCXRAY_MAX_BODY_MB); return 413 on exceed - Per-IP SSE connection limit (default 8, CCXRAY_SSE_MAX_PER_IP) - HTTP timeouts: headersTimeout=60s, requestTimeout=120s, keepAliveTimeout=5s - Sanitize ANSI/control chars in logged request URLs (log injection) - Extract readBodyCapped() helper for safe body accumulation Filesystem hardening (Phase 1): - Log files 0o600, log directories 0o700; chmod on existing paths - safeJoin() rejects path traversal (../, /, \, null bytes) - Hub lockfile and log written with 0o600 Hub localhost-only + validation (Phase 2): - /_api/hub/* restricted to loopback IPs (127.0.0.1, ::1, ::ffff:127.0.0.1) - /_api/health remains open (pure liveness, no sensitive info) - Register/unregister validate pid (int, 0 < n ≤ 2²²) and cwd (string, ≤ 4096) - Hub body cap 1 KB for control endpoints BREAKING: Server now binds 127.0.0.1 only. Set HOST=0.0.0.0 for LAN access. Closes lis186#7 (partial) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bumps basic-ftp to patched version, resolving HIGH severity CRLF injection in @aws-sdk transitive dependency. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This was referenced Apr 17, 2026
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Summary
Security hardening for network/shared deployment scenarios. Part 1 of 3 PRs from the audit in #7.
Network surface reduction
127.0.0.1by default — previously0.0.0.0, exposing proxy + dashboard to the entire network. AddHOSTenv for opt-in LAN access.CCXRAY_MAX_BODY_MB), returns 413 on exceed. Prevents OOM via large POST.CCXRAY_SSE_MAX_PER_IP). Prevents connection exhaustion.headersTimeout=60s,requestTimeout=120s,keepAliveTimeout=5s. Mitigates slowloris.Filesystem hardening
0o600, directories0o700. Hub lockfile and log also0o600.safeJoin()rejects../,/,\, null bytes; verifies resolved path stays within base dir.Hub IPC isolation
/_api/hub/*restricted to127.0.0.1/::1/::ffff:127.0.0.1. Non-local requests get 403.pidmust be positive int ≤ 2²²,cwdmust be string ≤ 4096 chars, body capped at 1 KB./_api/healthremains open (pure liveness probe, no sensitive info).npm audit
npm audit fix— bumps basic-ftp to resolve HIGH CRLF injection in@aws-sdktransitive dep.Breaking change
Server now binds
127.0.0.1by default. Users accessing ccxray from other machines on the LAN need to setHOST=0.0.0.0.Test plan
storage-path-traversal.test.js(7 cases),fs-mode.test.js(4 cases),hub-loopback.test.js(12 cases)npx ccxray claudestarts and proxies correctlynpm audit --audit-level=high→ 0 vulnerabilitiesRef: #7
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